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This thesis covers the fast-changing political and environmental climate of the Arctic 
region, and how the development has affected the Arctic discourse, created in Finnish 
media and public discussions in the period 2011-2013. The impact of global warming, 
which, thanks to the reseeding sea ice, is opening up the Arctic region at an 
unprecedented rate provide the researchers within the field of Arctic IR and governance a 
continuously changing cocktail of economic interests, natural considerations and nation 
state power-politics.  
 
In the fall 2013 Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new due to a 
combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected 
international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released 
its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and around the same time, in September 2013, 30 
international, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in 
the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. Greenpeace 
crew was imprisonment in Russia for over two months, and the crew included also one 
Finnish activist Sini Saarela, who gave activist fighting against the Arctic oil drilling a 
‘Finnish face’ and brought environmental problems in the Arctic ‘closer’ to the Finnish 
people. Events of the fall 2013 caused a media tornado, which invigorated Arctic interest 
also in the Finnish media. During the 2013, Arctic question were covered by wider range 
of Finnish media outlets than during any previous years since the turn of the millennium, 
which is why the discourse building before those events was chosen to the time frame of 
this master thesis project.   
 
Through an extensive examination of mainstream media, political speeches, interviews 
and academia about the developments in the High North this paper provides an up-to-date 
snapshot of the Arctic political climate in Finland, as well as an process-tracing case 
study of the change in Arctic discourse in Finland.  
 
Based on the theory of critical geopolitics, which – contrary to traditional geopolitics – 
states that discourse matters, and that change in discourse reflect change in politics, this 
thesis concludes that there has been a great increase in interest in the Arctic development 
in the timespan investigated. I have reached this result through the untraditional method 
 iii 
applied in the Finnish IR studies, the process tracing method, which has allowed me to 
incorporate large amounts of data, in order to investigate causal mechanisms behind the 
selected social phenomena. Casual connections have been investigated through selected 
variables (‘environmental changes’, ‘economic prospects’ and ‘international Arctic’), 
which I anticipated to be the most essential factors shaping the change in the Arctic 
discourse.   
 
Furthermore, and more interestingly, though the academic consensus has continued to 
reflect a growing concern about the speed in which the climate change occurs in the 
Arctic the discourse in Finland showed a trend towards more focus on the economic 
opportunities these changes present. This is fascinating, as Finland was among the first to 
actively promote a policy of environmental custodians in the early days of international 
cooperation in the Arctic. However, as with most academic research, my results are 
mixed, as is to be expected when official Finland’s public statements are not squared off. 
As my analysis shows, the different ministries in Finland are pushing for different 
agendas, which muddles the picture. What is a clear fact however, is that the frequency of 
the business- and economic driven argument, favoring Finland’s pursuit of economic 
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“As Finland is one of the world’s northernmost countries with one third of our territory 
above the Arctic Circle, it is natural for us to take our Arctic commitments seriously.” 
(Pertti Torstila 2011, Arctic Frontiers) 
 
A growing significance of the Arctic affairs appeared to the politicians and the public 
audience in Finland in the fall of 2013 (Mikkola 2014), when media intensively followed 
Greenpeace activist Sini Saarela’s story in the Russian Arctic Greenpeace ‘attack’ against 
the Russian oil rig was accused to be thoroughly planned media stunt, where the 
imprisoned activists gave ‘faces’ to the environmental injustices happening in the 
Russian Arctic, but it is easy to argue it worked: Finnish Arctic Center research 
institution reported the amount of ‘hits’ on discussion about the Finland’s position and 
perception the Arctic affairs more than doubled during the 2013 compared to previous 
years1.  
 
Arctic affairs is however not a new area of interest in the Finnish politics. After the 
famous Murmansk speech given by General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Murmansk 
in 1987, Northern nations turned their interest towards the Arctic environment and called 
for international cooperation on this issue. Finland took an active role in international 
Arctic cooperation as of its early days, and Arctic affairs have stayed high on Finland’s 
political agenda ever since. Internationally, the so-called ‘Rovaniemi process’ started a 
unique route to rediscover dialog between East and West in the post-Cold War world. 
Issues of environmental cooperation in the Arctic were perceived as a ‘low-tension’ area 
and as a forum for easier collaboration during antagonistic atmosphere of the time 
(Palosaari 2011, 3). The ‘Rovaniemi process’ resulted in the formulation of the 
                                                
1 Universtity of Lapland’s ArcticFinland- media monitoring site documented 42 articles (including news, articles, 
speeches and blog postings) on Finnish Arctic discussion in 2012; in 2013 same site had 216 hits in the same category 
(ArcticFinland 2014).  ArcticFinland-forum will be used as a primary source for data that I will analyze later in this 
thesis.  
 2 
Environmental Protection Strategy (IASC) for the Arctic region in 1991, and finally, in 
1996, the establishment of the Arctic Council (AC), which was agreed upon in the 
Ottawa Declaration by the world’s eight states with territory north of the Arctic Circle2 
(Palosaari 2011, 3-4). 
 
Since the early days of international Arctic politics, this branch of international affairs 
have had several dimensions, in Finland and globally, and the focus on the Arctic politics 
shifts depending on the perspective the questions are observed from. Security questions, 
local indigenous people’s rights, EU’s Northern Dimension and debate between 
economic benefits environment challenges are often discussed in Arctic policymaking. 
Despite changing attributes, defining the Arctic politics, Finland’s Arctic strategy from 
2013 summarizes how important role the Artic has on the Finnish political agenda:  
 
“Arctic (affairs) are a high priority in Finland’s foreign policy, Finland’s role in 
international affairs and country brand. (Valtionneuvosto 2013)”. 
 
Though focus have shifted in the international Arctic political environment rather 
frequently along the years, current environmental and economic changes in the region 
have significantly pushed the Arctic affairs higher on both the Arctic, and the non-Arctic 
states’ daily agenda. Behind the current, international and national Arctic boost are 
ongoing changes in global climate conditions. That climate change is real, and happening 
right now, and especially real in the complex Arctic environment, has been documented 
numerous times (United Nations Environmental Programme 2013). That being said, the 
focus in this thesis is on the change in Arctic politics, which is triggered by current 
environmental changes in the region today. Warming climate is not just altering the 
existing fragile environment of the Arctic but affecting drastically the economic and 
political landscape of the region.  
 
                                                
2 These states are Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, United States, Russia and Sweden. 
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Scientists from National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), together with the broad 
community of scholars and scientists, agree that the Arctic has warmed more than any 
other region over the past 30 years, and the effects of that warming are becoming more 
and more observable in Arctic ecosystems on the land and in the sea. Environmental 
changes in the polar areas, most concretely warming of the Arctic climate, have resulted 
in the rapid diminishing of the Arctic sea ice cap. In 2012, international community 
became widely aware of Arctic ice melt, and its consequences3, when NSIDC announced 
that the extent of the Arctic ice was the lowest ever to have been recorded in the Arctic 
history. In September 2012 ice fell below 4.00 million square kilometers for the first time 
in the 33-year satellite records. (National Snow and Ice Data Center 2012) 
 
Emerging ‘Arctic treasures’ are still covered with ice but buzz around them is already 
blazing. Predictions of Arctic energy sources are based only on estimates, but a widely 
cited study conducted by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) from 2008 
suggests that the Arctic may contain approximately 13 % of the global mean estimate of 
undiscovered oil and some 30 % of the global undiscovered gas. That oil amount equals 
approximately 618 billion barrels of oil (BBO). (U.S. Geological Survey 2008) The 
undiscovered oil in the Arctic equals approximately 618 billion barrels of oil (BBO) 
(U.S. Geological Survey 2008). Naturally, these figures vary from source to source, but 
scientists generally agree, that current estimates of total amount of hydrocarbon resources 
in the Arctic vary between 3 % and 25 % of the world’s total undiscovered oil and gas 
reserves (Hong 2011). 
 
Finland is one of those states, which have expressed their economic interest towards the 
Arctic. Finland states its detailed visions for the economic development in the Arctic in 
several action points on its Arctic strategy from 2013. According to the strategy, 
Finland’s Arctic profile is based on the following vision: 
 
                                                
3 The Guardian, Feb. 13, 2013 “Arctic needs protection from resource rush as ice melts, says UN” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/feb/18/arctic-protection-resource-rush 
Yle uutiset Sept. 9, 2012 “Arctic Sea ice melts record low (Arktinen merijää sulanut ennätyspieneksi)” 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen_merijaa_sulanut_ennatyspieneksi/6301853. 
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“Finland is an active Arctic actor with the ability to reconcile the limitations imposed by 
the Arctic environment with the related business opportunities. It can do so in a 
sustainable manner, based on international cooperation.” (The Arctic Strategy of 
Finland 2013, 7-8) 
 
In this thesis I focus on the rhetorical side of the environment vs. economy ‘battle’, which 
creates problematic paradigms such as the previous quote about Finland’s visions for the 
Arctic; ”the ability	  to reconcile the limitations imposed by the Arctic environment with 
the related business opportunities” suggest that Finland aims to accommodate the often 
conflicting economic and the environmental interest in its Arctic politics without 
neglecting one or another. With this thesis I aim to show how arguments and reasoning 
behind the potential Arctic business opportunities have change the understanding of the 
environmental challenges emerging at the region due to the warming climate, and how 
those changes have shaped Arctic discourse in Finland. 
 
As laid out in the arguments above, environmental changes and economic prospects are 
key factors in the future of the Arctic. Therefore I have limited the scope of this thesis to 
investigations on how the warming Arctic shapes the Arctic discourse in Finland, and 
especially which factors have affected the discourse the most. In other words, my aim is 
to track changes that happened in the Finnish Arctic discourse between the first and the 
second Arctic strategy, during 2011-2013. I forecast that the changes in the discourse 
mainly emerging from divided understandings of severity of the paradox between melting 
Arctic sea ice and its affects on the prospects for commercial activities, e.g. hydrocarbon 
resources, as well as on new shipping routes. This thesis investigates how the latest, 
accelerating changes in Arctic environment - and consequently in geopolitics of the 
region - have influenced Arctic discourse, and changed the proportions of environmental 






1.1. Research Question and Selected Research Data 
 
I argue that changes in the Arctic environment have effected the (geo)political and 
(geo)economical landscapes of the region faster than anyone has expected, which has 
caused a political, business and media race to the region. The scientific community as 
well as political actors carefully monitor changes in the Arctic, in order to stay informed, 
and on top of potential drastic influences these changes might have in geopolitical status 
of the High North. During these times of transformation in the region, the states 
bordering the Arctic are not necessarily the only actors who fight for power in the Arctic. 
Commercial actors, such as shipping companies, oil and gas extractors as well as 
icebreaker companies are getting increasingly interested about the Arctic’s markets. 
Commercial actors have the necessary know-how and capital to get involved in the Arctic 
economic affairs, which make them attractive partners to the state actors in costly Arctic 
business projects, and give them potential to strong leverage in lobbying Arctic decision 
making processes (Aaltonen&Loescher, 2013).  
 
Though the Cold War, and consequently, the “golden era” of geopolitics in IR is over, 
meaning of geography has not diminished in the studies of international politics. 
However IR studies influenced by postmodernism in social sciences, such as studies of 
critical geopolitics, understand geography as an constantly evolving concept that is 
socially constructed in interactions of various actors (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2) First 
and foremost, the Arctic region is geographical area, but ways of defining its borders or 
its “location”, in the periphery vs. in the center of the global politics, shifts significantly 
depending on the framework the Arctic is discussed in.  
 
It is exactly those multiple dimensions and, sort of a mysterious nature of the Arctic 
geography (and nature) that has always attracted new actors to the region since the early 
polar explores. Today’s academia’s, politicians’ and the corporate world’s fascination 
over the region can be explained by this truly unique location that the Arctic has in the 
world, both geographically and politically. For instance, the Arctic region is the only 
place on the globe that connects the three continents (Europe, Asia and North America), 
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which consequently creates unique potential to develop logistic connections between 
these three major powers of the world economy (Sørensen 2013, 2-3). If the Arctic ice 
keeps diminishing in its current pace, prospects for commercial utilization of new 
shipping routes4 becomes ever more realistic, cutting thousands of kilometers off the 
current route between Asia and Europe (Borgerson 2008, 67-71). Unique location brings 
unique challenges as well as great responsibilities in terms of defining political and 
legislative convention to the region, where the group of involved actors is highly diverse 
(e.g. indigenous peoples vs. private oil companies) and decisions of today can have 
unforeseeable impact to the future of the whole globe.  
 
Based on the arguments above about the current developments in the Arctic, I have 
narrowed my research question to following:  
 
How have recent environmental changes and todays economic prospects shaped the 
Arctic discourse in Finland from 2011 to 2013? Process tracing analysis of the change 
in the Finnish Arctic discourse. 
 
As described earlier the Arctic region is undergoing environmental changes that enables 
new business opportunities to rise at the region, which I argue to change the way of 
framing the Arctic issues, and will affect far-reaching to the practice of Arctic politics. 
Through process tracing I will tract down how Finnish Arctic discourse changed from 
2011 to 2013, and which were the causes that triggered these changes. Media and other 
public discussion around widely covered, current Arctic events, such as Greenpeace’s 
“Save the Arctic”-attack in September, 2013 are analyzed as a part of the process that 
lead to the Arctic discourse as it appears today in Finland.  
 
                                                
4 The two possible Arctic shipping routes, the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage, or Northern Sea Route 
represent a 7000-kilometer shortcut, or as much as a 50 % reduction compared to the current route between Europe and 
Asia (and much more for the cargo ships and oil tankers too large to enter the Panama Canal). From Finland’s 
perspective increasing cargo traffic through Northern Sea Route could open potential to develop infrastructure in the 
Arctic Finland to support logistics to and from a new commercial harbor on the Arctic Sea. (Aaltonen&Loescher 20-21, 
2013) 
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In order to bring international perspective to this topic, I will also conclude, on the basis 
of the selected data, whether it is beneficial to Finland to bandwagon heavier Arctic 
players, such as Norway, and pursue an economically ambitious plan in the Arctic, or if 
an ‘environmental path’ could provide Finland more beneficial ways in a chase of 
national success in the future Arctic?  
 
My hypothesis states that the frequency of economic-driven arguments have increased in 
the Arctic discussion in Finland at the expense of an earlier focus on the environment, 
which reflects the direction where Finnish Arctic politics is heading. Though 
environmental conservation and economic prospects are often seen as conflicting sides of 
the same case, with this thesis I want to investigate if that is the case in Finnish Arctic 
discussion as well, or if Finland is actually looking for possibilities to adjust business-
minded vision in order to respect sustainable environmental development in the region. 
What really triggered my interest was an urge to scrutinize, which reasons or factors 
have caused the shift in Arctic discourse in Finland, while in the global scale, melting of 
the Arctic sea-ice, and consequential “Arctic gold rush” are already often provided as an 
main factors behind the current understanding of the Arctic discourse. However, the 
changes in the Finnish Arctic discourse have not been investigated by any IR scholars, 
which makes it fruitful and rewarding start point to this master thesis project.  
 
In addition to the “political hotness” of this topic, I have thorough personal, academic and 
professional interest towards the Arctic politics, which inspired me to select this topic to 
my thesis. I have being involved, academically and professionally, in the Arctic affairs in 
Finland, Canada and Denmark since 2008, and have learned that the Arctic is a 
geographical space with a wide range political and environmental controversies, as well a 
an extraordinary place for global cooperation, which could set ‘an example model’ for 
international cooperation in other regions in the world as well.  
 
Combination of personal and professional experience from different Arctic countries 
have given me an excellent opportunity to follow daily media and public discussions 
about the Arctic related affair in a North-American context as well as in a broader Nordic 
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context, and a chance to observe the differences, as well as similarities, used in 
argumentation. Although as a native Finn, I was inspired to scrutinize the causalities and 
factors, which shape the Arctic discourse in Finland, because it has not been studied 
thoroughly before and due to Finland’s special geographical position in the Europe.  
Finland’s location in the eastern boarder of the EU and the Nordics, as well as its position 
in the far North of Europe, has always dominated its foreign and domestic politics, as 
well as defined Finnish national identity. Geography’s multiple meanings as a part of 
politics, and policymaking is widely analyses by scholars of critical geopolitics, which is 
why I chose it as theoretical framework of this study. Study of discourses is in the core of 
critical geopolitics (e.g. Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998) and I argue that by analyzing 
discourses we can understand better the changes emerging in geopolitical relations. 
Analysis of the current ‘status’ of the Finnish Arctic discourse provides an excellent case 
to evaluate, firstly how the change in argumentation happened, and secondly to evaluate 
how the changed discourse will affect the geopolitics of the region. 
 
Critical geopolitics suggests that discourses of a region or a political space, such as the 
Arctic, define politics and policymaking on that specific field. According to this theory, 
discourses are socially constructed in every day interactions between various actors such 
as in a relationship between media and audience. (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992) In this 
thesis I approach geography not as a self-evident concept, but instead as a result of  
historical and social knowledge formulation process that is constantly developing. (G. Ó 
Tuathail 1999, 108-109). These theoretical assumptions locate my study to the post-
modern tradition in the international affairs, and therefore, it follows constructivist 
understanding of the academic studies of International Relations. 
1.1.1. Research data 
My study is conducted as a process tracing case in which I analyze a wide array of media 
sources, including every major public speech on the subject, as well as blog posts on 
Finland’s new Arctic strategy. These sources represent my primary data to represent 
public and official understanding of the Arctic in Finland. All the data is collected from 
the ‘ArcticFinland-portal’ (http://www.arcticfinland.fi/en), which is a discussion and 
media-monitoring portal aimed at Finnish political society for providing a basis for 
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discussions on research and economical development in the Arctic. ArcticFinland is 
monitored by the Science Communications Unit of the Arctic Centre at University of 
Lapland (ArcticFinland 2013). ArcticFinland collects and publishes links to Arctic 
related topics Finnish media and speeches given by decision makers in Finnish politics 
and business community (ArcticFinland 2013). My research focuses on articles etc. 
published on the portal between 1.1.2011-31.12.2013. I have chosen to narrow the scope 
of this paper to this particular time frame, because it is the time period between release of 
the first and the second Finnish Arctic strategies and included historical boost in public 
interest towards the Arctic politics in the fall 2013. The media storm that was kicked up 
by the dispute between Russia and Greenpeace (and it spiller over to the diplomatic 
community of every country who had a member of the crew detained in the incident) in 
the wake of their ‘Save the Arctic’-campaign, which created excellent momentum for 
investigations of possible changes in Finnish Arctic politics, at least on discursive level, 
during the last three years. In other words to my aim has been to answer an important 
question of how the change happened in the Arctic discourse in Finland.  
 
I acknowledge that selection of articles and speeches on ArcticFinland-portal is not 
absolutely including all the media notions on the Arctic in Finland, and I accept that some 
arguments on Finnish discussion are left out due to this method of selecting data. 
Nevertheless I am positive that the large quantity and variety of selected media sources 
and speeches/remarks, together with an unprecedented use of process tracing method in 
mapping the arguments presented in the selected data, will provide an ample platform for 
analysis of the development of Arctic discourse in Finland, to be presented in this Master 
thesis research. 
1.2. Process Tracing: Something New? 
 
By combining a research design of process tracing, which is a one type of a case study 
method, to critical geopolitics, my theoretical approach, I will break the conventional 
division between positivist and post-positivist research traditions. The reason for this 
exceptional theory-method -combination is to produce a new perspective on discourse as 
a research object. Process tracing aims to bring theoretical assumptions closer to ‘real 
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action’, closer to what actually happens in political and social interactions instead of 
forcing real events to strict theoretical preconditions. As this study also shows, process 
tracing is based on a collection of huge amount of research data, which constructs the 
process itself, and the researcher’s role is to seek for explanations to the selected social 
phenomena by setting hypotheses and exploring mechanisms about how interactions 
become as they are today (Checkel 2005, 4). 
 
Mechanisms connect things and events, which together construct a process. Tracing a 
process happens in a theoretically informed way, where theoretical assumptions and 
hypotheses are leading the research. Process tracing is strongest on seeking for 
explanations to questions of how something happened and exploring interactions between 
events. (Checkel 2005, 4-5)  
 
In hindsight process tracing method proved to be a highly challenging research method 
due to its requirements for extensive variation of/and abundance in research data. The 
chosen methodology demands thorough investigation of research data thus keeping the 
analysis in the scope of this thesis, I chose to narrowed the period of observation to the 
relatively short time period, years 2011-2013. The years between 2011 and 2013 were 
event-filled in the Finnish Arctic-front, as well as on the global scene. Clear indication of 
Finland’s activation on the Arctic affairs was the Prime Minister of Finland, Jyrki 
Katainen’s announcement to establish  the Arctic Working Group in October 2012. The 
Working Group’s mission was to constitute a new Arctic strategy for Finland. Katainen 
pledged  Arctic affairs to be covered thoroughly in the Government’s new Action plan, 
which also envisioned Arctic region’s  gained importance Finland’s economical and 
political agenda (Prime Minister's Office 2013). 
 
During 2011-2013 attention of the the Finnish media towards the Arctic affairs 
accelerated significantly due to a series of controversal international events in the Arctic, 
in which Finland was also involved. One of them was the start of the cooperation 
between the Finnish icebreaker company Arctia Shipping and international energy-giant 
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Royal Shell in Arctic oil exploration outside of the coast of Alaska in March 20125 
(Arctia Shipping 2011). Another Arctic event, which attracted great deal of media 
attention, was the Greenpeace ‘attack’ against a Russian oilrig in Pechora Sea in the fall 
of 20136. My research data will give a more detailed outlook of the happenings in the 
Arctic region that triggered public interest during the years of 2011-2013. 
 
Increasing interest towards the Arctic issues was also shown in international media, 
which strengthens my argument to limit the timeframe of this study to only these three 
years; changes in the Arctic politics, environment and business happens extremely fast at 
the moment, and only a limited timeframe enabled me to conduct a coherent analysis of 
the changes in the discourse. International media followed also closely Arctic affairs 
during last three years. Among the other topics, the proceedings of Canada’s claims on 
Arctic resources, the Chinese involvement in the mining business in Greenland, and EU’s 
awakening in Arctic affairs were covered rather actively by international media7 . 
Although Arctic agendas of different countries might first appear to been quite 
fragmented during the last few years, I argue that a change has happened in the 
argumentation related to environmental threats versus economic benefits as a 
consequence of melting Arctic sea ice. Arguments and reasoning for economic prospects 
of the Arctic activities was coming up more frequently, and I wanted to investigate if that 
change of a discourse were also unfolding in Finland. 
 
Despite the methodological challenges that emerged along the research process, my 
personal and academic enthusiasm towards Arctic politics drove me through the process 
                                                
5 Arctia Shipping’s ice breakers’ participation stirred up active discussion in Greenpeace Finland about the projects’ 
environmental consequences: Greenpeace Finland, March 2012: “Letter to Minister Heidi Hautala: What is responsible 
business in the Arctic?” and February 2013 “Shell’s first right decision in the Arctic – What about Finland” 
(Greenpeace Suomi 2012/2013) 
6 See  in this thesis: “9. Research Data” article 47 and 50.  
7 Danish journalist and author Martin Breum administrates a media monitoring portal on Danish and global Arctic 
affairs, where he collects articles and news from world of the Arctic: 
http://www.martinbreum.dk/index.asp?ID=59&TopID=1 
For example the following articles about the current topics in international Arctic affairs are found on the portal: 
“China’s Arctic Strategy” (The Diplomat June  20, 2013), “Den store kineser i Grønland” (Information April 22, 2013), 
“Rush for Arctic's resources provokes  territorial tussles” (The Guardian July 6, 2011), “Canada, Russia will share 
Arctic riches, scientist predicts” (Postmedia News October 8, 2012) 
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simultaneously strengthening my assumption that this kind of study was needed in the 
field of Arctic IR. Working with this topic for the past several years, academically and 
professionally, made me to realize that a thorough examination and review of Finnish 
Arctic discourse was lacking in order to back up the ongoing discussion. Though 
domestic and international Arctic affairs have been actively studied by Finnish academia, 
e.g. studies as the comparative study of the all the existing Arctic strategies by Lassi 
Heininen (2012), there was no up-to-date review of the Finnish Arctic discourse after the 
turbulent (as well as eventful) years in the Arctic IR after 2010.  
 
The heating up of rhetoric (environment vs. economy) makes me argue that such an 
analysis as you have in your hands serves to strengthen the argument found in my 
hypotheses, and inspire to further studies on Arctic discourse in Finland. As I see it today, 
discussions around environmental and economic perspectives will accelerate in upcoming 
years and well-founded research needs to be conducted in questions arising.     
 
Finally, I have deliberately decided to conduct my research in English because of lack of 
academic studies about Finnish Arctic politics in any other language than Finnish and 
unfortunately the studies conducted in Finnish will remain non accessible for non-Finnish 
audience. In addition, findings from my research data show that Finnish politicians, as 
well as private businesses, are increasingly reaching out towards Nordic, and global, 
Arctic cooperation, which I argue, requires academically evaluated analyses on Finnish 
Arctic rhetoric. My contribution in this regard has been to investigate and open up the 
discussion that reflect changes in Finnish Arctic discourse from environmental and 
economic perspectives to the international community. I argue that discussion, and 
policymaking, in the frame of environmental vs. economic future of the Arctic will raise 
the most vigorous debates in Finland as well as globally in upcoming years.   
2. Background: Defining the Arctic  
 
As mentioned above even the geographical boundaries of the circumpolar world are still 
a highly debated subject. Considering the complexity of the geography, boundaries and 
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the people living in the area, it is obfuscating the matter to the point that no universally 
accepted definition of the Arctic, as a geographical region, exists. Contrary to Antarctica, 
which is a continent surrounded by an ocean, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by five 
different sovereign states (so-called littoral Arctic states). However, as mentioned earlier, 
eight different states have territory above the Arctic Circle8. Some argue that the most 
accurate definition to the Arctic is the territory north of the Arctic Circle, which lies at 66 
degrees, 30 minutes North Latitude. However this definition omits vast areas in North 
America, which lie below the Arctic Circle but resemble the treeless tundra associated 
with the Arctic. In Asia and Europe one can find forests and climate north of the Arctic 
Circle, which is much warmer than what would normally be associated with the Arctic 
(Grant 2010, 6). 
 
As well as definitions based on the latitudes, the others point to the fact that the Arctic 
cannot just be defined by an imaginary line but a definition must take into account the 
flora and fauna, e.g. the presence of permafrost9 or tundra vegetation as well as the 
culture of the people living there, the southern limit of the ice cap during winter months 
or definitions by the temperature. In fact the Arctic could even be described as a cold and 
dry desert (Arctic Studies Center 2004). 
2.1. Few Facts and Several Discourses of the Arctic region 
 
There are however a few undisputable facts about the region: the Arctic is roughly 14.5 
million square km and covers both the Arctic Ocean – which might be the smallest of our 
oceans but also the least explored – and the surrounding land, including Spitsbergen, all 
of Greenland (Denmark) as well as the most northern parts of Alaska (US), Canada 
(Nunavut, Northwest Territories and Yukon), Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and 
Russia.. The area covers roughly 8 % of the Earth’s total surface and includes land and 
sea territory that lies with the sovereign jurisdiction of eight countries (Suter 2010, 187). 
                                                
8 The Arctic Circle is an imaginary line which marks the line above which the sun does not set for at least one day 
during the summer and does not rise for at least one day during winter.  
9 Natural Resources Canada defines ’permafrost’ ”on the basis of temperature, as soil or rock that remains below 0°C 
throughout the year, and forms when the ground cools sufficiently in winter to produce a frozen layer that persists 
throughout the following summer” (Natural Resources Canada, 2007). 
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In this thesis I refer to these previous geographical facts, when I refer to the Arctic region 
and/or to the High North. 
 
Though some scientific and geographical definitions of the Arctic can be agreed upon, 
some Arctic scholars, such as Carina Keskitalo argue that the Arctic as a region is 
constructed by several discourse10, which makes the study of discourses in the Arctic 
context meaningful (Keskitalo 2007, 187). Relying heavily on constructivist theory, this 
means that our view and understanding of what is ‘the Arctic’ is affected by how it is 
being discussed by, for e.g., politicians or the media. Keskitalo argues that regions are 
first created through language, i.e. discourse (Keskitalo 2007, 188). Theoretical 
framework of this thesis, critical geopolitics, aims to reveal discursive structures behind 
the geopolitics, and investigate how those determine frames, e.g. to foreign policy 
making. As I will demonstrate in this paper, the discussion on Arctic-related issues, not 
only within the eight Arctic states, but also by private sector, NGOs and the media, can 
have a great impact in the future’s geopolitics, and policy-making, in the Northern 
hemisphere. 
 
As mentioned earlier, I approach Arctic discourse as a product of discussion and 
arguments presented in Finnish media, in academic debates as well as in official 
statements (e.g. speeches) given by Finnish political decision makers.  I accept, that due 
to vast amount of data available about the chosen topic, I can provide an adequate 
analysis in the limited scope of this thesis, only by selecting carefully the perspective, 
from which I am evaluating the Arctic discourse. I chose to focus only on arguments 
related to environmental and economic developments in the Arctic, because I found these 
two perspectives the most opposite from each other’s, as well as conflicting sides of 
many debates in current Arctic affairs. I acknowledge that the discourse observed in this 
study, is not the only Arctic discourse produced in Finland but I find the chosen 
perspective the most current, and ‘the hottest’, approach to the Arctic discussion at the 
                                                
10 By ‘discourse’ I mean the way in which speaking about certain thing, e.g. the Arctic as a region of great importance, 
as well as the selection of things that is spoken about, is a way of highlighting certain subjects while obscuring others 
(see e.g. Foucault, 1974). 
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moment due to rapidly changing environmental and economic landscapes in the Arctic 
region. I argue that changes in environmental/economic argumentations are politically 
consequential in the future Arctic politics. 
2.2. Defining Arctic Paradox 
 
The diminishing of the Arctic sea ice has resulted in an increase in questions related to 
environmental conservation and emerging new natural resources, which international 
community has not faced in the Arctic before. Prospects of oil and gas drilling in the 
Arctic force the international community to face the so-called Arctic paradox. Moral 
issues, from an environmental perspective, about the utilization of these new Arctic 
resources, and the potential implications for the region, clash with the potential economic 
possibilities, which undiscovered natural resources could create in the region. (Palosaari 
2011, 7) However due to our dependency on fossil fuels, the world’s demand for energy 
is rapidly increasing which makes supplying, dealing and trading energy an extremely 
important element in current international relations. Locating the last untapped energy 
reserves in the world can have can have an everlasting effect impact on the geopolitical 
balance in international community. Taking into consideration the serious impacts of the 
still ongoing financial crisis in Western economies, looming Arctic business 
opportunities appear very attractive for any actor with economic responsibilities 
(Aaltonen and Loescher 2013, 3-5). 
 
Increased attention towards the natural resources in the Arctic, has, naturally, also raised 
awareness of the high risks posed by drilling in the Arctic waters, and the possibly 
catastrophic consequences on the Arctic region’s fragile ecosystem in the case of a major 
oil leak. Environmental NGO’s - Greenpeace being the most vocal of them - have 
increased their involvement in the region significantly during the last years. One of 
Greenpeace’s most popular campaigns ever is named ‘Save the Arctic’ and has been 
active since 2009. It is based on a demand for an immediate moratorium on all oil and gas 
exploration and extraction in the Arctic (Greenpeace, 2013). The World Wide Fund for 
nature (WWF) and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) have both 
articulated a related message, though often more diplomatically than Greenpeace, by 
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calling for increased research into the environmental impacts of Artic oil exploration and 
exploitation (e.g. WWF.fi; UNEP.org). Both UNEP and WWF were granted the status of 
observers to the Arctic Council at the ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, 
while Greenpeace’s request was turned down at the very same meeting (Pelaudeix 2013).  
 
The ‘Save the Arctic’-campaign gained significant global media attention when a group 
of 30 Greenpeace activists, including a Finnish activist named Sini Saarela, got caught in 
their attempt to board a Russian oil-drilling platform in the Pechora Sea, Russia in 
September of 2013. Greenpeace’s mission was to protest against oil exploration and 
future oil drilling activities in the Arctic by Russian energy company Gazprom. All 30 
Greenpeace activists participating the operation were detained by the Russian Coast 
Guard and kept in prison for over two months in Russia. Finnish, as well as global media, 
followed closely the events surrounding the imprisoned Greenpeace activists in 
Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of the two activists who managed to board the Russian 
vessel before they were detained. Saarinen was held in custody for over two months 
while Russian authorities pursued an investigation on piracy charges against the activist, 
however the charges changed from piracy to hooliganism during November 2013, and 
finally in December Russia dropped all charges against the activists (Greenpeace 
International) 
 
As I will show in this paper, the ‘Arctic media storm’ in the fall of 2013 had a significant 
impact on Arctic discourse in Finland, and even further; I argue that it had a long-
reaching impacts on the Finnish Arctic policymaking, which can only first be measured 
after policymaking in Arctic affairs goes forward in Finland. However, in order to 
understand the current changes in the Arctic discourse, it is important to study earlier 
academic discussions in international and Finnish Arctic politics, which I have 
summarized to next chapter.  
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3. Looking Back: Previous Studies of the Arctic IR  
 
As presented earlier, the thesis focuses on Arctic as geopolitical space, and how it is 
(re)constructed in Finnish Arctic discourses. My research is based on thorough mapping 
of existing data from ArcticFinland, thus analysis will give a snapshot view how Finnish 
Arctic discourse have development during past three years, and reach also forward to 
forecast what the changes possible tell us from the future Arctic politics in Finland. Used 
method is called process-tracing (case study) that serves particularly well studies of 
complex series of events, which have resulted a certain outcome (Bennett 2002, 26-28). 
Process-tracing bases on carefully mapping of research data, i.e. documentation of the 
process that lead to X outcome, theoretically guided typologies as a tool to structure the 
analysis (ibid, p. 28-29), and in my view also a brief look to time before the chosen chain 
of events happened, is crucial part of a case study.  In the following chapter I summarize 
previous studies in Arctic IR, anchoring Finnish Arctic discussions to wider international 
debate in Arctic politics, which will help to understand why new study perspective for the 
topic was also needed. During my thorough research within previous Arctic studies, I did 
not encounter any researchers to approach Arctic politics, nor discourses on the Arctic, 
with process tracing methodology.  
3.1. Academic ‘Arctic Storm’ 
 
Early years of 21st century started still ongoing surge of popular interest in the Arctic. A 
great deal of IR studies between 2000-2012 focused on “the scramble of the Arctic” (Sale 
og Potapov 2010) following the lines of classic division between realistic-liberal 
discourses11 in Arctic affairs; division between speculations over natural resource or 
military conflicts and development of international regime and institutes to govern Arctic 
cooperation within regional and international players in the area. Clearly this was too 
simply categorization of the complex circumpolar affairs (Sørensen 2013), which has 
                                                
11 See more e.g. G., Borgeson. Scott, 2007 "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global 
Warming."; Huber, Robert, 2009 "Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and 
Conflict.” ; Young, Oran 2011 "The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace? ." in order to mentioned 
few most cited studies contributing to tradional realisim-liberalism debate in Arctic IR. 
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lead us to today’s diverse mix of studies in Arctic politics ranging from sovereignty-
focused, heavily security oriented argumentation to analysis driven by concepts of 
region-building and strong intern-governmental cooperation all the way to evaluations on 
(geo-economics) impacts of Arctic resource exploitation to the global economy or the 
global climate12.  
 
I argue that Arctic politics are still on the road that paves the way to the future of region, 
but based on empirical evidence and several academic studies, we finally can move on 
from alarmists’ rhetoric of looming conflict and anarchy. Conflict/cooperation debate has 
become outdated proven by empirical evidence on Arctic nations’ recent endeavors 
firstly to strengthen governing structures of the Arctic Council, and secondly to promote 
political consensus in their interstate relations. In contrary debates over the global 
environmental impact of glaciers melting vs. the utilization of the new Arctic oil and gas 
resources are heating inside the Arctic nations and also globally (Palosaari 2011, 2), 
which demands academic analysis and evaluations on impacts of these changes in 
Arctic’s future.  
 
However study of Arctic discourse in theoretical framework provided by critical 
geopolitics can easily fall into to repetition of arguments on security and sovereignty in 
Arctic interstate relations, yet this is valid discussion, but also widely covered by several 
Arctic students and scholars13. In this thesis my aim has been to seek for an explanation 
to how Arctic discourse has developed to today’s form by evaluating the changes in 
rhetoric of Arctic politics in Finland. Consequently stepping forward from the realist-
liberalist discourses to more explanatory outcomes of the future Arctic prospects still 
basis on the previous academic argumentation and studies conducted in Arctic IR, which 
this following outlook will summarize. 
                                                
12 Diversity of studies in Artic IR and Political Science is vast, see more e.g.: A. Smith, Heather, 2010 “Choosing not to 
see: Canada, climate change, and the Arctic.”; Schram Stokke, Olav, 2013 “Political Stability and Multi-level 
Governance in the Arctic”; Byers, Michael, 2010 “Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the 
North.” 
13 Recently IR graduate Marc Jacobsen covered in his extensive MA Dissertation (in September 2013) development of 
the Arctic security discourse analyzing political events from the Cold War years to Post-Illullisat era, from 1949-2013, 
in the Arctic international relations (Jacobsen 2013). 
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3.1.1. Arctic paradigm of the decade: Cooperation vs. Conflict  
Since the turn of the millennium, the focus of Arctic researchers and observers has been 
the question of whether cooperation or conflict would dominate the future of the 
Arctic14. However, political change in the region is happening just as fast as the climate 
change, and the recent intensifications of governance structures in the Arctic Council and 
resource explorations e.g. at the Russian Arctic demonstrate a trend which has incited 
observers to step forward from Cold War paradigms15. These changes have forced 
scholars to start to evaluate the shifts in Arctic politics we are witnessing today (Young 
2009, 73).  
 
As one of the most prominent neorealist Arctic writers Scott Borgerson, International 
Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander 
in the U.S. Coast Guard, declared already in 2009: “The next few years will be critical in 
determining whether the region’s long-term future will be one of international harmony 
and the rule of law, or a Hobbesian free-for-all” (Borgerson 2009).  
 
Until the late 2000s, (Huebert, Canada & the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security & 
Stewardship 2011) analysis on the Arctic international relations mainly followed the 
classic lines of scientific discourse based on realist and liberal tradition in IR (Heininen 
2011). Analyses based on realist tradition presume that dominant attributes for political 
behavior in the Arctic are national interest and power, which are often related to territory 
and sovereignty (Huebert, Canada & the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security & 
Stewardship 2011). Studies following realist tradition defined Arctic region as 
“expansion field for national sovereignty” (Claes, Østerud & Harsem 2010) and a 
playfield of a “future resource race” (Borgerson 2008). 
 
Despite the rhetoric of the Arctic as ‘a wild-wild west’ of the Northern hemisphere, are 
                                                
14 See e.g. Sven Holtsmark, Towards cooperation or conflict? Security in the High north, NATO Defense College, No. 
45, 2009; Oran Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north, Polar Record, Vol. 45, 
2009 or Ian Brosnan et al., Cooperation or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?, Ocean Development and International Law, 
Vol 42, 2011. 
15 The first major change was the thawing of international relations across the Arctic region following the end of the 
Cold War.   
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the Arctic waters and the seabed firmly covered by international agreements; the legal 
source for governing the maritime sovereignty issues in the Arctic, as well as in the rest 
of the world, is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)16, 
and in addition to UNCLOS, the Arctic seabed is governed the International Seabed 
Authority and the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) deals with 
the costal states’ claims to extend their territory past the EEZ (Koivurova 2008, 15). 
Nevertheless many of the arguments for increased conflict were examples of an 
oversimplification of ‘complex multidimensional issues’ or based on individual events 
taken out of context, this rhetoric of conflict has non-the less been dominating the debate 
in the Arctic IR, but which do not seem to have taken into account the recent years’ 
developments in the region (Brosnan, Leschine og Miles 2011; Palosaari 2011, 1). The 
Russian flag-planting episode in 2007 was a widely covered example of individual, over-
exaggerated political event that nourished conflict discourses in the Arctic discussions17. 
 
3.2. Does Economic Opportunities Create a Risk to ‘Pax Arctica’? 
 
Among the (neo)realist scholars, new economic opportunities have raised deep concerns 
about sustaining peace and consensus in the Arctic. Scott Borgerson published Arctic 
neorealist scholars’ landmark article in Foreign Affairs titled ‘Arctic Meltdown’ in 2008, 
where he argues, that “the combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in 
possible oil and gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for 
a toxic brew” (Borgerson 2008, 71). This trend continues in Canadian scholar Rob 
Huebert’s writings, e.g. in his article from the 2009, ‘Welcome to a New Era of Arctic 
Security (Huebert 2010). 
 
The neorealist discourse of increasing conflict reached mainstream media in 2007, when 
                                                
16 See the convention in full here: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm 
(accessed October 14, 2011).  
17 In the summer of 2007 Russian scientist Artur Chilingarov descended to the seabed directly below the North Pole to 
plant a Russian flag in a media stunt to remind the world of Russia’s Arctic aspirations and capabilities in the Arctic 
(Ingimundarson, 2010, 18). 
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record-low levels of sea ice were recorded, and the news coincided with the before-
mentioned Russian flag planting. Same year Time Magazine ran a cover story titled ‘Who 
Owns the Arctic’ in where the interest in the Arctic is described as “a perfect storm 
seeded with political opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, high energy 
prices and the arcane exigencies of international law” (Graff 2007). The article 
showcases the trend of ignoring the growing political importance of institutions, 
especially the AC, by focusing on a number of potential conflicts and the lack of an 
overarching international legal regime (ibid.). The scientific journal ‘Nature’ published in 
January 2008 an article called ‘The next land rush’ where Cressey explains how the  
“nationalistic debate about who has rights to what in the Arctic“ has been reignited since 
the turn of the millennium (Cressey, 2008).  
 
Political developments in the Arctic move forward rapidly, and over the last five six 
years Arctic states have taken even further steps to strengthen consensus in Arctic affairs. 
Among the others, Arctic scholars Lassi Heininen and Anne Toft Sørensen, argue that 
especially following interstate cooperation initiatives highlight the cooperative curse, 
where Arctic international relations are heading (Sørensen 2013, 4-5): 
1. llullisat Declaration formulated by the Arctic littoral states18 in 2008 and 
2. Barents Sea Treaty agreed between Norway and Russia completing 40-year-long 
negotiation process in 2010. (Sørensen 2013) 
3.3. Illullisat, Nuuk and Kiruna 
 
The latest environmental and political developments were first time illustrated by official 
agreement in Ilullisat conference in 2008, when the Arctic rhetoric got new tones in the 
global agenda. Naturally coastal states around the Arctic Ocean still emphasize(d) their 
national interests within the Eternal Economic Zone (EEZ)19  towards the region’s 
                                                
18 Arctic coastal states, United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, are often referred as ‘the Arctic 5’.  
19 Today the littoral states follow the rules laid out in UNCLOS’ Article 76 when trying to establish the ownership of 
the seabed that is beyond the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In practice, it is the (CLCS) which deals 
with the submissions once the five costal states all have handed in their claims. Costal states can summit a claim to 
CLCS to extend its EEZ if it can prove that the seabed under the Arctic Ocean is a geological extension of the country’s 
 22 
potential natural resources, but at the same time they have recognized cooperation and 
diplomatic interactions as the most beneficial means in Arctic affairs. Deepening 
cooperation between ‘the Arctic Five’ was manifested in Illulisat declaration in 2008, 
where littoral states agreed to “ (…) take steps in accordance with international law both 
nationally and in cooperation among the five states and other interested parties” (Illullisat 
2008, 2).   By signing the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, the members of ‘the Arctic 5’ 
agreed to resolve all current and future disputes in the Arctic region on the basis of the 
UNCLOS (Ilulissat Declaration 2008).  
 
IR scholar interpreted outcomes of Illulisat as steps towards Arctic stability, peace and 
good governance (Rosamond 2009, 49), though not unconditionally. Critical voices did 
not see it purely as a positive development to the cooperation. Counter-arguments for 
harmony and cooperation in the High North stated that Illulisat reflects deepening 
cooperation only among the economically legitimate Arctic partners, which could mean 
weakening of Arctic Council and consequently leaving Iceland, Sweden and Finland out 
of the important decision making in Arctic affairs (Heininen 2011, 42).   
 
As a response, and alternative, to the realists’ studies, neo-liberal interpretation of the 
Arctic relations rose in North American and European studies of IR. The analyses 
focused on institutionalized cooperation across the circumpolar region seeing the degree 
of cooperation as the key common variable (Nilsson, Hoogensen og Nicol 2010; Young 
2010). Scholars flagging for the Arctic cooperation, such as Oran Young, approached 
Arctic relations through theoretical assumption on increasing benefits for all the actors 
when mutual interest were recognized (Oye 1985, 19). Such as mutual interest can e.g. be 
a peaceful Arctic region, which ensures equal opportunities for all the littoral states to 
explore economic possibilities in the region. As for a strong Arctic Council, as a core 
governing body in the region’s politics, ensures equal decision making as well as 
legislative rights to all the Arctic states in the questions related to the Arctic. 
Consequently AC’s members boosted the governing structures of the region in the 
                                                                                                                                            
own continental shelf. At the time of writing Canada, United States and Danmark are still in the process of collecting 
geological data in order to establish their claims before presenting them to the CLCS. 
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Ministerial meeting in Nuuk (Greenland) in 2011, by agreeing to establish the Council’s 
permanent secretariat to Tromsø in Norway (Nuuk Declaration 2011). 
 
The establisment of the permanent secretariat finally suppressed the critisism towards  the 
AC in terms of lacking instutional structure and constantly rotating personel and shifting 
priorities on its agenda. Some scholars also accused the AC to be ”decision-shaper rather 
than decision-maker” (Ingimundarson 2010, 18, Koivurova 2008, 14) In addition Nuuk 
Declaration finalized negotiations on the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement), which represents the first 
legally-binding instrument crafted under the auspices of the soft-law body Arctic Council 
(Nuuk Declaration 2011, 2) 
 
In the spring of 2013 the AC’s Kiruna meeting reflected and amplified the fast pace of 
challenges that Arctic is facing today. Meeting emphasized the growing importance of 
the Arctic in world politics, which requires Arctic states’ and whole international 
community’s preparedness to be able to manage these changes (Pelaudeix 2013). Kiruna 
Declaration set out the Arctic Council priorities for improving economic and social 
conditions, acting on climate change, protecting the Arctic environment and 
strengthening the Arctic Council (Kiruna Declarion 2013). 
 
But the AC has not been all consensuses minded in terms of streamlining Arctic states 
political road maps for next decades. For instance, Canada has not been in favor of so-
called internationalization of the Arctic that Sweden and Finland, instead, have strongly 
supported.20 Subsequently the EU’s membership application for permanent seat at the 
Arctic Council was denied in Kiruna meeting. Nevertheless, the members of the AC 
signed their second legally binding agreement regarding shared governance of the Arctic 
region:  the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic. The Agreement followed diplomatic negotiation process that 
                                                




resulted the AC to sign on the SAR agreement in Nuuk in 2011 (Kiruna Declarion 2013). 
 
However cooperation and the governing structures of the AC have strengthened during 
the last decade, arguments on sovereignty and national interest have not been entirely 
abandoned from the today’s Arctic discussions. In spite of that, several studies and the 
current empirical data show, that cooperation has become more dominant paradigm in the 
Arctic IR in last three years.21 Emergent financial crisis in the Western world and 
struggles of the Arctic economies have also argued to be behind the ‘consensus boost’ in 
the Arctic relations.  Global financial crisis and impacts of the climate change are both 
causing uncertainties that the humanity has not faced before (Tienhaara 2010) and 
media’s, businesses’ and politicians’ perception on the Arctic as ‘new Eldorado’22 of the 
global economy is encouraging Arctic nations to ensure peaceful cooperation to continue 
at the region.    
 
However coherent, and yet valid, explanations, realist and liberal approaches provided to 
the Arctic affairs, are they too narrow in order to explain the current environmental, 
economic and geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic. On the basis of my data analysis, I 
argue that the developments in the Finnish Arctic discourse reflect similar changes that 
the international Arctic affairs is undergoing , as well as a shift in the paradigm of the 
Arctic IR (from conflict vs. cooperation to environment vs. economy -debate). 
3.4. Finland in Arctic IR  
Finland’s position outside the littoral states’, as well as a lack of an up-to-date academic 
analysis on the Finland’s current, and future position in the international Arctic affairs, 
                                                
21 Sovereignty rhetoric is still part of current discussion on the Arctic affairs in Canada but clearly fading from the 
Nordic and European academic studies. Lassi Heininen’s extensive study on all existing Arctic policies showed which 
arguments were dominant in different Arctic states and in Canada’s Northern Strategy “Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future” national identity and sovereignty were named to define Canadian Arctic politics (Heininen 2012, 17).  In 
addition Canadian media is often eager to frame Arctic region as an national territory of Canada and to lift sovereignty 
issues to the headlines i.e. CBC 12.9.2012 “Sovereignty issues loom as Arctic sea ice shrinks”. Most recently, in 
December 2013, Canada announced their plan to submit a claim on North Pole as part of their extended continental 
shelf in the Arctic i.e. CBC 9.12.2013 “Canada's claim to Arctic riches includes the North Pole.” 
22 Finnish newspaper Kaleva described in December 2013 the Arctic as “new Eldorado just around the corner of 
Finland”. I will discussed these definitions more in the analysis chapter. 
http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/kolumnit/eldorado-ihan-naapurissa/651948/ 
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has been the key inspirations to this thesis. Finland’s position in international Arctic 
politics is certainly not unproblematic; Finland’s position outside the littoral coastal states 
requires it to seek alternative avenues for diplomatic influence as well as for economic 
participation in Arctic economic affairs now and in the future. 
 
Finland’s geographical location is in many sense ‘secluded’ in the EU and the Europe, 
even in the Nordics, but in the Arctic affairs it is aiming to be in the core of the ‘actions’; 
Of all the people living north of the Arctic Circle, nearly one third are Finns (Arctic 
Strategy 2013) In the Arctic affairs Finland’s foreign policy guidelines are very tangled 
to its Nordic neighbors, as well as to the European Union. Finland has for instance, been 
an active participant in EU’s Northern Dimension, which is an political instrument of 
cooperation between geographical partners; the European Union, Russia, Norway and 
Iceland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2014). 
 
Finland’s geographical position as the “Western gateway” to the East, and, especially to 
Russia, has traditionally defined its foreign policy identity. Consequently, Finland lobbies 
vigorously for a stronger role for Arctic Council e.g. in questions regarding Arctic natural 
resource management in order to ensure its voice to be heard at high level meetings 
(Heininen and Numminen 2011, 141). Finnish politicians and civil servants supported 
eagerly the EU’s bid to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council (i.e. Under-
Secretary of the State Laajava in his speech 201123), which was illustrated in the Finnish 
media several times in 2011-2012. I will present more elaborate data on the Finnish 
discussion about the EU’s bid in the analysis chapter later in this thesis.  
 
Since Finland is not part of Arctic littoral states, traditional security questions have never 
been on a high priority on its Arctic agenda, but preservation of the environmental 
security, i.e. conservation of fragile Arctic nature has being on the Finnish Arctic agenda 
since 1990. In the matter of fact, environmental security was the initial reason behind 
Finland’s interest to promote international cooperation between the region’s countries 
                                                
23 Data list article number 6. 
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(Heininen 2011, 24; 81).  
 
However, the political importance, Arctic affairs are relatively undervalued realm of 
research within the Finnish political scientists and the IR scholars, and studies have 
mainly followed the same mainstream paradigms than international studies conducted in 
the Arctic affairs. The flagship institution for the Finnish Arctic research, is the Arctic 
Center, an international research hub that operates in conjunction with the University of 
Lapland in Rovaniemi. Through the research, the Arctic Centre promotes increased 
knowledge, awareness and understanding of the Arctic both within and outside the region 
(Arctic Centre, University of Lapland 2013) In addition The Finnish Institute Of 
International Affairs (the FIIA) produces occasionally reports on the latest developments 
in the Arctic international relations (2014). More recently, in August 2013, FIIA 
published a study on the growing interests in the Arctic region of Russia, China, the 
United States and the European Union. Study focuses on Arctic re-emerging as a 
geopolitically important region in world politics (Käpylä and Mikkola 2013).  
 
On a more general, and global level of Arctic politics, FIIA’s researches, Juha Käpylä 
and Harri Mikkola, published a report in 2013 on the conflict potential in today’s Arctic 
affairs. They summarize that Arctic resource exploration still including so many 
unknown variables that well-functioning regional and international governance is a pre-
request for the Arctic region to progress into an attractive economic investment for actors 
interested in Arctic resources. The harsh Arctic climate makes resource exploration 
extremely expensive and a high-risk investment, which should not be underestimate when 
economic benefits of the Arctic are discussed. A risk of major inter-state conflict remains 
low if governance mechanism in the Arctic cooperation will remain strong and 
legitimate. Käpylä and Mikkola state that “incentives for stability in combination with 
relatively well-functioning Arctic governance, the potential for a major inter-state Arctic 
conflict due to endogenous sources is quite low and there is little reason to presume that 
this will change any time soon” (Käpylä and Mikkola 2013). 
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At the time of writing this thesis, Teemu Palosaari’s and Lassi Heininen’s study “Jäitä 
Poltellassa. Suomi ja arktisen alueen tulevaisuus” (2011) is the most thorough, academic 
overview on the contemporary issues in the Finnish Arctic politics and policymaking 
published in the 00’s. It provides a fruitful outlook of academic articles on the 
contemporary Arctic issues from the Arctic IR perspective, and the articles address Arctic 
issues from various different frameworks, such as from the perspective of the 
international law and the Arctic indigenous people.  Though, the publications is a few 
years old by now, it still provides several up-to-date views on  the Finnish Arctic politics, 
which I use as a background, and comparison material in this study. Placing the current 
case to its historical background is a crucial phase in order to conduct a successful 
process tracing study (Bennett and George 2005). “Jäitä Poltellassa. Suomi ja arktisen 
alueen tulevaisuus” also provides a solid ground for methodological comparison because 
the articles approach Arctic affairs from a different perspective than my study on causal 
mechanism in the change of Finnish Arctic discourse.  
 
Lassi Heininen’s comparative research on all Arctic eight nations’, as well as the EU’s, 
Arctic strategies, or state policies, provided an unique overview of similarities and 
conflicting agendas in international Arctic politics as of 2011. Heininen’s study covered 
Finland’s objectives for the Arctic from its first Arctic strategy. Heininen concluded all 
the strategies reflecting that the Arctic region is increasing in geostrategic significance, 
and consequently growing its role in international politics (Heininen 2011, 80). 
Heininen’s extensive study elaborates and compares a wide range of policy objectives 
between the Arctic states and the EU, and he summarizes an intriguing common feature 
in all the strategies launched between 2009-2011: “All the Arctic states, as well as the 
EU, would like to become a natural or real, or major actor or player, or even leader or 
power, in the Arctic (or in some field of northern affairs), or would like to maintain a 
leading role there” (Heininen 2011, 81). That conclusion envisions increasing interest 
towards the Arctic politics as a part of international affairs. One objective of this study is 
to reveal how Finland’s attempt to become “a major player” in the Arctic affairs reflects 
from its Artic discourse. 
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In the publication, Timo Koivurova approached Finland’s role in the Arctic from a 
perspective of international law, evaluating the existing legislative structures in Arctic 
affairs and whether or not there is a potential for Finland to take a stronger lead on that 
subject. The role of the Arctic Council in terms of developing stronger, legally binding 
policies, for instance for environmental regulation in Arctic, remains debated. (Koivurova 
2011, 75-76) Koivurova’s article together with Lassi Heininen’s analysis (2012) on the 
Finland’s first Arctic strategy provides a good comparison to my study, and they also 
show how rapidly discussions in Arctic politics are moving forward and changing course. 
 
Latest developments in Finnish Artic politics are a good example of rapidly changing 
focuses in the Arctic.  In 2010 Finland had proposed an exclusive summit for the Arctic 
issues to be organized in Finland, which could have be seen as a continuum of the 
successful Rovaniemi-process The summit was planned to give an wider political 
emphasizes to the region’s future (Koivurova 2011, 77; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, 2010), albeit it got postponed due to Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011. 
The elections caused a heavy reshuffling of the ministerial positions in Finnish 
parliament including the ministers at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, resulting in Arctic 
affairs being put on hold once again (Heikkilä 2011).  
 
Despite the fact that Arctic has been gaining significant importance on a global political 
arena in past seven years, it has also gained increasing attention in international and in 
Finnish media, extensive, academic studies have not been conducted on the actually 
arguments and discussion constructing the Arctic discourse in Finland. All the studies 
above, as well as current empirical data, demonstrate a growing interest on the changing 
geopolitics of the Artic region, which can spill over to several sectors of international 
relations but which is also full of “what if’s” and predictions. 
3.4.1. The Arctic 2.0  
Anne Sørensen coined the phrase for the new era of Arctic cooperation as “the Arctic 
2.0”, by which she refers to a constructivist approach to the Arctic affairs, due to the lack 
of explanatory power of neo-realistic and neoliberal approaches (Sørensen 2013). Current 
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agreements24 and diplomatic cooperation between Arctic states have provided noteworthy 
evidence that political dynamics in the Arctic is heading further from a security focused, 
antagonist atmosphere of the past (Sørensen 2013, 2).  Today’s Arctic relations are about 
a question of identifying opportunities for and linkages between issue-specific areas of 
cooperation (Young 2011), such as prospects for establishing a legally binding 
international agreement on Arctic resource exploitation25.  
 
To summarize, I argue that the Arctic IR studies of the first half of the 2000s had a clear 
focus on the conflict vs. cooperation paradigm, which however, has faded during the 
recent years marked by the intensification of international governing structure of the 
Arctic. Due to these diplomatic developments in the world of the Arctic IR, the 
community has moved further away from the theoretical presumptions flagged by realist-
liberalist scholars towards more constructivist approach in order to address the complex, 
multi-dimensional, and truly global Arctic issues (Sørensen 2013). 
 
The purpose of this short review of the last years’ political events and previous academic 
studies on the Arctic international affairs is to highlight the backdrop on which the 
current situation in the politics of the Arctic plays out, as well as to explain the 
development of the dominant paradigms in Arctic IR. However, the objective of this 
study is not to evaluate which paradigm is the most dominant or has the most explanatory 
power in the Arctic IR of today, but to investigate how the change in the Arctic discourse 
in Finland happened which might also illustrate a broader change in the Arctic paradigm. 
All in all, I argue that black-and-white conflict vs. cooperation-paradigm does not 
provide a comprehensive enough platform to scrutinize the Arctic affairs of today26. 
Broader theoretical and methodological approaches are required in order to analyze, as 
mentioned above, truly global Arctic issues.  
                                                
24 Barents Sea agreement and SARS agreement. 
25 Finland was the first state to call for a global sanctuary around the North Pole (Arctic strategy 2013, 48). 
26 Though the current developments and proceeding in the Arctic relations illustrate strengthening of a confidence-
building paradigm (Illullisat, Nuuk and Kiruna declarations), Harri Mikkola (FIIA) argues that the recent dispute 
between Russia and Greenpeace challenges the understanding that all the Arctic states will follow their commitment to 
the UNCLOS, when vital national interest (in this resource exploitations) is in question (Mikkola 2014). 
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3.5. My Contribution to the Arctic IR: Objectives of This Study 
 
Despite the great amount of studies and research reports covering various aspects of the 
Arctic IR, there is a very little methodological or theoretical variety among them. As 
mentioned above e.g. comparative study and theory testing are among the others widely 
used research methods in the Arctic IR27. 
 
Critical geopolitics provides a widely used theoretical reasoning to approach discourse as 
the defining factor in geopolitics, as in this case in the Arctic region, but process tracing 
method brings a new perspective to study the construction process of the Arctic 
discourse. This thesis seeks to bridge the positivist and interpretivist understanding of the 
research process in in order to respond to question of causality - what caused the known 
outcome (in this case the change in the current Arctic discourse in Finland). Therefore I 
believe, that process tracing is a fruitful, though challenging, method to apply to a hasty, 
and complex discourse formulation process such as the Arctic discourse in today’s 
Finland.  
 
Researchers can use process tracing to subtract causal mechanisms behind a complex 
event or series of events, such as formulation of a discourse in e.g. public discussion. By 
carefully mapping different turns and moves (in my case different arguments and 
statements in Finnish media) in a series of events, researchers can with the tools of 
process tracing analyze what kind of and how change happened. Mapping causal 
connections in a historical process gives a fruitful ground for further research, and poses 
a stand to formulate new hypotheses based on the outcomes of the previous process-trace. 
(Bennett and George 1997)  
 
                                                
27 Read more about the previous studies in the Arctic IR from the chapter “Looking back: Previous studies on 
contemporary Arctic issues” in this thesis. To name a few theory testing/comparative studies in the Arctic IR: “ Canada 
and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict” (Hubert 2009), “Amazing Race-
On Resource, Conflict and Cooperation on the Arctic” (Palosaari 2011), “ Arctic Strategies and Policies. Inventory and 
Comparative Study” (Heininen 2012). 
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Though not so commonly applied method in the Arctic IR, several process-tracing case 
studies have been conducted in the other subject fields of IR in order to scrutinize causal 
connections and mechanism behind various questions of the international relations. 
Among others, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon’s (1999) seeks in his study “Environment, 
Scarcity, and Violence” causal patterns of linking together environmental scarcity and 
violence in different societies e.g. in water shortage problems in China and land 
distribution disputes in Mexico. Homer-Dixon’s research is based on a wide range of 
empirical studies on the affects of ecological marginalization and how those can lead to 
critical social as well as environmental problems (Burns 2000). Bennett and George 
mentioned another significant process tracing study which was published already in 
1970s by George and Smoke (1974) with a title “Deterrence in American Foreign Policy 
Making: Theory and Practice”. In this process-tracing study George and Smoke apply a 
structured, focused comparison of a relatively small number of historical case studies in 
order to develop the selected theory (Bennett and George 2005, 75). In the forthcoming 
methodology chapter I will elaborate the analytical tools of process-tracing that are 
utilized in this study.  
 
Notwithstanding the current international agreements covering the various Arctic issues, 
as well as an increasingly positive political and economical attitude towards the benefits 
of jointly coordinated Arctic region, we cannot lull ourselves to believe controversies 
would be over in the Arctic relations. Confrontation between Russia and Greenpeace, in 
the fall of 2013, reflected again political sensibility of the Arctic; actions of e.g. non-
governmental Arctic actors can cause geopolitical turbulences between Russia and the 
West, which can have unpredictable impacts on political consensus in the High North 
(Mikkola, The Return of Realpolitik? The deepening crisis in Ukraine may spill over to 
the Arctic 2014). That is why existing Arctic paradigm(s), and the causalities behind 




4. Theoretical Framework: Critical Geopolitics 
 
As I have already mentioned, the concept of change is a core element of this thesis. 
Change is an attribute that is very commonly connected to explanations of the current 
state of affairs in the Arctic. Climate change, change in political awareness of the region, 
changes in the Arctic ice cover, change in the world’s economical situation and change of 
the geopolitics of the Arctic, just to mention few changes distressing the Arctic.  
 
Change was also an important factor behind the birth of the critical approach to 
geopolitics, which serves a theoretical framework in this thesis. Critical geopolitics is a 
loose set of theoretical concepts and reasoning based on a post-modern influence in 
geopolitics (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 313). Critical thoughts on geopolitics was born as result 
of the great changes that happened in the world order after the end of the Cold War, and 
which caused dramatic turbulences in global (geo) politics by the late 1980’s and early 
1990s: The bipolar geopolitical East and West disappeared from the map of world 
politics and opened new avenues for political  alliances, as well as for new rivalries. This 
new era of geopolitics was especially true in the Arctic, where global governance, new 
actors and European integration became more present to everyday politics of the region. 
New ways to understand the emerging interdependence and the rapid changes on a new 
global Arctic agenda were desperately needed (Koivumaa 2011, 113).  
 
In the next chapters I introduce the core hypotheses of critical geopolitics in relevance to 
this study. I will mainly refer to the writings of Irish scholar, Gearόid Ó Tuathail, often 
referred as the founder of contemporary critical politics, and of fellow Irish scholar 
Simon Dalby, as well as to writings of British political scientists, John Agnew, and the 
works of Finnish political scientists, Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio. Already in their early 
writings, Tuathail and Dalby located critical geopolitics to post-modern, post-positivist 
realm of international relations research by accepting broader understanding of political 
reality including concepts such as ideas, social interactions and identities as important 
building blocks of political reality. Tuathail approaches geo and politics from a human 
science perspectives ignoring any absolute truths about the world, or ways of organizing 
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it, but instead seeing geopolitics as discursive practice re-constructed in social 
interactions. (G. Ó Tuathail 1996) (Dalby 1990)  
 
As mentioned earlier, the research behind this thesis is formed my methodology and 
previous research. The theoretical framework of critical geopolitics is considered a 
background reasoning for the selected research approach. Despite the fact that critical 
geopolitics was defined as a modern, and critical theory within the school of IR, it has 
never created a neatly defined research field or school of scholars, which makes it serve 
perfectly in study with a strong method and large pool of research data. Studies in critical 
geopolitics do not necessary separate the method from the theory, but instead apply 
theoretical concepts as theoretical guidance to selected research question (G. Ó Tuathail 
1994, 313). Critical geopolitics is often defined as a diverse collection of works 
characterized by focus on the processes through which political practice is bound up to 
territorial definition (Kuus 2010, 1-2) (Harle and Moisio 2003).  
 
In addition, Tuathail and Agnew (1992), as well as Vilho Harle avoid naming critical 
geopolitics as a strictly limited theory of IR. They define critical geopolitics as a 
collection of various methods, approaches and research targets, which together create a 
theoretical framework to conceptualize or conduct a geopolitical analysis (Harle 2003, 
45) (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 313-314). To sum up: In this thesis I follow this tradition of 
critical geopolitics by using it as a loose theoretical basis for my conclusions, and more 
importantly, as a theoretical reasoning to discursive approach to Arctic politics.   
 
4.1. From Geopolitics to Critical Geopolitics 
 
“Geopolitics, as I have suggested elsewhere, is best studied in its messy contextual 
specificity” (G. Ó Tuathail 1998, 17) 
 
Generally, geopolitics can be defined as a research field that studies how geography 
affects politics and vice versa. Geography is not a self-evident concept in the world, 
rather it is a result of a historical and social processes, which produce knowledge and is 
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under constant development (G. Ó Tuathail 1999, 108-109) As an academic concept, 
geopolitics, defined by attributes such as borders and identity, have existed in the tool set 
of political scientists since the writings of Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer 
Mahan in late 19th century. However, analysis of ideologically as well as geographically 
divided world of the Cold War brought geopolitical research traditions into mainstream 
of political science (Moisio 2003, 21-22).  
 
Traditional geopolitics was determinant to see material factors, such as material 
capacities (resources), environmental surroundings (e.g. access to the oceans) and 
geopolitical positioning as dominant attributes to define states’ existence in politics. 
Traditional geopolitics considered these material capacities to appoint the direction and 
power structure in international relations, whereas critical geopolitics saw discourses 
behind the material factors (e.g. building up navy) to make political actions meaningful 
and justified (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192) (G. Ó Tuathail 1994).  
 
Traditional geopolitics provided an extensive tool set for theoretical analyses of the Cold 
War world, where geography and power politics determined division between the states 
in East and West. The end of the Cold War broke the ‘Old World Order’, which opened 
the barriers (literally and figuratively) between people and ideologies, trade and markets, 
cultures and region from all corners of the globe (Harle 2003, 49-51). In the midst of the 
early 90’s political turbulence, scholars of critical geopolitics turned the focus from 
(geopolitical) rivalry of power to foreign policy making, and, how it defines geography. 
Whereas traditional geopolitics treats geography as terrain of pre-existing geopolitical 
claims (e.g. boarders between states), scholars in critical geopolitics approach 
geographical knowledge as a modern, constantly evolving, discourse of power (Kuus 
2009). Critical geopolitics wanted to analyze the official political strategies that produce 
the foreign- and security political “maps” of the world (G. Ó Tuathail, 1996; Harle and 
Moisio 2003, 28). Foreign- and security politics, i.e. actual acts of politics, produce 
geopolitical knowledge, which define political spaces, and this knowledge is always 




The ‘new way of understanding’ geopolitics, critical geopolitics, did not completely 
abandon material factors as a part of foreign policy analysis, and consequently the 
different understandings of geopolitics can be found as an undertone in critical 
geopolitics. Moreover, critical geopolitics was developed by international relations 
scholars, who wanted to emphasize social, cultural and political aspects over the physical 
resources in geopolitics. Critical geopolitics aim is to scrutinize the geopolitical order in 
world as a socially and historically evolved process, which is preserved through 
discursive interactions. Reconstruction of (geo)power was to be made by discursive 
practices (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2-4) (Popke 1994). 
 
Even though the concept of discourse rose to the core of critical geopolitics, it did not 
assume regions to speak for themselves but theirs stories needed told by someone. Policy-
and decision makers as well as main-stream media are these “communicators” of 
geopolitical stories, which produce our understanding of different geopolitical premises 
(Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 194-1996). Scholars of critical geopolitics argues that 
geopolitical phenomena are outcomes of social and political interaction (Harle and 
Moisio 2003, 27), which gives this thesis justification to seek the change in Finnish 
Arctic discourse in arguments, writings and comments of Finnish politicians and media. 
The geopolitical phenomena under scrutiny in this thesis is the politics of the Arctic 
region in Finland and it is approach through ‘researchable’ outcomes of social 
interactions i.e. discourses produced in the public discussions.  
 
By documenting arguments presented in various speeches, reports, articles and news 
stories about Finnish Arctic policies, I have constructed a process that is based on the 
assumption that discourses defines geopolitical space (Harle and Moisio 2003, 27). I do 
not focus only on environment, or economic-driven discourses in the Finnish Arctic 
discussion, but instead I track down a series of discursive elements that materialize in 
selected speeches and articles. By locating the discursive elements, I aim to reveal how 
official and public speaking (and writing) on the Arctic issues illustrate a change that has 
happened in the understanding of the Arctic in Finland  from 2011 to 2013. 
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4.1.1. Post-modernism Behind Critical Geopolitics 
Following the same path as many other critical theories in social sciences, critical 
geopolitics emerged in an awaking of postmodern world that featured post-industrial 
capitalism, rise of the information society, globalization and the aforementioned 
revisiting geopolitical truths. It aimed to question grand theories that had determined 
geopolitical studies during the 20th century (Moisio 2003, 28). The end of the Cold War 
forced scholars to question the existing assumptions of a static world order, where the 
balance of two super powers had defined the order in world politics for decades. Analysis 
of geopolitical concepts, such as space and borders, became multidimensional and 
complicated in the context of a new and interconnected world. The new era of 
international relations also triggered the emergence of new analytical concepts, such as 
discourse, to be added to the geopolitical tool set (Harle 2003, 49-51). The critical 
approach tried to respond to growing need of new analytical tools for geopolitical 
thinking. It aimed to break off historical determinism in geopolitics by applying new 
methods of constructed geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics tries to bring 
poststructuralist ‘methods’ to the analysis of space and geographical conditions. In other 
words, scholars of critical geopolitics aim to avoid any pre-given, material perceptions of 
the geopolitics as basis of the analysis (G. Ó Tuathail 1994). 
 
Characteristic to critical thoughts in social sciences is to question predominant power 
structures behind knowledge. Critical geopolitics shares philosophical roots with social 
constructivism, which emerged to IR studies in the 1980’s. A well-known constructivist 
Alexander Wend’s article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’ has been called as ‘a door-opener’ for critical thinking in geopolitics 
(Aalto p.43-44), which illustrates the close connection between constructivism and 
critical geopolitics. The constructivist heritage gave critical geopolitics an understanding 
of the idea of discourse as being a defining concept in international relations. Critical 
geopolitics view the world through different discourses such as environment, foreign 




In order to simplify and summarize social constructivist understanding of geopolitical 
realities, it needs to be divided into two separate layers: an ideal layer and a material 
layer. The material level refers to material resources such as geographical location or 
military power, whereas the ideal level represents ideas and norms behind the structures. 
Change in one or both layers will affect to socially constructed societies. For example, a 
need or whish to implement new environmental regulation in the Arctic can evoke from a 
shift in common opinion of how Arctic should be protected, or it can rise from a 
environmental catastrophe such as flooding that has affected to people living in the area. 
Existing material resources and prevailing ideas determinate, how state practice their 
politics on domestic and international arenas (Burch 2000, p.198-201).  
 
Postmodern poses no single rationality or historical narrative above to another in terms of 
creating common understanding on social science and history. Diverse societies include 
huge number of different implications and identities, which makes political actors to be 
significantly indefinable than rational approaches assume. In addition, postmodernism 
highlights the role and influence of discourses in a broad sense of the concept - including 
meanings, symbols, words, identities, means of communication - in all structures of 
society (Halliday 1994, 38).  
 
In this paper, the influence of postmodern traditions is reflected in my collected data, 
which contains solely textual materials from various Finnish Arctic communicators in 
forms of their comments and interviews in media. In this study I am anchoring to the 
postmodern trend due to the power of its exploratory nature; my study aims to explain 
how Finnish discourse changed to during past three years, instead of analyzing the status 
quo of existing Finnish Arctic discourses that reflect current policies and practices.  
4.1.2. Discourse in Critical Geopolitics 
Another important, postmodern feature in critical geopolitics is the significance of 
linguistic dimension in geopolitical studies: critical understanding of geopolitical space 
and borders requires acknowledgment of socially constructed discourses as a core 
element of the study (Aalto 2011). Analyses of textual materials (speeches, statements of 
the foreign policy makers etc.) are still often the basis of IR studies applying critical 
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geopolitics as theoretical framework, though scholars of the critical geopolitics have 
never fully agreed on what is a discourse in critical geopolitics (Häkli 1998). 
Nevertheless, textual materials are often seen to play a crucial role in construction of 
knowledge about the geography, which can be analyzed depending on how it is 
conceptualized and understood. In this thesis I refer to discourse as a set of models, pre-
requisites and ways of framing the selection of things that is spoken about (see e.g. 
Foucault, 1974; (Hajer 2009, 64). 
 
Tuathail also emphasizes the connection between linguistic history of critical thinking 
and re-defining geopolitics, which relates to French school of poststructuralists28. The 
poststructuralist paradigm views the surrounding world as being composed by mobile 
structures that is re-defined constantly in social interactions such as politics. Based on 
poststructuralists thoughts of the world, geography was seen as constantly evolving 
process where discourses are dependent on involved actors identity. Different actors 
produce different discourses even in a same framework of issues. The development of 
discourse analysis methodology in social theories provided methodological basis for 
critical geopolitics awakening (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 525-529). 
 
Critical geopolitics brought about discourse as a way of understanding the interconnected 
relationship between geography and politics. Ó Tuathail and John Agnew were among 
the first scholars to regard geopolitics as a discursive practice. In other words they stated 
that geopolitics is to be defined by political practices and social interactions (Ó Tuathail 
and Agnew 1992, 191-192). In contrary to traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics 
emphasizes as much a state’s material, as conceptual boarders in order to analyze how 
these boarders construct spaces between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and ‘domestic’ and 
‘foreign’ domains. Critical geopolitics aims to discover, how states themselves produce 
these divisions or concepts (Ó Tuathail ja Dalby 1998, 3–4). In other words critical 
geopolitics turned the focus from studying how geopolitics are, to what kind of 
                                                
28 French school poststructuralists were a philosophical inspiration for scholars of critical geopolitics. For a further 
introduction read Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze:” Poststructuralism: Post-Structuralism, Michael Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Habitus, Roland Barthes” General Books LLC, 2010.
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knowledge of the world geopolitical studies and argumentations are actually producing 
(Harle and Moisio 2003, 11). 
 
Tuathail emphasizes the definition of geopolitics as a discursive practice that is 
constantly reconstructed in practice of politics (G. Ó Tuathail 1998). As a result, 
discourse analyses have been an inherent part of critical approach to geopolitics; socially 
constructed language has a vital role in reconstructing spatial dimension of geography 
and politics.  
 
Different ways of constituting political language creates different discourses that are used 
for policymaking. Scholars of critical geopolitics approach geopolitics as part of reality, 
which is constructed in political discourses, and consequential generates the structure of 
geopolitical actions (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2). Change in those (political) 
discourses can have a significant impact on policymaking and political practices, which 
makes investigations of those discourses greatly important in order to predict, where the 
current politics are heading.  
 
Geopolitical analysis cannot, according to critical geopolitics, be completed without one 
or the other; dominant discourse illustrates the structure, and geopolitical rhetoric 
represents the acts of politics in geography. The study of rhetoric in political actions 
makes it possible to unveil any changes in the dominant discourses. Reconstruction of 
geopolitical space is never neutral which is why Moisio encourages researchers to 
understand political speaking (language) and actual act of politics united: “Language 
should be perceived as action or practice” (Moisio 2003, 103-105).  
 
In addition to Moisio’s framework, Tuathail introduces an alternative way to interpret the 
discursive constructed structures in geopolitics. In his arguments, he refers to Agnew and 
Corbridge, who emphasize the material aspects of spatiality in geopolitics. They see 
geopolitical order as being a hegemony, which is still constructed by discourse methods. 
According to Agnew and Corbridge, the political elite produces practical geopolitical 
reasoning that reflect the dominant representations geopolitical space, where actual 
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politics are carried out. This understanding is often applied to global political economy 
studies, where there is a greater emphasis on material basis (such as military power), also 
from geopolitical perspective. Definitions of geopolitical practice, imagination of the 
actor and interactions between the actors need to be taken into carefully consideration, 
when constructing analyses based on the thoughts of critical geopolitics (G. Ó Tuathail 
1996, 21-22, 31). In this thesis I have organized selected textual data to a process, in 
where I tract the change happened in Arctic discourse in Finland. I don’t focus on 
separate discourses in Finnish Arctic politics but instead concentrate to investigate how 
those speeches and articles reflect change in Arctic discourse in Finland. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, I have not chosen the ‘usual methodological partner’ of the 
critical geopolitics (discourse analysis) to the research method in this thesis. Instead I 
approach discourse as a part of a process and eventually scrutinize, how they produce the 
prevalent outcome. Process tracing as a methodological tool works well by tracing down 
causal mechanism within discourses, historical events and different steps of the particular 
phenomena (Bennett and George 2005). Discourse analysis focuses on a discourse itself, 
not to what it presents, or how it is produced (Weaver 2004, p.199), whereas this thesis 
focuses process thinking behind the discourse. Discourse analysis does not drive for 
reveling causal mechanisms29 (Foucault 1969, p. 214), which process tracing does and 
thus allows it to be used in investigations on connection between the process and the 
outcome. 
 
4.2. Three Paths To Reconstruct Geopolitical Imagination  
 
Tuathail and Delby introduced a three-fold typology as a framework in which to 
approach geopolitics: practical, formal and popular geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 
1998, 4). I aim to use these categories as a prior framework to study research material in 
my thesis. This typology gives the user a tool to organize different discourses in 
                                                
29 Discourse analysis is often applied to studies with critical geopolitics’ theoretical framework due to textual materials’ 
importance for the theory. However textual research data, i.e. previous studies from analytical journals, speeches, 
media sources, can be well applied to process tracing studies as well, see e.g. Åtland 2009, Anttila 2012, Lind 2011.  
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geopolitical analyses of the Arctic. It diffuses popular, structural and practical discourses 
produced by difference actors in foreign policies.   
 
Practical geopolitics focuses on the foreign policy practices and bureaucracy made every 
day by state leaders and other officials. It studies practice of the statecraft in actual 
decisions-making and concrete political acts. Practical geopolitics reflects the existing 
predominant visions of the state official in geopolitical situation of the state, which can 
also predetermine their actions in the international relations (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 
4-6). 
 
Formal geopolitics refers to strategic communities (academia and think-tanks for 
example) and how their visions and traditions are reflected in geopolitics. Previous study 
of a specific geopolitical case is an example of formal geopolitical knowledge. The study 
of formal geopolitics seeks to find concrete historical and discursive grounds that 
statecraft applies to explanations of dominant geopolitical situations (G. Ó Tuathail 1999, 
111). In my case of Finland, I will focus on historical and discursive perceptions behind 
argumentations about environment and economic benefits presented by Finnish decision 
makers between 2011-2013.  
 
Third path to geopolitical imagination is popular geopolitics, which illustrates social 
perceptions in geopolitics that are produced by the transnational/national popular culture 
actors such as mass media, cinema and literature. It aims to expose popular and 
widespread ideas on the certain object or phenomena (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-5). 
Due to limits of master thesis project, I have left out the data that would present 
geopolitical imagination of the Arctic Finland by popular geopolitics. Although, I have 
collected data from various Finnish mass media outlets, which represent popular 
geopolitics, I interpret media to deliver ‘public opinion’ and arguments of the decision 
makers, more than represent stands of the Finnish media as such.     
 
This ‘tri-pod’ approach creates a productive framework in which one is able to exam 
geopolitical practices and discourses. Thanks to popular, practical and formal geopolitics, 
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a researcher can reconstruct a comprehensive picture of multidimensional imagination-
building in a society. All the three layers impact the formulation of, for instance, Arctic 
discourse. The objective of this study has is to demonstrate how a geopolitical 
imagination is formed from different perspectives and how definitions from not only 
political discourses but also in popular culture references. Further study would show how 
these construction-processes actually influences a case such as Arctic discourse in 
Finland in a long run. Dodds highlights how critical it is to understand that geopolitics is 
not only conducted by academic researchers but in every-day activities of the people all 
around the world (Dodds 2007, 21).  
 
The picture below illustrates the three-fold approach to geopolitics, which aims to 
produce a new representation of the geopolitical knowledge. The three-way approach to 
geopolitics illustrates how scholars of critical geopolitics object the homogenous, nation-
state centralized monopoly of geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics aims to 
combine all three elements of geopolitics in order to create discussion about the 
prevailing structures behind the international geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-
5).  
 
Figure 1: “Three paths to reconstructing geopolitical imagination “ (ibid.) 
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As mentioned above, I have followed this typology when I collected my research data in 
order to locate where and how change in Finnish Arctic discourse happened from 2011 to 
2013. Thorough investigation of previous Arctic studies (chapter 4 in this thesis) 
represent the formal geopolitics in geopolitical imagination building in the Arctic. The 
typology model is useful in order to disclose, from the Finnish discussion, how the 
frequently used themes in Arctic policy making, environment and economy, create 
geopolitical imagination of the Arctic as a space in international relations. 
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4.3. Criticism of Critical Geopolitics 
 
Vilho Harle discusses in his article “Is critical geopolitics critical science?30” the meaning 
of ’critical’ in the critical geopolitics (2003). He emphasizes the role of the actor, 
especially the linguistic, discursive choices made by the actor in constructing spaces and 
regions. Spaces and regions are constructed by spoken discourses and by written text to. 
Actors in geopolitics are in the core of this mission to construct the space of geographical 
regions (Harle 2003, 37-40). 
 
Harle combines previous work from Häkli and Tuathail in order to construct an 
understanding about the essence of the research objective in critical geopolitics. Critical 
geopolitics seeks to understand geographically produced definitions about power and 
execution of power. ‘Unleashing’ these core themes of international politics from their 
geographical bindings creates a fruitful space for new understanding about geopolitical 
structures between political actors such as nation states, NGO’s and people (Harle 2003, 
38-39). 
 
One can criticize that critical geopolitics concentrates too much on reshaping its research 
object, geography, but actually it also contributes to critical theory by creating 
alternatives. Harle concludes that critical geopolitics research aim to reveal discursive 
structures and epistemological undertones in international relations (Harle 2003, 48). In 
other words, critical geopolitics seeks to reconstruct predominant knowledge-structures in 
geopolitics, in order to provide new understandings about geographical spaces and 
regions. This kind of knowledge can for instance be the perceptions of Finland’s role as 
environmental/economic actor in the Arctic. 
 
Criticism towards critical geopolitics has also targeted the hegemony of the discourse, 
which in geography can still be seen as very material.  A researcher should always 
carefully select a case and representative study data, and acknowledge that a possibility 
of hegemonic discourses occurring in his/hers research data. Critical geopolitics has been 
                                                
30 in Finnish: “Onko kriittinen geopolitiikka kriittistä tiedettä?”  
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accused to stay only on academic level instead successfully reflecting the practice of 
geopolitics. In addition, feminist scholars in IR have questioned how marginalized 
voices/actors could be better brought in to geopolitical discussion and discourse building 
(Harle 2003, 54-55) (Jukarainen 2003, 78-79). 
 
In this study I have aimed to overcome these challenges within the selected discourses by 
acknowledging the fact that both environment and economy are overarching themes in all 
aspects of Finland’s Artic politics. Hence I do not focus on what environmental and 
economic discourse per se represents in Finnish Arctic discussion, but follow the change 
that has happened between these two discourses during last three years in Finland.  
 
Next I will introduce in more detail my research method, process tracing, which has 
provided this thesis’ ‘muscles to wrestle’ the challenging amount of diverse research data 
in order to investigate how Arctic discourse have changed in Finland in past few years. 
 
5. Methodology: Process-Tracing as a Case study Method  
 
Political Science as a discipline seeks to formulate explanation why thing in societies 
happen as they do and reports about the processes how these things actually happened 
(G. Falleti and F. Lynch 2009, 2). 
 
Qualitative research draws particular attention to contextual issues such as time, space 
and social setting where my research data is collected. Therefore qualitative methods are 
especially good catching meaning, process and context where studied phenomena occur. 
In addition, qualitative method is beneficial to this thesis by it ability to tap into thoughts 
behind processes in politics or in social structures in general, or into narratives in peoples 
minds, for example in foreign policy makers minds, who construct discourses they 
maintain (Devine 2002, 199-200) 
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Quantitative methods are often linked with positivist assumptions and mechanism of the 
natural science. Quantitative approaches are based on a notion that only the observable 
can count as valid knowledge. Researchers working within qualitative paradigm accept 
these conditions when research data is collected (Devine 2002, p.200-201). On contrary, 
qualitative researcher aligns his/hers research with interpretive epistemology that stresses 
a dynamic and continuously evolving nature of social reality. A crucial factor in the 
choice of method is whether the method provides suitable tools to answer to the selected 
research question from empirical and theoretical perspective. However, neither of these 
methodologies completely excludes collaboration with one and another, and consequently 
social scientists are increasingly mixing methodologies rather than using only one 
method in isolation (Devine 2002, 201-202). 
 
In this paper I have decided to practice a theory-guided process tracing case study, that 
focuses on the causal mechanisms in order to answer how Arctic discourse in Finland has 
changed during last years. Through my analysis I am providing a comprehensively 
academically-reasoned perspective to the ongoing debate on Finland’s role in domestic 
and international, Arctic affairs. Eventually, by evaluating the processes that lead to the 
current state of Arctic affairs, one might be able to predict some future trends in the 
Arctic politics, in my case the development of environmental and economic reasoning in 
Arctic politics in Finland. The focus of this thesis however, is in the current, prevailing 
change in Arctic discourse and how it happened during the last ‘turbulent’ three years.  
 
In the following chapter I elaborate more extensively on my decisions to apply this quite 
unconventional type of case study method, process tracing, in IR master thesis research. 
My aim has been to test, how this bit unusual theory-method combination works in a 
study of discursive structures, and whether it manages to create a new understanding of 





5.1. Case Study in Qualitative Research 
  
One can argue that all studies in social science are case studies: every research project 
has a target or an object that the researcher aims to reach by explaining and collecting 
material and data about it (Niemi p. 43). In this study I refer to case study methodology as 
an overarching category that includes both within-case analysis of a single case study, 
and comparison of small number of cases. As a methodological umbrella, case study is 
multi-dimensional and it provides different research design tools to conduct a qualitative 
research, e.g. designs from historical explanations to process tracing, as well as different 
ways to construct new hypotheses (Bennett 2002, 27). In this study I apply process 
tracing as the research design and data collection tool, which produces the analysis of this 
thesis.  
 
Hence the confusion that sometime arises between case study as a method or as a 
research design tool, it has established a solid place among IR methodologies since the 
1970s (Sprintz and Wolinsky 2003, 11). Despite this confusion, I argue that a correct 
selection of research tools within case study methodology, and a carefully conducted 
research design, are more significant aspect in order to conduct a successful case study, 
than focus on discussion whether case study is a method or a research design tool.31 My 
main source of methodological concepts and definitions have been Andrew Bennett and 
Alexander George’s book “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences” 
(2005), which is an excellent guidebook to case study methodology in social sciences.   
 
In social sciences case study method has been very popular especially within the field of 
anthropology; studies of historical communities and among other studies of social 
interaction between/within institutions and individual (Laine, Bamberg & Jokinen 2007, 
13-14). In a nutshell one can define a case study as a way of examine relationships 
                                                
31 Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen state in their book ”Tapaustutkimuksen taito” that conceptual differences emerge about 
the definition of a method between Social Science research done in English and in Finnish. In English definition of 
method include a broader selection of means of actual data collection and research methods. In Finnish the word for a 
method (menetelmä) refers only to clearly defined research methods. Thus, in Finnish methodology literature refers to 
case study more as an umbrella concept of several methods and I accept these slight conceptual difference in this study 
(Laine , Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 9). 
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between empirical data and theory (Laine;Bamberg ja Jokinen 2007, 21-22). Methods 
used in history studies are often closely linked to the case study methodology as a case 
study captures a well-defined aspects of a historical happening that the investigator 
selects for analysis, rather than a historical study of the happening itself (Bennett 2002, 
29). The case study approach is claimed to serve well studies that aim to tackle complex, 
uncategorized and unique phenomena in international relations (Bennett and Elman 2007, 
171), which is why I chose it as methodological approach to investigate vast and 
multidimensional data from Finnish Arctic discourse building.  
 
In addition, case study methodology emphasizes an overall and thorough understanding 
of the time and space in which and where the selected phenomena take place (Bennett 
and George 2005, 72-73). Time and space are key concepts in critical geopolitics, which 
seeks to conceptualize geography in constant process of change and uncertainties (Kuus 
2010, 6).  
5.1.1. Testing, Developing and Building Theoretical Frameworks 
Theoretical and empirical framework of a case study depends on the choices made by the 
researcher, which makes defining a well-reasoned statement of the research problem or 
“puzzle” crucial part of case study design. All choices made in a case study drive to 
create an understanding of, and new perspectives on the selected case as a whole (Häikiö 
and Niemenmaa p. 42). In this study my aim is to create an updated understanding of the 
Arctic discourse in Finland through analyzing the change, and simultaneously explore 
what possible consequences the change in the discourse has to the future of the Arctic 
politics in Finland.   
 
Bennett summarizes the major advantages of case study methods as being the ability to 
identify new or omitted variables and hypotheses. In addition, case study methods can 
make inferences on causal mechanisms, and to help to develop historical explanations of 
particular cases. Case studies are particularly advantageous in creating new hypotheses, 
because they allow for a combination of deduction and induction in analytical reasoning 
(Bennett 2002, 26). A case is understood in this study as Bennett’s definition: “(the case 
is) an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator” (Bennett 2002, 27). By 
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using a case study approach, a researcher aims to discover reasons for the appeared 
outcome by applying theoretical frameworks or causal mechanisms models to the case. 
The years between 2011-2013 are the time period when a series of significant political 
events happened in the Finnish Arctic politics, as well as in international Arctic relations, 
which is why I chose to narrow my study to focus on those years. As for the case in this 
study, it is ‘the change in Arctic discourse in Finland’, which represents a broader 
thematic topic of the evaluation of the objectives and stage of Finland’s contemporary 
Arctic politics.  
 
Thus it is important to differentiate empirical generalizations from analytical replications; 
drawing generalizations from a highly selected and defined case study research should 
not necessarily be the goal of a single or comparative case study. Instead, the researcher 
should focus on presenting the analytically replicable definitions and conclusions that can 
be tested in another context (Vaus 2001, 243; Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 25). 
Discussion about the replication of a case study highlights the importance of well-stated 
case selection. Even one specific case is enough to conduct replicable case study, if it 
serves the chosen research objectives (Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 3-4). This 
thesis is conducted as a single case study, because it serves the purpose to investigate, 
how Arctic discourse have changed in Finland during the selected years.  
 
Though my aim is not provide absolutely generalizable arguments about the affects of 
rhetoric battle between arguments pro/against environment and economy in the Arctic 
discourses of different Arctic states, my objective is to construct a comprehensive 
analysis of the change in Arctic discourse in Finland, which delivers a basis for further 
testing of new hypotheses in different research setting that resemble Finnish Arctic 
discourse (for example, evaluation of the Arctic discourse in another Nordic state). In this 
case study I apply process-tracing research design by George and Bennett (2005), of 
which I use to chase a historical explanation behind the change in Arctic discourse in 
Finland during this relatively short time (in history), meaning the years from 2011 to 
2013.  
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5.2. Presenting the Case: Finland and the Change in the Arctic Discourse 
in 2011-2013  
 
As stated earlier, Finland followed the trend of its Arctic partners, and launched its first 
Arctic strategy in 2010, which pushed Arctic affairs on higher priority on the domestic 
and foreign policy agenda in Finland. Within last five four years all the Arctic states have 
published and updated their national Arctic strategies; Canada and Russia in 2009, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland in 2011 and United States of America in 2013 
(Arctic Finland). Growing global interest on the Arctic has encouraged Arctic states to 
update and sharpen their Arctic position, which was incentive also behind Finland new 
Arctic strategy (Mikkola and Käpylä 2013, 3). 
 
I see the fall 2013 as a culmination point of the previous three years developments in the 
Finnish Arctic politics. Illustrations of this “culmination point” was i.e. how in 2012 
cooperation started between state-owned Arctia Shipping’s offshore icebreakers and 
Royal Shell, that rose to the headlines in the aftermath of Finnish Greenpeace activist, 
Sini Saarela’s, time in prison for piracy after protesting (peacefully) at an offshore 
platform in the Artic owned by Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom in October 
2013. Events in Russia turned Finnish media’s attention towards Finland’s participation 
in Arctic resources exploration, and especially towards questions on official policy-lines 
for the Arctic region. State-owned icebreaker company, Arctia Shipping’s, participation 
in Arctic offshore activities gained lots of media attention and started public debate on 
Finland’s objectives in the Artic region (Kaleva 21.10.2013 “Kylmä arktis herättää 
kuumia tunteita” in English: ”Cold Arctic provokes hot feelings”). 
 
In my perspective, the discussion around Finnish ice breaker’s off shore activities; the 
release of the new Finnish Arctic strategy and statements from Finnish (foreign and 
domestic) policy officials provides adequate empirical material in order to conduct a case 
study that aims to reveal a change in Finnish understanding of the Arctic affairs in 2013. 
As I stated earlier, Arctia Shipping’s participation in Shell’s oil drilling project in 
Beaufort Sea in 2012 was first time, when Finnish government-owned company paired 
up with international energy company in an offshore oil exploration in the Arctic region 
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(YLE 8.3.2012 “Finnish icebreakers to sail in Arctic oil drilling”). This event among 
others caught my interest towards clearly shifting focuses in Finnish Arctic politics, and 
encouraged me to investigate if those changes can be found also in a discourse level in 
Finnish Arctic discussion.  
 
Although the case of this study is the change in Arctic discourse in Finland and even 
though it does not aim to produce generalizations of changes in Arctic discourse in other 
countries, I argue that my analysis does reflect factors that could be found behind 
changes in Arctic discourse also elsewhere. I interpret my case study to a most-likely 
case study, which presents a typical, most representative case of the phenomena under 
examination (Bennett and Andrew 2005, 83; e.g. Eckstein 1975). I argue that the 
evaluation of the change, especially in terms of environment vs. economy –battle, in 
Arctic discourse represent a trend that Arctic politics is going through in Finland.  
 
During 2013, when this thesis was conducted, Arctic politics underwent a turbulent 
period in Finland, which has never been experienced before. Though, the Arctic paradox 
truly burst out to the awareness of the general public in Finland in the fall 2013, Arctic 
has always been essential part of Finland’s self-image as an Arctic nation. Finland’s 
geographical location in the Arctic region, as well as its indigenous population, Sami 
people, living above the Arctic Circle, illustrate Finland’s Arctic identity (Arctic Strategy 
2013). On the basis of these arguments my case study change in the Finnish Arctic 
discourse presents a most representative case of Artic discourse in Finland. 
 
I recognize the epistemological challenges facing me by combining definitions from 
qualitative theoretical framework and somewhat quantitatively rooted process tracing.32 
A researcher has to take into serious consideration his or hers understanding of the 
knowledge, when combining quantitative and qualitative research design (Devine 2002, 
                                                
32 Bennett and Elman reflect more advantages and challenges of qualitative and quantitative methods in terms of social 
scientists constructing and verifying their knowledge about the word. Template on causes and effects is also discusses 
there more explicitly. Due to limited scope of this thesis, those discussion, as well as important legacy of Keohane, 
King and Verba’s thoughts on lack of qualitative methods applied in social sciences, are left out from the methodology 
chapter in this research (Bennett and Elman 2006). 
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199-200). In the next chapters I elaborate more thoroughly how I apply process tracing to 
a qualitative case study, and discuss possible pitfalls of the selected methodology before 
putting it into action in the presentations of the data, and finally in, the analysis.  
 
5.3. Nuts-and-Bolts of Process Tracing 
 
“Process tracing is in, acquiring near buzz-word status in certain circles. Europeanists 
do it; IR scholars do it – all with the goal of bringing theory closer to what really goes on 
in the world”(Checkel 2005, 3). 
 
As mentioned earlier, process tracing is located in “a sub-category” of the case study. 
Process tracing as an IR study method aims to observe and analyze causal mechanisms 
around selected case, which hopefully can be applied to a wider context in international 
relations. Process tracing seeks explanations for social phenomena by setting hypotheses 
and exploring mechanisms how interactions become as they are today (Checkel 2005, 4-
5).  In addition it is an analytical tool for describing political and social phenomena, as 
well as a tool to evaluate causal claims behind the case (e.g. political and social 
phenomena) (Collier 2011). 
 
Mechanism connects things, which together construct a process. Tracing a process 
happens in theoretically informed way, where theoretical assumptions, hypotheses, are 
leading the research. Process tracing is strongest on questions of how something 
happened and exploring interactions between events (Checkel 2005, 4-5).  
 
According to George and Bennett (2005), process tracing serves well in a research 
conducted in “a grey-zone” between political science and history. It provides “a common 
middle ground for historians interested in historical explanation and political scientists 
(…) who are sensitive to the complexities of historical event s but are more interested in 
theorizing about categories of cases as well as explaining individual cases” (Bennett and 
George 2005, 223). Analytic practice of tracing can assess how outcomes of a case were 
affected by the choices of the actors along the way (Bennett and George 2005, 213; Tracy 
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and LeGreco 2009). Reference to studies of history and concept of causality, can arise 
positivist connotations and confusion on epistemological basis of this study, which is 
why I aim to reason carefully and transparently, how process tracing method is used in 
this thesis.   
 
Despite the positivist connotations, a well-reasoned process tracing can be part of a 
constructivist methodological tool kit, and, as a matter of fact, it can contribute greatly to 
qualitative analysis of causes (Bennett and George 2005). This thesis stands on post-
positivist epistemology, which acquires deeper explanation on my understanding of 
variables and approach to the concept of context.  
5.3.1. Defining Variables  
In a process tracing research as important as defining one’s goal on developing or testing 
selected theory, is selecting suitable variables, which are actually core elements of 
process trace. Researcher’s first step in choosing variables is to ask what does she/he 
actually want to explain or predict in the study, and the answer will define the dependent 
variable(s) (Bennett and George 2005, 79). Through variables researcher challenges 
theoretical predictions on existing outcome of the research question. Thorough study of 
connections, or lack of them, during the process reveals new assumptions on, how things 
happened as they did in the selected case (Checkel 2005, 15). 
 
Independent and/or inventing variables are the ones affecting to the end result, in other 
words, by scrutinizing independent variables one can predict and explore why dependent 
variable became as it did. Theoretical assumptions support selection process of the 
variables and ensure they have power to reveal new hypotheses from the chosen research 
question (Checkel 2005, 5-7). Thus this thesis applies the logic of exploring causal 
mechanism between the variables in order to describe the path to the outcome, it does not 
take causal mechanisms as fundamental or only way to the occurring outcome. Context is 
one of the core concepts in the analysis because I see context and causal mechanisms as 
an inherent coalition in the study of process. In the other words I address importance of 
the timeframe, where the causal mechanism are studied.  
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Hypotheses and selected variables should be in a close discussion with each other 
through out the research conducted in process tracing tradition (Bennett and George 
1997). In this study I defined dependent variable in reflection of the predicted outcome of 
Arctic discourse formulation process. In contrary, independent variables refer to 
phenomena, concepts or other factors influencing to the process. Independent variables 
lead and shape the direction of the analysis towards the outcome of the study. Together 
with defining variables it is vital to narrow down what is the specific problem or question 
asked from selected research data. In addition in a single-case study meaning of left out 
variables should be considered cautiously in order to secure research validity (Bennett 
2005, 80-81).  
   
In the limits of this thesis research and my hypotheses, I have chosen to focus on 
environmental and economic dimension in the Finnish Arctic discourse. This thesis won’t 
focus to any other, though important, Arctic discussion such as could be e.g. indigenous 
peoples rights, development of legislative regimes or changes in the security discourse in 
the Arctic. All these discussion have left out, yet those discussions can provide some 
fascinating variables to another process tracing analysis of the Arctic discourses. 
However, security issues, as well as social development in the Arctic region, are 
recognized as important factors in questions of Arctic oil and gas, due to still unsolved 
debates on search and rescue (SAR) plans in case of an oil spill accident in the region 
(discussions often refer to BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 200633).  
 
By observing the relationship between the intervening variables, and impact of the 
intervening variable, I test my theoretical assumptions (discourses as defining factor in 
geopolitics) to the selected dependent variable. Nevertheless, I am not assuming this 
limited study to produce widely generalizable outcomes. I have defined two independent 
variables, which also appear in my research question, and one intervening variable in 
                                                
33 In April 2010 a gas release and subsequent explosion on BP-operated Deep Water Horizon oil rig caused largest 
accidental marine oil spill in the history of petroleum industry, which media and environmental organizations have 
used as alarming example case of devastating environmental impacts of an uncontrolled oil spill accident (e.g. 
Greenpeace 2013 “Black ice - Russian oil disaster”; The Guardian 2013 “Arctic oil spill is certain if drilling goes 
ahead, says top scientist”) (The Guardian, Environment n.d.). 
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order to understand why and how Arctic discourse in Finland has changed in 2011-2013. 
Selected variables are presented in this chart below:   
 
Variables   















Change in Finnish Arctic 
discourse 
 
As mentioned above, theoretical framework should lead the researcher in the process of 
selecting the variables. Though a careful problem formulation, well-reasoned case 
selection, and choice of methodological tools are cornerstones of a single case study, are 
all these choices dominated by researcher’s own mindset, which can lead to biased 
research approach. In single case studies causal inferences and poorly selected variables 
can cause over-assumptions in the analysis, or challenge the validity of the conclusions 
(Bennett and George 2005, 220). Therefore meaning of carefully selected, representative 
variables is amplified in a single case study, such as the case in this thesis.  
 
Critical geopolitics guided me to select environmental changes and economic prospects 
as independent variables, because those themes are the most debated on the today’s 
Arctic agenda (in Finland and internationally). The intervening variable ‘International 
Arctic’ includes arguments arising along the process, that refer to international 
cooperation, as well as to impacts that Finland’s international Arctic partner/competitors 
have to the discourse.  Significant events, such as Russia vs. Greenpeace –dispute, and 
the EU’s release of the Arctic strategy, stood out several times from the selected research 
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data, which is why I wanted to evaluate international Arctic partners’ impact to the Arctic 
discourse in Finland. 
 
The debate between environmental and economic arguments, as well proceedings of the 
international Arctic affairs, can be claimed to have had the most influence on the Arctic 
agenda during the beginning of the 21st century, and therefore have raised lots of focus 
within Arctic (geo)politics (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009) (Moisio, Dittmer and Dodds 
2011). I argue that geopolitical imagination of the Arctic is constructed in those debates.    
 
5.4. Bridging Post-Positivist Theory To Positivist Methodology 
 
As Checkel states above, process tracing research aims to create new conclusions about 
the selected topic on the basis of thorough understanding the case, in other word bringing 
theoretical frameworks into the analysis of the real world.  
 
Process tracing is used to track down causal mechanisms in practice of a (historical) case 
or process. Researcher maps carefully “the process, exploring the extent to which it 
coincides with prior theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the 
mechanism (Checkel 2005, 115).” In other words, it tests the explanatory power of 
particular theory in selected process (ibid). Concepts of causality and causal mechanisms 
can first appear to be prone to positivist epistemology, and consequently be seen as a 
challenge in cooperation with a post-positivist theoretical framework. Nevertheless, they 
do not have to exclude one and another. Philosophical realism provides the conceptual 
‘bridge’ and epistemological opportunism to diminish the possible contradiction on a 
metatheoretical level in process tracing studies conducted in post-positive theoretical 
framework (Checkel 2005, 22). Causality is here understood on the epistemological basis 
of philosophical realism34. Therefore cause is understood to mean ‘‘anything that 
                                                
34 Philosophical realism refers to philosophical proposition about the reality that exists independently of our 
observations of it and therefore cannot be “directly observed”. Philosophical realism believes on “the real ontological 
structures” of the reality, which consist both observed fact and “unobservable” such as reasons, ideas, aspirations, 
discourses, as well as “social relations and social structures” (Hall 2009, 629). 
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contributes in anyway to the producing or maintaining of a certain reality’’ (Hall 2009, 
630). 
 
Philosophical realism refers to causality as an understanding of a complex interaction 
between varieties of different kinds of causal factors. Causal mechanisms are interpreted 
simply as constitutive elements in a process.  The philosophical realists define causation 
as an open, ‘common-sensical’, intuitive notion with multiplicity of different meanings, 
excluding laws of causation and determinism (Kurki 2006, 190). 
 
Ideas, meanings and reasons are significant in the social world because they are causal 
themselves. Epistemologically, philosophical realists approve notions of information in 
social and political context we live in: “(…) knowledge about the world is constructed 
and enabled by linguistic conventions, conceptual systems and the social-political 
backgrounds that we know ‘within’” (Kurki 2006, 203). 
 
Philosophical realists, such as Wendt, Dessler and Patomäki, challenged the ‘taken-for-
granted’ Humean positivist model of science, and simultaneously they opened up new 
avenues for ontologically and epistemologically reflective, and methodologically 
pluralists frameworks to be applied in social sciences (ibid.) Due to the limits of master 
thesis I am not going to immerse myself into a meta-theoretical debate on the 
conceptualization of cause, which has been a complex, ongoing debate in IR community 
since the rise of humeanism (in social sciences) until today35. This study emphasizes 
interactions and context as the basis of causation analysis, in which the development 
ofArctic discourse in Finland is studied. 
 
                                                
35 Milja Kurki discusses further the debate of early positivist and development of social sciences in her paper “Causes 
of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory” (2006). Causal relations have 
been defined after Hume’s thoughts about causation, which had embedded rules and regularities to the concept of 
causality.  Causality was seen as regulatory-deterministic (ibid., 192). 1990’s mainstream IR community also accepted 
King, Keohane and Verba’s methodological thesis Designing Social Inquiry as a “guidebook” to ‘scientific’ causal 
analysis. King, Keohane and Verba underlined identification of appropriate empirical variables in order to social 
scientist to study causal mechanism of social life. (ibid.,196) In addition constructivist approaches had their saying on 
causality but they continued to attach certain deterministic and materialistic connotations to the notion of cause. 
Consequently relation between constructivist explanations and causal mechanism remained unclear. (ibid., 199-201).  
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That been said, I impose upon my study the following postmodern research traditions in 
social sciences, where mixing of methods is considered acceptable (Devine 2002; 
Checkel 2005). I argue that from constructivist stands, the reality, and discourse of the 
Arctic is formulated in the discussions/public speaking conducted by Finnish Arctic 
policymakers and the media, and consequential a change in the Arctic discourse has an 
impact on the politics conducted by Finnish policymakers. By investigating the process, 
where the discursive interactions are defined, I aim to locate causal mechanisms behind 
the change in Arctic discourse in Finland, which I argue to reflect the current 
understanding of the Arctic in Finland.   
 
I am aware of the threats and the possible downfalls of a single case study, and that is 
why I aim to articulate clearly my theoretical and methodological choices. Bearing in 
mind my possible pitfalls of a case study, I do not seek to present a single truth about the 
state of affairs, but instead aim to create new knowledge about selected phenomena or 
event (Leino 2007, 227) 
5.4.1. Context And Causal Mechanisms 
As mentioned earlier, selected variables are not seen here as absolutes or given but as part 
of the context of this case. Leino argues that successful and comprehensive understanding 
of the context of selected case can construct new perspectives to approach the case that 
can eventually be applied to more general context (Leino 2007, 215-216). A 
comprehensive outlook on the context of this study, updated discussion about Finnish 
Arctic politics, and general developments of in the Arctic IR, is presented along the 
analysis by introducing wide selection of media writings on the Arctic affairs in 2011-
2013. 
 
Detailed examination of causal mechanisms behind individual cases is on of the core 
purposes of all the case studies. As mentioned earlier causation is understood here as an 
open interaction between causal factors, which means in this study natural determinism 
incausation is rejected. In the thesis causal mechanism is defined after Bennett’s and 
George’s definition, which states that “causal mechanisms (…) operate only under certain 
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condition and their (…) effects depend on interactions with the other mechanism that 
make up these contexts” (Bennett and George 2005, 145). 
 
In this study causal mechanisms are observed in the context of the current developments 
in Arctic discourse in Finland, as well as in the frame of international proceeding in the 
Arctic. I argue that ‘pro-economy’ argumentation has increased in Arctic discourse in 
Finland, by number of the Arctic actors emphasizing occurring economic benefits in 
region, yet the same time concept of environmental sustainability is widely presented as 
an important principle for Finland actions in the Arctic. With this thesis I point out the 
change in the discourse, and explain why and how it occurred.   
 
As mentioned earlier, I acknowledge the positivist epistemology behind of process 
tracing research design, and its emphasis on causality, but this study approaches causal 
mechanisms from another perspective. Causal mechanism are considered here only as a 
part of constantly re-constructed social context of international politics, such as Finnish 
Arctic politics. Therefore I apply to Fallatti and Lynch’s (2009) notion on causal 
mechanism, in which they refer to causal mechanism as portable concept operating in 
different contexts. Causal mechanisms interact with the context in which they operate 
which makes the outcome of the process unpredictable (ibid. 5-6). By studying causal 
mechanism researcher can reveal “ how actors relate, how individuals come to believe 
what they do, or what they draw from past experiences, how policies and institutions 
endure or change, how outcomes that are inefficient become hard to reverse, and so on.” 
(ibid., 3-5) This thesis approaches variables and causal mechanism as constitutive 
features of the process, emphasizing role of the context, where the research data was 
collected from 2011 to 2013.  
5.4.2. How Process Tracing And Critical Geopolitics Work As Research 
Partners? 
A theory guided study approach is a core element in a well-executed process trace 
(Checkel 2005, 4). My research is collected from data portal called Arcticfinland.fi and 
includes speeches, comments and media material, which underlines critical geopolitics’ 
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perspective on discourses as the basis of the geopolitical knowledge, and further as a key 
attribute to understand political practices of a certain region (Kuus 2010, 1)  
 
Theory is understood here, as not to replicate the real world, but to structuralize social 
life’s realities. Same principle applies to selected variables in the thesis: Their role is 
constitutive in the process of scrutinizing causality, but they are expected to produce 
omnipresent outcomes (Kurki 2006, 203). Critical geopolitics provides the threefold 
typology where different types of meanings, ideas and information construct geopolitical 
imagination, and through the imaginations one can interpret geopolitical realities (Ó 
Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-5). As mentioned earlier research data in this thesis 
represents mainly formal and practical way reconstructing geopolitical imagination, but 
popular category is presented incorrectly in my data sources, which are mainly different 
media outlets.  
 
Critical geopolitics understands discourse as ‘an element’, like a building brick, which 
constitute reality, not just describe it. Also social constructivism leans strongly to 
discourses in restructuring social structures in the world. Constructivism emphasizes 
actors, such as states and media, as active contributors in international relations. 
Discourses are affected by, and actually, created in the ideas and meanings of these 
actors, though material dimension of social interaction is not completely abandoned. I 
approach geopolitical reality from critical geopolitics and constructivist perspective and 
argue, that discursive structures and context are inseparable elements in understanding 
the geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2-3).  
 
Critical geopolitics shifted the focus geopolitics greatly towards different methods of 
producing knowledge, or understanding on geopolitical events instead of reproducing 
material frame realities of geopolitics. In other words geopolitical speaking and writing 
actually shapes our understanding of the geopolitical realities and is contacts changing 
(Harle and Moisio 2003, 11). I interpret this notion to support my unconventional 
selection of method and theory; by observing causal mechanism between the variables, I 
seek to discover the change, and its explanations behind the Artic discourse in Finland, 
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and most importantly analyze what this change represent in the Finnish Arctic politics. 
Finally by locating the change in the discourse I aim to produce new understanding of the 
existing assumptions about the (geopolitical) reality of the Arctic in Finland.  
6. Research Data: Development of the Arctic Discourse in Finland from 
2011 to 2013 
 
In following analysis I present a carefully documented and summarized selection of 
media articles, news releases, speeches and blog posts related to the debate between 
environmental conservation and economic prospects in the Arctic region. All data is 
collected from ArcticFinland-portal between 1.1.2011 and 31.12.2013. All together, my 
research data includes 77 articles originally published in Finnish mainstream media; 
various Ministries’ websites and in other online outlets. 
 
This analysis proceeds in mainly in chronically order, following the timeline, when media 
articles and speeches where published on the ArcticFinland-portal. The chronologically 
order will help to reveal the causal mechanisms between dominant arguments and current 
political events, which might have had an impact on Finnish Arctic discourse during the 
process. The main focus of this analysis is to establish how Arctic discourse have 
changed, and what has caused the change in Finland during the last three years.  
 
I use all the speeches, blog posts and media materials published on ArcticFinland-website 
from 2011 to 2013 as my primary source of research data. However, due to limits of this 
thesis, and the huge amount of articles on the Arctic issues collected to ArcticFinland-
portal, I had to narrow the selection of media sources directly referred in this analysis to 
two main Finnish language (online) news media, Helsingin Sanomat and Yleisradio36 
(YLE), and to one main Swedish-language media in Finland, Huvudstadsbladet. In 
                                                
36 Yle is Finland’s national public service broadcasting company. Yle programmes and content reach 95 % of Finnish 
people weekly (Yleisradio Oy 2014). 
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addition, I use articles, news etc. material published in online edition of one of the main 
regional media  in the Northern Finland, in Kaleva newspaper. 
 
Further more, I have paid extra attention to carefully map arguments presented by 
different key actors, such as Finnish ministers, and to summarize all their arguments 
presented in the selected media outlets. Research data in this analysis includes translated 
version of all references, comments or arguments presented in the sources above, in 
which the speaker refers to Arctic environmental changes/impacts/developments/risks or 
economic benefits/prospects/potentials/risks, and which were archived in ArcticFinland-
portal between January 2011 and December 2013.  
 
I refer to the articles etc. summarized in the analysis by using numbers in brackets, which 
leads to the original source and the publisher of the comment. The data used in the 
analysis is attached as a numbered list of references in order of appearance in Chapter 9. 
6.1. Representativeness of the Data 
 
Media has an important role in creation of geopolitical definitions and perceptions, which 
is the reason why I have mainly selected data from different media outlets in order to 
conduct a comprehensive process of the arguments etc. that construct the Arctic discourse 
in Finland. Media delivers arguments from political decision makers, which reflects 
state’s, or other political entity’s, official stance on a particular issue. While public 
opinion is relatively complicated to investigate in societies, without conducting massive 
interview surveys, media is often considered as a communicator of public opinion. 
Moreover media itself plays a role in public discussion. It frames arguments differently 
based on which it sees relevant and important. (Bennett and George 1997, 10) Arguments 
presented in media construct discourses, and further, maintain certain kind of reality. 
Media has power to frame reality in their the arguments they present, and in addition, the 
arguments that are left out from the limelight of media are as important (Kuusisto 1999, 
19; Fairclough 1997, 139). 
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As well as media discussions, political actors’ public speeches or comments construct 
discourses. The very act of argumentation expresses a belief, that the argument can 
change ideas and those ideas shape our understanding of the world. Public 
communication, speeches and product of media outlets, deliver arguments, that can be 
used, at least to some extent, as an evidence of the ideas building (geopolitical) 
imagination37. Based on the notion, that media and public opinion cannot be separated, 
media data is understood here as opinionated, not as an holistic, view of the word. 
Perspectives presented in the media can belong to a journalist, a politician or an 
institution, depending whose voice has been represented at the time. Media data serves 
well a purpose to map public opinion on certain topic, because media represents often 
both the argument, and the mean of representing the argumentation (Fairclough 1997, 10-
11)   
 
Combination of media articles, speeches and official Arctic strategy will reveal different 
perspectives and reasoning behind the change, or lack of it, in Arctic discourse in 
Finland. Hypothesis of the thesis claims, that environmental changes and shift in 
economical attitudes, combined to the international atmosphere in Arctic cooperation, 
have shaped Finland’s Arctic discourse towards more economy driven approach in the 
cost of weakening environmental agenda.  
 
I acknowledge the fact that a researcher conducting empirical studies has to carefully 
self-reflect role of objectivity in relation to his/her own interpretations on the research 
data. In an analysis of qualitative material several different interpretations can me made 
and there is no definitive interpretations that tells the ‘truth’. However, the qualitative 
researcher has to demonstrate clearly the their plausibility of their interpretation in the 
selected research project (Devine 2002, 205-206). In order to ensure plausibility in this 
thesis I interpret findings from my research data through academically discussed 
theoretical typologies, as well as follow carefully research guidelines defined in process-
tracing methodology.  
                                                
37 See e.g. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) ”Rethinking geopolitics”. 
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6.2. Year 2011: “As an Arctic Country, Finland is a Natural Actor in the 
Region” 
 
Year 2011 was the year, when Finland was supposed to implement its objectives on the 
Arctic affairs as it had pledged in its first Arctic strategy from the previous fall. 
Internationally, the Arctic affairs had taken a significant step forward on the road to 
balance and cooperation in the region, when Norway and Russia had signed a new 
maritime delimitation in Barents Sea (Barents Sea agreement) in 2010, which ended a 40 
year-old dispute between the two countries (Sørensen 2013, 7). 
 
Secretary of State, Pertti Torstila, gave a speech at the Arctic frontier conference in 
Tromsø in January 2011 reflecting current developments in international Arctic affairs 
and presented Finland’s objectives, defined in its new Arctic strategy, for the Arctic 
politics (1). Torstila described Finland’s interest in the Artic affairs as the following: “As 
a result of geography, history, and experience, Finland has a natural interest and 
contribution to make in the Arctic.” Torstila described Finland’s historical bond to Arctic 
with Arctic explorers and the Saami people. Often overshadowed by the Norwegian polar 
explorers the Finn, Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, stands out as the first man who sailed his 
ship through the Northern Passage during 1878/1879. Torstila bridged Finland’s 
historical background as a polar exploring nation to the modern ice management 
technology which is Finland’s core competence in Arctic business opportunities: “We are 
the only country in the world experiencing such a dramatic limitation to seafaring and yet 
shipping continues at all our harbors uninterrupted all year round.” (1) 
 
In the speech Torstila presented Finland’s priorities in the Arctic as stated in the strategy 
by summarizing them to “utilization of Finland’s Arctic know-how and research, 
institutional issues, regional cooperation, environmental matters and questions related to 
the indigenous peoples”. A key issue to Finland is to create measures to combine 
economic activities and environmental concerns. Finland’s economic approach to the 
Artic region takes sustainable development, in terms of the fragile Arctic environment, as 
the basic platform of all the Arctic activities. Despite the mention on the importance of 
the principle of sustainable development, Torstila did not offer any concrete action plans 
 65 
for ensuring sustainability in Finland’s economic projects in the Arctic. Most concrete 
initiative introduced in the speech was Finland’s request to place Arctic Information 
Center for the European Union to northern Finland in Rovaniemi. Finland’s role in 
increased scientific and research related cooperation is seen as strength for its Arctic 
presence (1). This application reflects clearly Finland’s determination to promote Finnish 
Arctic know-how and research capacities, as well as Finland’s support to the EU in its 
process to apply for its observant status in Arctic Council. 
 
The purpose of the information center would be to “serve as a tool to support EU’s Arctic 
policy and increase its visibility”. Torstila mentions also a greatly awaited report from 
European Parliament called “Report on a sustainable EU policy for the High North,” the 
so-called ‘Gahler Report’ named after the rapporteur, Member of the European 
Parliament, Mr. Michael Gahler. Torstila stated openly Finland’s support to EU in Arctic 
affairs by describing EU’s role essential factor for strengthening Arctic cooperation. 
Finland has promoted EU as an Arctic actor, and the EU Commission’s prospect to be 
accepted as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council. Torstila summarizes: “It is hard 
to see how the Arctic Council could not benefit from a more active participation by the 
Union.” (1) 
 
Overall, Torstila introduced a economic-driven, environmentally conscious and 
cooperation-favoring Finnish Arctic action plan, which reaches to the future by 
emphasizing Arctic research and strengthening cooperation between old and new Arctic 
partners. However, Torstila gave a vague definition of Finland’s future actions in the 
region by stating that Finland is “open to exploring possibilities of increased scientific 
and research related cooperation”(1). Research cooperation, especially in form of Arctic 
Information Center for the European Union center is mentioned as Finland’s high priority 
in the Arctic affairs several times. Finland’s answer to Arctic environmental questions is 
to act cooperatively, to use resources in environmentally sustainable way and to enhance 
“the dialogue and cooperation mitigate the consequences of the change, while preparing 
to adapt ourselves to others.” Torstila mentioned also research and education in order to 
prepare us to the future changes in the Arctic. (1)  
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Torstila’s speech did not give many concrete examples of how Finland will e.g., execute 
its plans for Arctic economy, but an increasing enthusiasm for the Arctic can be read 
from the speech. However, the Arctic future is still a big unknown for all the players in 
the region, which leaves a lot of room for speculations and expectations. (1) 
 
In January 2011, the Ministry of Employment and Economy published a press release on 
the economic opportunities in the Arctic. The release contained no reference to 
sustainability in terms of economic prospect for Arctic opportunities. It was based on an 
official report on reforming economic structures of the Barents region (2). Finland’s main 
focus on Barents region should be in marine industries, technology application, 
development of local heating and electricity production, forestry, construction, mining- 
and metal industries as well as in other areas of Finland’s expertise, not forgetting 
growing opportunities in support and maintenance sectors and in tourism (2). 
 
The report encouraged Finnish business representatives to explore emerging 
opportunities within the Arctic industries, which will increase simultaneously with the 
extensive gas- and oil projects in the region. These support functions can create a huge 
variety of export potential for Finnish businesses. The report emphasizes Russia’s central 
role in future Arctic resource explorations and the importance of a well maintained 
Russian-Finnish business relationships in terms Finland’s intentions to strengthen its role 
in Arctic economic activities.  Finland does not hold a special connection with Russia in 
Arctic affairs anymore, because Norway, for example, has strengthened its relationship 
with Russia through logistic investments and co-managed project over the Arctic Ocean 
via Northern Sea route. The report encouraged Finland to rediscover its former strong 
business- and political relations with Russia via public and governmental intermediary 
organizations, such as The National Technology Agency (Tekes) and Finpro, as well as 
via reliable, preferably ministerial level, representative as a facilitator in communication 
and execution of business projects in the Barents region. According to the report public 
mediation organizations can only facilitate better business connections between Finland 
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and Russia, but the actual will power and initiations have to arise from the private, 
Finnish businesses (2).  
6.2.1. Partners, Competitors and Enemies: Discussion on the Arctic Foreign 
Relations anno 2011 
Helsingin Sanomat covered in January 2011 the results of ‘the great Arctic survey’, 
which was conducted to the people of the eight Arctic nations38 and covered their 
perceptions of Arctic international relations. 9.000 people participated in the survey, 824 
of them were Finns. According to the survey, the Finns would like to strengthen Arctic 
cooperation especially within the Nordic countries, and at the same time avoid 
cooperation with China (3). Finns, along the majority of the other participants in the 
survey, support political collaboration and negotiation over the possible economic use of 
the Arctic region. 77 % of the Finns want to strengthen the Arctic Council, whom they 
see as a weak, Arctic actor. Professor Timo Koivurova from University of Lapland 
commented in Helsingin Sanomat, that the Finnish opinions on the Arctic cooperation 
follow closely Finland’s official lines of the Arctic foreign policies. (3)   
 
In addition to the Nordic dimension of the Arctic cooperation, the Finnish media closely 
follows debates and discussion on the Arctic issues in the European Union. On January 
20th 2011, YLE Lappi39 reported on European Parliament’s support on an initiative to 
locate EU Arctic Information Centre in Rovaniemi, Finland. YLE reported about the 
European Parliament’s (EP) recently released report (so called Gahler’s report), which 
names Rovaniemi and University of Lapland as the only potential and realistic location 
for the EU Information Centre. European Commission makes final decision on the 
location, but the European Parliament’s statements create pressure to the process. YLE 
told discussions regarding to the Information Center take place in the spring of 2011 in 
the EU Commission. (4) 
 
In terms of the EU’s Artic report mentioned above, the EP organized a discussion and 
debate in connection with the release of the report “(..) on a sustainable EU policy for the 
                                                
38 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, USA, Sweden and Russia. 
39 YLE Lappi: YLE news’s local department covering news in Northern Finland and in Lapland.  
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High North” (5). The debate took place in Strasbourg in January 2011. Finnish MEPs 
Liisa Jaakonsaari, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Timo Soini, Mitro Repo and Riikka Manner 
participated actively to the debate on the report’s content, and on the signals it sends 
about the EU’s Arctic policies. Despite the Finnish MEPs represent different political 
groups in the EP, they all mentioned the importance of the EU in the Arctic affairs. They 
all also emphasized the report’s great contribution to develop the Artic Council’s role in 
the international Arctic affairs by eventually accepting the EU as an observer to the 
Council. In addition, they all supported strongly the suggestion to locate EU’s Arctic 
Information Centre in Rovaniemi. Anneli Jäätteenmäki (ALDE Group40) for example 
pointed out that “The University of Lapland deserves a praise for being the only 
university, the only agency, that has really worked to ensure that such a center would be 
established, and has devoted much time and effort to this.” (5) 
 
The Finnish MEPs participating the debate raised their concerns on possible 
consequences, which resource exploration in the Arctic could have on local, indigenous 
communities and on the fragile polar environment. Timo Soini from the Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy (EFD) party, representing right-wing Eurosceptic political 
group in EU, was the most expressive in his criticism towards the EU’s “Arctic 
excitement”.  He reminded, together with his Danish EFD colleague, Anna Rosbach, that 
EU’s access to the Arctic issues comes mainly through its Arctic member, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden. Therefore EU’s Arctic presence should not be taken for granted. He 
argued “they (Arctic regions) are regions with sovereign rights, which they may exercise 
to take decisions on their own matters.” (5) 
 
Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D Group41) reminded the listeners, that resource exploration brings 
not only possibilities, but as well as responsibilities for the EU: “It is important that 
natural resources are exploited responsibly and carefully in order to avoid the ‘gold rush’ 
phenomenon and catastrophes of the sort that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico (5)” 
                                                
40 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. 
41 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
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From a Finnish perspective, the EU is seen as an important intergovernmental actor in the 
Arctic affairs, as well is the Arctic Council.  Finland’s Under-Secretary of State Jaakko 
Laajava gave a speech at the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk in 2011, 
where he addresses the Arctic issues importance to Finland. Bearing in mind the audience 
for the speech, Mr. Jalava emphasizes intergovernmental cooperation as a corner stone of 
the Arctic politics, and Finland’s willingness to be a proactive participant in all the 
endeavors to deepen Arctic cooperation in the future. He stated: “Cooperation is not 
possible without political will, and political will must be based on the realities of our 
interconnected world and the appropriate understanding of our respective national 
interests in our new environment of increased mutual interdependence (6).” 
 
Jalava expresses Finland’s contentment with the current policy proceedings42 of the 
Council including the decision to establish the Council’s permanent Secretariat to the city 
of Tromsø in Northern Norway. Finland sees the permanent secretariat as an important 
instrument to raise awareness and to create long-lasting networks in the Arctic. Overall, 
Jalava expresses Finland’s support to strengthen the Arctic Council, which can be 
achieved by “engaging governments and institutions with legitimate interest in the 
region”. (6) Finland supports strongly EU’s acceptation as a permanent observer to the 
Arctic Council: “ In view of the major contribution by the EU to enhanced cooperation in 
the field of environment, economy, research and human contacts in general, its input into 
our work within the Arctic Council should be welcomed. I believe we all would benefit 
from a permanent observer position granted to the EU.” (6) 
 
Secondly, Jalava stressed Finland’s current Presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers 
(NCM), where it has been leading NCM’s response to climate change, especially in the 
Arctic. Finland encourages AC to seek dialog and to embrace best practices between 
                                                
42 Arctic Council’s member states signed in the Nuuk meeting the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue, the SAR agreement, which is the first legally binding agreement between the eight Arctic 
states (Arctic Council, 2011).  Jalava expresses Finland’s wish that SAR agreement as a succesful precedent ”will lead 
to further improvements in the Council’s normative role” (6). 
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other organizations related to Artic issues. Finally, Jalava emphasized Finland’s long 
history in the Arctic in terms of its indigenous Sami population, and strong traditions in 
ice know-how, both through Finnish Arctic explorers and modern ice-breaking 
technology. (6) 
 
Timo Koivurova (University of Lapland) commented in Kaleva newspaper in October 
2011, the outcomes of the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting. Koivurova points out a shift in 
power structures in the AC meetings; previously, some of the highest state 
representatives and the civil servants from the each member state attended the Council’s 
meeting, but the increased focus on the Arctic, means that today even ministers attend the 
meetings. For instance, US Secretary of the State Hilary Clinton participated meeting in 
Nuuk 2011. This change reflects the increased importance that Arctic Council is gaining 
in world politics. (7) 
 
Koivurova argues that the increasing number of new candidates for observant members 
also reflects international communities’ growing interest towards the Arctic. At the 
moment, the AC has six members with an observer status, but the EU Commission, Italy, 
China, Japan and South Korea have all submitted their applications to receive observer 
status. The AC members agreed in Nuuk for the new and relatively strict criteria for bids 
of new observer candidates. New applicants have to accept and support the objectives of 
the Arctic Council, recognize the Arctic States' sovereign rights in the Arctic, respect the 
values and interests of the Arctic indigenous people and demonstrate political 
willingness, as well as financial ability, to contribute to the work of the Arctic indigenous 
people in the Arctic Council. (6) 
 
Koivurova summarized in Kaleva’s article Finland’s willingness to make the Arctic 
Council the international institution and cooperation forum, where core decisions for the 
future of the region are made.  Finland is an eager supporter of the new bids for observers 
in the Council in order to strengthen its power in global Arctic affairs. (6) 
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6.2.2. Finnish Ministers on the Arctic Road 
In June 2011 Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government published a press release 
presenting the finalized negotiations over the Government’s Action plan for the next 
four-year-period. The press release stated that the Arctic affairs will be covered 
thoroughly in the Government’s new Action plan. The Arctic region has gained 
increasing economical and political importance in the global and domestic politics during 
the past years. However, climate change and resource utilization increase the risk of an 
environmental catastrophe in the Arctic region. Finland’s response to increasing risks is 
to promote Finnish expertise, and to intensify cooperation between the actors in the 
region. Finland believes that “cooperation between the Arctic countries should be 
increased in order to enhance the region's business activities, and in order to work against 
the environmental threats in the region” (7). In addition, “mining operations and 
exploitation of the natural resources in the region must respect the ecological 
sustainability and the rights of the indigenous peoples” (7). In terms of the EU’s 
participation in the Arctic policymaking, Finland's aim is to strengthen the EU's Arctic 
policy and get the EU's Arctic Information Centre to be located in Rovaniemi. (7) 
 
Erkki Tuomioja was elected to become Finland’s new Foreign Minister to Jyrki 
Katainen’s government in the summer of 201143. Foreign Minister Tuomioja, gave a 
speech at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) meeting in Kiruna, Sweden in 
October 2011.  
 
In the speech he addressed Arctic issues from the Barents region perspective by 
describing BEAC not only “to embraces people-to-people, community-to-community, 
or cross-border relations”, but actual represent the region, that is a part of the Arctic. For 
Finland, the Barents region is its gateway to the Arctic, and globally, the region is gaining 
increasingly more and more attention. (8) 
 
Tuomioja emphasized a comprehensive approach to the challenges occurring in the 
Barents region in the upcoming decades: “Climate change, together with sustainable use 
                                                
43 Jyrki Katainen’s Government: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/hallitus/jasenet/fi.jsp 
 72 
of natural resources, biodiversity conservation, pollution prevention as well as building 
up energy efficiency and renewable energy resources, economic growth, enhanced 
transportation and logistics in the region are inherently intertwined”. Barents Euro Arctic 
Council represents remarkable knowledge and expertise on these issues, and therefore has 
a potential for increasing its role influence on these complex problems that the region will 
facing.   
 
From the Finnish perspective, the Barents region plays a crucial role in the future of 
infrastructural development in the Arctic. Tuomioja stated: “The Barents link railway 
corridor from Northern Norway via Sweden and Finland to North-West Russia is 
essential for the economic development of the region. The Barents link will, undoubtedly, 
complement the Northern maritime routes”. (8) 
 
Lastly, Tuomioja highlights the importance of emerging new transportation routes across 
the Arctic via Barents region: “As a result of the climate change, the North-East Passage 
is opening as a global maritime transit corridor. While this is expected to benefit the 
Barents region, and contribute to region’s socio-economic growth and well-being, 
increasing traffic brings about new challenges and risks. The Agreement on Cooperation 
within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response is an 
indispensable instrument in this context. Finland will ratify the Agreement within the 
next few weeks”. (8) 
 
Last documentations from 2011 is a speech from Minister of Environment, Ville Niinisto, 
which he gave at the Barents region environmental ministerial meeting in Umeå in 
November 2011. Minister Niinistö gave the speech in a meeting where Sweden handed 
over the chairmanship of the Working Group to Finland for the following year. In his 
speech, Niinistö stressed Finland’s objectives for its chairmanship period, which includes 




Barents Region has gained significant emphasizes as strategic region for whole Europe.  
Niinistö encourages the Council to develop and to facilitate ”more communication on 
environmental issues with, and between, the economic stakeholders in the region.” 
Natural resources and new transportation routes are in the interests of the whole global 
community. The area is the world leader in in paper and pulp production. In addition, 
Niinistö reminded “that all of the 14 minerals listed by the European Commission as 
critical to the European Union can be found in the Barents Region.” Needs for natural 
resource extraction in the region come increasingly from outside of the Barents states, 
which demands a pan-Barents approach to the future environmental challenges in the 
region. (9) 
 
Finland believes that cooperation on nature conservation could enhance overall 
understanding and management “of the magnificent nature values existing in the region”. 
Niinistö stressed the importance of comprehensive understanding of natural conservation 
in the region in order to decrease the environmental impacts from the increasing 
endeavours on natural resources. Finland will continue its participation to the Barents 
Protected Areas Network (BPAN) project it order to increase understanding on 
environmental impact of the economic activities in the Barents region. Results of the 
BPAN project will be reported at the end of Finnish chairmanship. (9) 
 
Niinistö also named understanding of the climate change consequences on the economy 
as an important point on the Finland’s chairmanship agenda. He mentioned that Finland 
is developing regional climate change strategies, and encouraged similar cross-sectorial 
regional processes to be applied also elsewhere. Finland is committed to continue “the 
main lines of environmental cooperation in the framework of the Working Group on 
Environment”, and to maintain the group’s role “as one of one of the most important and 
active bodies of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.” Overall, Niinistö emphasized in his 
speech the importance of increasing environmental cooperation within, and outside the 
Barents region so as to generate comprehensive understanding of the environmental 
impact of future economic activities in the region. (9) 
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6.2.3. Domestic Politics Weakens the Arctic Agenda 
As a criticism to the weakening importance of the Arctic agenda in Finland, Analys 
Norden44 published an article in June 2011 referring to Finland’s recent political actions 
as “wasted opportunities” in the Arctic international relations. The article blamed Finnish 
political decision-makers for prolonging the government formulation process after the 
Parliamentary elections in April 2011. Finland’s passive Arctic politics in the Barents 
region has lead the country to pursue a dull Arctic agenda without any concrete 
accomplishments, e.g. to create a plan to improve railway connection between the Arctic 
Ocean and Norway, Finland and Russia. Finland lost its Arctic coastal line in the World 
War II, which moved it to the team of non-littoral, ‘secondary’ Arctic states, together 
with Sweden and Iceland. Nevertheless, those geographical changes granted Finland a 
special role as an Arctic mediator, because it does not have to worry its direct, national 
interests or to preserve its sovereign rights in discussions over the Arctic resource claims. 
However, Finland has not capitalized the benefits of its special role in the Arctic. (10) 
 
Developments in the Finnish domestic politics have been seen as a hindering factor on its 
road to strengthen state’s Arctic profile. The article argues, that changes in Finland’s 
domestic politics in the spring of 2011, interrupted severely its ruling government’s 
strong curse in international Arctic politics. Minister Stubb, together with the Katainen’s 
first government acted as strong Arctic lobbyists, but the election in March 2011 resulted 
a shift in the domestic power structures in Finland, and put a pause on progression in the 
Arctic agenda. While Finland has been struggling to strengthen its Arctic profile, Norway 
has successfully created a hub of international Arctic politics in Tromsø, as well as turned 
one of it’s the most remote Arctic islands, Svalbard, into Norway’s most international 
local community. The focus of the global Arctic community is turned firmly toward the 
Arctic Norway, argues the article. (10) 
 
 
                                                
44 Analys Norden is a web publication produced and maintained by Nordic Council of Minister. Its aim is to give a 
summarized outlook of ongoing political debates in the Nordic countries (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014).  
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6.3. Year 2012: Interest Towards the Arctic Increases  
 
The Finnish media’s attention towards the Arctic-related topics increased significantly in 
2012 compared to the previous years45. ArcticFinland reported 24 different articles, 
speeches and press releases from Finnish Arctic discussions on 2012, whereas on the 
previous year, that number was 14. Media coverage, as well as topics of the official press 
releases on the Arctic were widely fragmented covering themes from emerging Arctic 
business opportunities to the EU High Representative Cathrine Aston’s Rovaniemi-visit 
and to the indigenous peoples’ involvement in the future Arctic policy making. (Arctic 
Finland 2014) 
6.3.1. All Eyes Are On the Arctic 
Kaleva newspaper covered Arctic topics actively during 2012. Kaleva’s first column on 
the Arctic affairs in the 2012, was published in February and it highlighted the 
differences between Finland’s and Norway’s Arctic presence. Basically, the column 
focuses on explaining how Norwegians deliver much more successful Arctic business 
strategies than Finns do. Climate change and global economic recession are the main 
reasons for economic endeavors that Norway has actively practiced in the Arctic for the 
last decade. (11) 
 
The direct impacts of the climate change are seen in the opening of new, global 
transportation routes, such as the Northern Sea Route. This new transportation route 
could benefit considerably also Northern Finland’s cargo transportation as soon as 
Finland finds its access to the Arctic Sea. At the same time, Norway establishes actively 
Barents region’s gas and oil province to Northern Norway. Norway expects exploitation 
of the Arctic natural resources to bring even more jobs and prosperity to the northern 
regions of Norway in the upcoming years, while already now Norway is the world’s 
second largest gas and the sixth largest oil producer. A key phrase for the Norwegian 
plans for the Arctic, is ‘energy export’. (11) 
 
                                                
45 By this notion I refer to frequency of media ‘hits’ on the Arctic.finland-forum, which means there is a possibility, 
that some Arctic related articles are not included to this analysis.   
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Norway aims to offers Europe a more sustainable alternative for Arctic energy production 
than unethical and unsustainable energy production operated by Russia. However, the 
column also addresses criticism raised against Norwegian energy procedures in the 
North. Local communities, including indigenous communities, do not want to become a 
target of energy colonialism, which means that foreign energy giants or Norwegian 
national energy companies from the South, would gain all the benefits from the Arctic 
resource exploitation. In addition environmental organizations are against actions that 
expose fragile Arctic ecosystems to environmental hazards. (11) 
 
Finally, the column argues that Finland’s Arctic strategy, as well as its Arctic actions in 
general, lack of a genuine enthusiasm towards the Arctic cooperation. According to the 
columnist, Finland has the knowledge and the know-how required for projects in harsh 
Arctic conditions, e.g. understanding of extreme ice-conditions and long periods of 
darkness. Despite the know-how and occurring possibilities in the Arctic, Finnish interest 
towards the region has stayed surprisingly low. (11) 
 
The second Arctic-related column in Kaleva in 2012 approached the Arctic affairs with a 
title “Presidents of the North”. Finland’s 12th presidential elections were just over, and 
the columnist commented Arctic being more vigorously exposed in national media during 
the presidential debates than ever before. Questions about the politics of Northern 
Finland, especially in the frame of transportation connections to the Arctic Sea and 
mining projects in Lapland, were regularly covered in presidential election debates. (12) 
 
Globally economic potential of the Arctic is not news anymore. In Finland the economic 
potential of the Arctic is tied to our geography, which can be very beneficial to Finnish 
economy. Increasing importance of the Arctic does not necessarily benefit only the 
Northern parts of Finland, but shipyards and technology industries located in Southern 
Finland can as well boost their business through incoming Arctic investments. This 
comprehensive approach to the Arctic strengthens Finland’s position as a true Arctic 
nation. Nevertheless, the growing national interest towards the Arctic, regional 
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cooperation moves slowly forward in the Barents region. Policy mechanism for 
intensified cooperation are existing but actions stay on a backburner. (12) 
 
Kaleva’s next column, in March 2012, addressed huge investment potentials that the 
Arctic region can bring to the Northern Finland in upcoming years. The column 
encouraged Finland to “wake up” and start following its Arctic neighbors’ lead in the 
search of Arctic business opportunities. Lapland Chamber of Commerce estimates that 
potential investments related to Arctic business and infrastructure to northern parts of 
Finland, Norway and Sweden could rise to upwards of 125 billion euros during this 
decade. As a comparison the columnist mentioned that the state budget of Finland is 
annually around 50 billion euros. (13) 
 
The majority of investments come from mining, oil- and gas industries and projects 
within transportation infrastructure. In addition, wind power investments are rising in 
Sweden and Norway, while Finland is investing in nuclear power. Time will show, which 
energy path creates most sustainable ground for energy production. At the moment, the 
Sakatti-mine in Sodankylä is the biggest mining project in Finnish Lapland and is owned 
by mining company Anglo American. The columnist predicted that the Saketti-mining 
project could change Lapland region more than anything in its history. However, today 
the region is still a Nature-conservation area. (13) 
 
The columnist argued that exploitation of natural resource will bring along also 
challenges in terms of reindeer herding, forestry, tourism and nature conservation. New 
businesses will need the same land that has been used by the local business owners, and 
e.g. by the indigenous people in the region. The columnist predicted that there will come 
a day when investors’ and indigenous people’s interest clash in the Sami areas. (13) 
 
The column suggested occurring Arctic business opportunities to become a long needed 
“steam engine” to boost Finnish economy up again. Columnist advises innovation people 
of Helsinki to “Look North”. Finally column reminds of the importance of 
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comprehensive approach to land utilizations, and the knowledge of environmental 
impacts of any economic activities in the Arctic. (13) 
 
6.3.2. Business, Business, Business. But Let’s Not Forget the Environment 
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) is the leading business organization in Finland, 
and its main mission is to create an internationally attractive and competitive business 
environment for companies operating in Finland. EK has 16.000 member companies in 
Finland, which all together employ over 950.000 workers (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto 
2014). In February 2012 EK published in its Prima-magazine a feature story titled “Arctic 
Window Is Open” focusing on Finland’s business opportunities in the Arctic. (14)  
 
Chairman of the Finnish Construction Industries Timo Kontamäki encouraged in the 
article Finnish companies to act on the business opportunities in Arctic infrastructure 
development now, when the momentum is here. Finnish expertise on, for instance in 
research and development and in infrastructure construction businesses is highly valued 
in e.g. Northern Russia. Norwegians have already materialized lots of this Arctic business 
potential, and they work closely with Russian e.g. in Shtokman’s energy projects.  
 
Finland’s other strong asset in the Arctic business is its world-leading ice management 
industry. Tero Vauraste, CEO of state-owned icebreaker company Arctia Shipping, 
predicts that demand for offshore icebreakers grows when Arctic energy exploration 
keeps expanding. Northern Sea Route and growing Russian energy industry can generate 
significant new business for Finnish ice management industry. However, Vauraste 
reminded the reader that expanding Arctic transportation markets mean toughening 
competition in the area. Finnish shipyards have to be able to keep their cost of labor on 
competitive (compare to foreign operators) in order to stay in the race. (14) 
 
In the same story, Hannu Halinen Finnish Arctic Ambassador, summarized Arctic 
economic endeavors to be grounded on political and scientific cooperation. Finland is the 
EU’s forerunner in the Arctic cooperation. He stated, that competition over the Arctic 
natural resources will be hard, but the majority of the estimated energy reserves will be 
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found within the EEZ of some of the Arctic littoral states and therefore, ownership of the 
reserves will stay undisputed. Lots of questions still remain unanswered in the future 
discussion over the Arctic. For example Arctic fishing laws, transportation and 
environmental conservation will all include variety of aspects that need to be settled 
between the Arctic nations. (14) 
 
Hallinen emphasized Russia’s role as an important Arctic partner for Finland. However, 
Halinen encouraged Finland to be more proactive towards Russia and Norway, who both 
have intensified their Arctic relationship since the Barents Sea Agreement, in order not to 
be left out of crucial Arctic discussion and decision-making. In addition Halinen 
emphasized the role of University of Lapland in Finland’s international Arctic profile. 
Finland’s strong and multidisciplinary Arctic research profile will strengthen 
international interest towards the Finnish Arctic knowhow. Scientists from the Arctic 
center follow actively, for instance climate change impacts on yearly ice covers in the 
Polar areas. (14) 
 
Tero Vaurasto, CEO of Arctia Shipping, commented Finland’s Arctic profile and its Artic 
endeavors also in Helsingin Sanomat in April 2012. The news article was titled 
“Competition over the exploitation of the Arctic regions accelerates” and included 
argumentations for and against economic utilization of the Arctic region. Russia, Norway 
and Canada are already operating actively in the region, and Finland is about to follow 
their lead. Arctic politics have been included to the Government’s Action Plan and 
Finland has its own Arctic strategy, but lacks coherence in term of executing its plans for 
the Arctic. Vauraste said in Helsingin Sanomat that, Finland’s “take off” for Arctic 
business opportunities has been sluggish. According to Vauraste Finland has a unique, 
comprehensive know-how on ice management, extending from ship design to working 
with them: “This should also be capitalized properly.” (15) 
 
In the same article, EK’s Timo Laukkanen, addressed the significance of an early 
decision making when vast investment projects are in question in the region. Finland’s 
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role in the Arctic is to be a supplier of technology due to its geographical location outside 
the Arctic coastal states. (15) 
 
A third expert in the news article was Greenpeace Finland’s Programme Director, Tapio 
Laakso, who was disappointed on the fact, that impacts of climate change in the Arctic 
are seen purely as a business opportunity to drill more fossil fuels out of the Arctic 
grounds. In the article he criticizes Finland’s Arctic Strategy for “talking the talk” of 
fragile Arctic environment, but not “walking the walk” of it. He says Finland should not 
support any oil extraction projects in the Arctic because “Finland does not have any 
required skills, that would make oil drilling (in the Arctic) any safer. Finland's own 
Arctic strategy notes, that oil spill prevention in the icy waters is completely impossible 
with the existing technology." Laakso is particularly concerned about Russia's actions in 
the Arctic region due to its bad reputation to control oil-drilling projects even on the land. 
(15) 
6.3.3. State of the Arctic Environment Concerns Minister Niinistö  
The only documentation exclusively focusing on environmental threats behind potential 
economic activities in the Arctic is a post from Finnish Minister of Environment, Ville 
Niinistö’s blog from May, 2012. He explains the reasons behind Arctic “rush” evoking 
from the growing population and consequently accelerating energy consumption in the 
world. Due to the increasing energy dependency, pressure to find new natural resources 
from still undiscovered regions is increasing in every corner of the globe, including the 
Arctic is mounting. (16) 
 
Niinistö reminds that Finland has followed the global trend of the Arctic boom by 
rediscovering its mining industry. However, Arctic has still stayed untouched of any 
drilling and mining projects due to its harsh climate, but global pressure to start exploring 
Arctic natural reserves is growing. For instance, conceivable oil accidents, oil spills, 
under the Arctic ice and snow can trigger an environmental catastrophe that could be 
almost impossible to curtail. In order to stop this kind of hazard to happen, Ville Niinistö 
calls for a moratorium on Arctic oil drilling, fully prohibiting any resource exploitation, 
in the most vulnerable areas of the High North. Niinistö emphasizes politicians’ 
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responsibility to take action in international institutions, such as in the Arctic Council, to 
ensure that internationally agreement on the Arctic environmental conservation will be 
established. Interests of the Arctic environment and peoples should be considered before 
starting any exploitation of the region’s natural resources. A comprehensive approach of 
the region’s future is needed instead of rushing after the region’s natural resources in the 
cost of the Arctic people and nature. (16) 
6.3.4. High Time for the Finland’s Arctic Awakening  
Finnish newspaper, Huvudstadsbladet (HBL), published an editorial reflecting the news 
on ‘the kick-off’ of the Arctic cooperation between Finnish icebreaker company Arctia 
Shipping and Royal Shell in oil exploration outside of the coast of Alaska in March 2012. 
HBL’s journalist, Yrsa Grüne, wrote that Finland’s actions in the Arctic started “not a 
day too early.” Economic interests towards the Arctic ‘treasures’, oil and gas, are rising 
around the world, in among the others China, South Korea and India, who have all 
expressed their interest toward future Arctic resource exploration. (17) 
 
Contrary to Minister Niinistö’s demand for the Arctic moratorium, Grüne wrote that a 
total ban on oil and gas exploration in the region is unrealistic scenario. However, the 
international community has to predict and prevent environmental catastrophes in the 
vulnerable Arctic region, which can to be done by establishing an international agreement 
exceeding national borders. It should be a high priority for the policymaking in the Arctic 
Council and the Nordic Council. (17) 
 
Grüne further explains that relying only on the oil companies’ actions in the region, is an 
ignorant approach to the issue. Arctic states have to make sure oil companies have 
mapped the risks, and are prepared to tackle any unexpected situations that might to 
occur. Finland has started to pay higher attention to the Arctic, but a lot can still be done 
in order to secure sustainable future in the Arctic. (17) 
6.3.5. Geopolitics of “the New Arctic” 
In August 2012, Sami Moisio published an editorial in Kaleva about “the new geography 
of the North” and what kind of impacts changes in Northern geopolitics will have on 
Finland. Moisio argued that melting ice, development of the global energy and the raw 
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mineral prices and general trends in the world politics will define the curse of the future 
Arctic politics. Development and changes in the relationships between the key players in 
the Arctic, such as Russia and European Union, are especially important to Finland’s 
Arctic politics. International relations in the Arctic will affect progress of the region’s 
governing structures and engagement of the relevant actors. Current governing structures 
of the Arctic are defined by international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, and 
international convention, such as UNCLOS. (18) 
 
Furthermore, despite the changes in Arctic geopolitics, the defining attribute for 
Finland’s Arctic profile is its location outside of the littoral, Arctic states. Therefore, 
chances for Finland to get involved with resource-related conflict or disputes are 
negligible. However, changes in the Arctic, can radically affect the Northern Finland’s 
future proceedings. At the moment the majority of Finland’s “peripheral regions” are 
becoming deserted, as residents move away for work and study. (18) 
 
Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen gave a speech in Martti Ahtisaari-seminar in Jyvaskyla in 
November 2012. He spoke about the arising importance of the Artic region, not only for 
the Northern parts of the country, but the state of Finland as a whole. Arising Arctic 
interest, and its impacts to geopolitics, changes Finland’s own view of itself as country. 
Finland has moved from being “a far-away-land” to the “center of the opportunities”. 
(19) 
 
According to Minister Katainen, the ongoing mining boom, rise in Arctic energy natural 
resources, and new shipping routes are the main “game changers” in future, global 
politics and economy. Melting sea ice in the Arctic enables these changes to happen. 
However, Artic nature is extremely vulnerable and that is why all the economic activities 
in the region, especially resource exploitation, must be conducted in respect of highest 
environmental standards. (19) 
 
New shipping routes, as the Northern Sea Route, would remap the transportation logics in 
the world. However, Minister Katainen is skeptical of Northern Sea Routes realistic 
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benefits for Finland. Despite the lower levels of ice, harsh climate conditions and 
darkness remain in the polar areas for majority of the year. Cargo volume through Arctic 
shipping routes should increase significantly before it would be beneficial for Finland to 
consider investing for new railway connections new Northern harbors. (19) 
 
However, Finnish expertise on ice management technology is world leading, and 
therefore should be emphasized in its Arctic profile. Katainen stated that Finnish “cold 
how” can provide more potential growth and benefit for Finnish economy than Arctic 
shipping routes. Finland is the world’s only country, where all harbors are frozen in 
winter but remain their functionality all year around. Consequently, majority of world’s 
ice breakers are produced in Finland. Finland needs partners in order to grow its Arctic 
business, because Arctic project needs big investments to materialize. Cooperation 
initiatives such as Arctic maritime clusters are ideal for Finland’s participation, and its 
expertise for example in environmental protection technology, has guaranteed demand. 
(19) 
 
Katainen in the speech further explained, that the Government is currently updating its 
Arctic strategy with deeper focus on creating more concrete guideline for a knowledge-
based Arctic policy. Katainen summarizes the vision of the new strategy to develop 
Finland’s competences to coordinate the environmental constraints and the Arctic 
business opportunities as a part of international Arctic cooperation. (19) 
6.3.6. Minister Tuomioja: Climate Change Concerns 
Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, gave a speech at an Arctic 
seminar organized by FIIA in the 18th of September 2012. Minister Tuomioja started his 
speech on a rather “harsh” note compared to the other Finnish government official’s 
speeches in 2012. Tuomioja stated that “the raison behind ever-growing Arctic interest 
and endeavors is rather sad and frightening”. Progress of climate change is the most 
visual in the Arctic region where “the global average temperature increase of one degree 
will actualize at least doubled”. (20) 
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Tuomioja addressed the understanding of the Arctic regions as a whole, taking into 
account not only the area of natural resources and transport routes, but including the 
environment and the local residents. Tuomioja emphasizes cooperation, interdependence, 
trust and transparency as the key elements of all Arctic activities. Finland has an initiative 
in processes to develop existing legislative structures in the Arctic; “state sovereignty 
must be respected, but it does not prevent the recognition of interdependence”. (20) 
 
Changes in the Artic region will have far-reaching effects on the Finnish society as a 
whole. Tuomioja stated clearly the starting point of Finland’s own Arctic strategy: “while 
economic activities increases, Finland - and other Arctic countries - must make sure that 
all activities (in the region) are conducted in respect of the environment and the 
indigenous rights. In order to preserve sustainable development of the Arctic region, it is 
essential that the region's natural resources are exploited in a controlled manner, taking 
into account the economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts.” (20) 
 
Tuomioja explained Finland’s Arctic policies to be defined in close connection to the 
international Arctic discussion. Bilateral relations are significant also in Arctic affairs; 
Russia, Sweden and Norway are mentioned as the main Arctic partners to Finland. In 
addition, Nordic cooperation through the Nordic Council of Minister has also an Arctic 
dimension, though Nordic countries have very different basis for their Arctic politics. 
However, the Nordic countries share the same principles for Arctic cooperation, which 
they can strengthen in the other Artic forums as well. (20) 
 
The central forum for international cooperation in the Arctic is the Arctic Council, whose 
role, Finland wants to strengthen. The Arctic Council fulfills all the prerequisites to 
become an international institution with a global role and responsibilities. The thought of 
a joint Arctic Council was born in 21 years ago during the ‘Rovaniemi meeting’, which 
lead to the ‘Rovaniemi process’, that was assigned to asses the environmental impact 
assessment in the Arctic. Now would be the time to examine how environmental impact 
assessment framework and terms of reference work in practice. Tuomioja encouraged the 
Artic Council to take an active role, and place these questions to its agenda again. (20)  
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Finland acts as a vigorous developer of EU’s Arctic politics. In order to enhance the EU’s 
internal and external Arctic communication, Finland has proposed the EU’s Arctic 
Information Center to be located in Rovaniemi, Finland. Decision on the Center’s 
establishment will make the EU Commission, and it will be a part of a broader process of 
the EU’s strategic action points for the Arctic. Finland will be following-up the process 
carefully in the upcoming years. In terms of the EU’s bid for permanent observer status in 
Arctic Council, Finland believes EU meets all the requirements of a permanent observer 
and assumes it will be granted the new status in the next spring (2013). (20) 
 
Tuomioja ended his speech with a note on the continuity of the era of the united, peaceful 
Arctic region, so called era of “Pax Artican”. Nevertheless, he stated that cooperation and 
mutual trust must be built and increased continuously within the old and the new Artic 
partner. (20) 
6.3.7. Lobbing EU And Seeking New Partnerships From Norway 
In September 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, gave another Arctic 
speech in an experts’ seminar focused on Finland-Russia partnership in the Arctic region. 
Tuomioja addressed mainly the same objectives and priorities as elaborated in his 
previous Arctic speech above, e.g. the necessity of the cooperation in Arctic region. He 
repeated the same key elements, from Finnish perspective, in the Arctic discussions: 
cooperation, mutual dependence, trust and transparency. Adequacy of the current legal 
basis should be assessed, and Finland wants to be an active player in this development 
process. He highlighted the importance of the Arctic politics for Finland’s future; 
changes in the region will have far-reaching impacts to the whole country: As economic 
activities in the region increase, Finland together with the other Arctic countries, must 
ensure that all the activities occur in respect of the Arctic environment and the indigenous 
people. (21) 
 
EU’s Arctic politics remained closely covered in the Finnish media, when Catherine 
Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited 
Finland, Sweden and Norway in March 2012. The purpose of the visit was to highlight 
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EU’s increasing strategic, economic and environmental interest towards Arctic region, 
and discuss the EU’s application for permanent observer status further with these Arctic 
Council member states (European Comission 2012). Finnish media covered the visit 
intensely: YLE news and Lapin Kansa-newspaper covered the visit in five (online) news 
articles, in addition a special Arctic news portal, the Barents Observer, noted Catherine 
Ashton’s visit to the Nordics in their news reporting46. (22) 
 
Before the visit, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland reported Catherine Ashton’s visit 
to cover discussions on the EU Northern Dimension and the Union’s relationship with the 
Arctic. Aston comments on a press release, that she wants to “get a real sense of the 
issues (of Arctic/Northern Dimension) we need to address, and how the EU can engage 
effectively in support of our member states’ work in these parts of the world.” Aston’s 
Arctic tour continued from Helsinki to Rovaniemi, from where she travelled to Sweden 
and Norway. During her visit in Finland she met the Foreign Minister Tuomioja together 
with his ministerial colleague at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for 
International Development, Heidi Hautala, the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, and 
Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen. Aston’s visit to the Nordics ended with the EU’s 
Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen, Denmark. (22) 
 
YLE news reported in connection to Aston’s visit to Rovaniemi, that Finland is going to 
get the EU's Arctic Information Centre to Rovaniemi. Intentions had been that the 
decision would have been confirmed already during the visit, but the EU bureaucracy 
could not manage such a rapid schedule (22). Finnish Artic Ambassador, Hannu Halinen, 
was also positive about Finland’s project on EU’s Information Center. He emphased that 
this visit to the EU’s Northern regions will give Catherine Aston concrete vision how 
important these regions are, and how those have to be included to the EU’s policy 
making. Halinen stated also that the decision-making process in EU is slow, but the base 
for the project is strong. By locating the Information Center to Rovaniemi, the EU would 
                                                




also reach out to the its only aboriginal, Sami people, who are residents of Rovaniemi 
region. (22) 
 
Rector of University of Lapland Mauri Ylä-Kotola wrote a lengthy column in Kaleva in 
June 2012 about the same theme; Rovaniemi’s application for “the Center of the Arctic 
Cooperation.” Especially he emphasized University of Lapland’s broad network with 
wide ranging Arctic institution around the globe. Despite the fact that Norway got the 
Arctic Council’s secretary to be placed in Tromsø, and therefore made it to Arctic 
region’s capital, Norway has an ongoing disagreement with global super power China 
about its global research station in Svalbard. (23) 
 
Ylä-Kotola stressed that University of Lapland has a strong profile and far-reaching 
expertise on multidisciplinary Arctic research varying from social, environmental and 
human aspects of the Northern issues. In addition, it is the EU’s northern most university. 
Ylä-Kotola encourages Finland to cherish its long Arctic history and experience, and 
endeavor to become forerunner of EU’s Arctic affairs. (23) 
6.3.8. Finland bolsters its Arctic Cooperation with Norway  
“Finland has long traditions in Arctic navigation and shipbuilding technology. An 
expedition led by Finnish polar explorer Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld was the first to achieve 
a complete crossing of the North East Passage. For Finns the ability to navigate in 
winter has not been only a means of livelihood. It has also been our country's lifeline. 
Finland is the only country in the world where in winter every single harbour may get 
frozen.” (Niinistö 2012, Norway) (27) 
 
The President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, made an official state visit to Norway in October 
2012. Finnish media covered the visit in five different articles published, among the 
others, in Kaleva and in Helsingin Sanomat. The President’s delegation for the state visit 
included Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Alexander Stubb, Minister for 
European Affairs and Foreign Trade and a delegation of corporate leaders; and experts on 
the Nordic region from the Universities of Lapland and Oulu and from Barents Center 
Finland. During the visit, President Niinistö discussed the bilateral relations between 
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Finland and Norway with the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, focusing on 
issues relating to the Arctic region, and current international affairs. The Office of the 
President of the Republic of Finland47 stated in their press release in relation to the visit: 
“Finland and Norway share interests in the development of the northern regions, and 
Finland also wishes to strengthen both economic and scientific cooperation in the Arctic 
region.” The visit included a seminar focusing on the economic relations between Finland 
and Norway and a visit to the city of Tromsø where program focused particularly on the 
issues of Arctic research and cooperation. (26) 
 
As mentioned above, President Niinistö participated a seminar at the Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs, where he gave a speech highlighting strong diplomatic, 
geographical and cultural ties between Finland and Norway. In all, the speech addressed 
the importance of the great Finnish-Norwegian relationship, which potential both 
countries should recognize. As an opening remark, Niinistö maked a reference to Finland 
and Norway as tough competitors in winter sports but defined this competition as “very 
much a family affair”. He pictured Finland and Norway “a one Nordic family”. (27) 
  
He explained that Nordic cooperation continues maintaining its important role in the 
Nordic politics, but this cooperation can still be brought to “next level”. Niinistö stated 
that Finland has not properly realized its potential of economic cooperation and 
opportunities with Norway. On the realm of Arctic, Finland has woken up to action later 
than Norway, but Niinistö was convinced that Finland is “wide awake now”. And Finland 
sees Norway as its key Arctic partner; Niinistö summarized the cornerstones of the 
partnership to be “common border, close contacts and mutually complementary 
expertise”. (27) 
 
The Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) are natural forums for 
Finnish-Norwegian cooperation and, to strengthening Arctic region politically. Secondly, 
Arctic know-how is common dimension for cooperation. Niinistö addressed the 
importance of the Arctic know-hows in the environmental and economic sectors, where 
                                                
47 In Finnish: Presidentinkanslia. 
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networking of Finnish and Norwegian companies and research institutes is essential. In 
addition, strong cross-border cooperation on local and regional level, in all sectors of the 
Arctic, can offer new opportunities for both countries. Lastly, Finland’s and Norway’s 
close cooperation is needed in order to develop visa practices in the North between 
Norway, Finland and Russia. Finnish and Norwegian consulates in Murmansk are very 
useful actors in this area of cooperation. (27) 
 
Niinistö summarized his speech by stating that Finland and Norway have much in 
common: “We are not identical, but we are very similar. Although we are very close, we 
have not fully found each other yet. Or, paradoxically, perhaps because of our closeness, 
we have not identified the full potential of our relations. It is surely time to open our eyes 
and ensure that we never lose sight of each other and these possibilities”. (27) 
 
6.4. Year 2013: Arctic Issues Entering the Main Stage 
 
Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a 
combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected 
international and national events in the Arctic politics (Arctic Finland 2014). The Finnish 
Government released its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September 30 
international, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in 
the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. This caused 
a media tornado, which invigorated Arctic interest also in the Finnish media. During the 
2013, Arctic question were covered by wider range of Finnish media outlets than during 
any previous years since the turn of the millennium, but due to limits of a master thesis 
project I still focus only to the same selection of media outlets than in years 2011 and 
2012 (Helsingin Sanomat, YLE and Kaleva). 
6.4.1. Spring 2013 
Finnish media started the year 2013 by publishing news and opinion pieces discussing 
among other topics, whether Arctic economic opportunities are utopia or the most 
important direction for Finnish business to develop. Also importance of the EU’s Arctic 
Information Center’s for Finland emerged in media comments of Finnish officials in the 
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winter/spring 2013 (ArcticFinland, 2013). YLE started Arctic news year in January 2013 
with a news about the EU’s new focus towards the North. News story mentioned 
Finland’s and Lapland’s key role in the EU’s Arctic plans. European Economic and 
Social Committee visited Rovaniemi in January 2013, in order to listen locals’ 
perspectives on needs for, and requirements of the Arctic region. The Committee is an 
independent body, which provides advice and recommendations to European 
Commission and Parliament. (28)  
 
YLE reported that the committee seeking rapid actions for the EU’s Arctic policies 
because developments in the regions were speeding up strongly at the moment. The 
committee’s draft recommendations were dived into two parts. In one hand, the 
Committee recommended that “the EU to consult local, indigenous voices in order to 
safeguard the area’s nature’s balance.” In addition the EU should take more active role in 
the Northern affairs, for example by strengthening its role in the Arctic Council. (28)  
 
On the other hand the Committee’s draft defined the North as a region of new 
opportunities: “Global warming opens up new sea routes and allows for more efficient 
use of natural resources.” Climate change is not seen just as a threat on the Committee’s 
draft recommendation for the European Union; EU should see it also as an opportunity 
and adaptation to it should be explored thoroughly. (28)  
 
YLE also reaffirmed that EU’s Arctic Information Center had received a positive funding 
decision from the EU, though project is still under evaluation and preparation stages 
would last until 2013-2014. University of Lapland’s Arctic Center manages and monitors 
the project during the final decision process. (28) 
 
Secondly, YLE news covering the Arctic topics in 2013 discussed the impacts of Arctic 
ice melt on the marine environment in the region. News addressed concerns emerged in 
science community about strong, increased growth of algae growing under the Arctic ice. 
Due to disappearing ice cover algae gets more sunlight, which speeds up its normal 
growth. Scientists say this to be a new phenomenon in the Arctic.  “Warming climate and 
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shrinking sea ice lead presumably to massive changes in ecology of the northern areas ”, 
YLE news stated.  
 
6.4.2. Arctic Milestones in 2013: Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna  
The Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council under Sweden’s chairmanship took place 
in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013, where Sweden handed the Chairmanship over to 
Canada. The meeting had a historically important agenda, because the decision on several 
non-Artic states’ bid for observation status to the Council was to be decided during the 
meeting. Evaluation of the observer candidates, especially the five Asian states (China, 
India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore) had raised new international attention 
towards the Arctic Council. Arctic issues were no longer confined to the peripheral 
affairs in the world politics that were in the interest of the Northern states quite the 
opposite; Arctic had penetrated the global geopolitical agenda (Pelaudeix, Arctic Council 
Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized 
Arctic – China in, the EU on hold 2013). In Kiruna, the Council’s member states agreed 
to accept the five Asian states as new observers at the Council, but EU’s bid stayed only 
“affirmed” and final decision of it was postponed. The EU’s ban on seal products has 
caused an ongoing dispute between the EU and Canada, which hindered the Union’s 
acceptations to the Council. (Pelaudeix, Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: 
Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized Arctic – China in, the EU on hold 
2013) 
 
Lassi Heininen, Professor of Arctic Politics from the University of Lapland, commented 
on th expectations and outcomes of the Ministerial Meeting in YLE news on the May 14th 
and 15th, 2013. According to Heininen, Arctic Council has created stability to the Arctic 
region, which is globally unique, because the region was only 30 years ago still a Cold 
War arena. After the meeting, Heininen commented to YLE news that the inclusion of the 
Asian states as observers strengthens Artic Council in a long run. The new, powerful 
observer states the Arctic Council becomes a global actor in world politics. (29, 30)  
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Heininen was not surprised the Arctic Council’s decision to defer EU’s bid for observer 
status. He addressed that roles and responsibilities between different EU bodies 
(Comission, Parliament and the Summit) are still unclear for the Council’s non-EU 
members, which causes confusion on EU’s representation in an international 
organization. In addition EU’s and Canada’s interests clash in seal banning issues, and 
the dispute requires more time for reconciliation. (30, 31) 
 
Heininen mentioned that the Kiruna Declarion brings new understanding on how to 
combine economic interests and environmental protection in order to pursue sustainable 
development of the Artic region. Heininen address that economic interests are still one of 
the key interest on the Artic states’ agenda, but the oil spill response agreement that all 
the Artic states agreed upon, is first step on the way to sustainable Arctic development. 
(30)  
 
Also, Helsingin Sanomat reported on the outcomes of Kiruna meeting by highlighting the 
Council’s decision to postpone EU’s application for observer status. The EU’s and 
Canada’s disagreement over seal products was mentioned as one of the main reasons for 
leaving the EU still waiting for its observer status in the Arctic Council. (31) 
 
Other Arctic topics that Finnish media covered during the spring/summer 2013, were the 
Arctic Prime Ministers Summit of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Kirkenes in June 
2013, where ministers signed Kirkenes Declaration about the future objectives for 
Barents region. The declaration highlighted on one hand, the sustainable utilization of the 
region’s natural resources, and on the other hand, the importance of improving the 
region’s transportation infrastructure in order to benefit from potential new transportation 
routes in the Arctic region (32). YLE news reported Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitri 
Medvedev’s suggestion at the Kirkenes meeting to create local, visa-free Barents region. 
Finland did not receive Medvedev’s suggestion with a great enthusiasm (33). Finland’s 
Ambassador for Barents region, Marja-Leena Vuorenpää, commented on YLE news that 
special visa arrangements would be too costly for Finland due to its long boarder with 
Russia (34).  
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Kaleva newspaper reported on the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas-cooperation 
meeting in Oulu May 2013, where regional actors from Northern Finland, Norway and 
Sweden discussed about future perspectives of these regions. Cross-boarder cooperation 
will strengthen Northern communities and they can create more awareness about the 
valuable region also in the EU. (35)  
6.4.3. Summer 2013: ‘Calm’ Before the (Arctic) Storm 
During the Summer Finnish government official, at home and in the EU, commented 
their anticipations on Finland’s new Arctic before it was published in August 2013, and 
also after the release evaluating its objectives. 
 
Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen, introduced a new strategy to the Parliament and the 
Government of Finland in June 2013 by describing it more comprehensive compare to its 
predecessor. The new strategy includes goals and objectives for Finland’s Arctic politics, 
and defines means for achieving these goals. Katainen envisioned Finland as “an active 
Arctic player, capable of sustainable coordination of the constraints set by the Arctic 
conditions and business opportunities while making use of international cooperation.” 
Compare to the old 2010 strategy, sets the new strategy few more concrete goals in the 
following substance sectors: ﬁrst, the environment, “Fragile Arctic Nature”; second, 
economy, “Economic Activities and Know-How”; third,  “Transport and Infrastructure”; 
and fourth, “Indigenous Peoples”. (Katainen 2013) 
6.4.4. Same Strategy, Various Interpretations 
Green Party MP/Minister Ville Niinistö and Finnish MEP, Satu Hassi, commented on the 
Government’s preparation process of the Arctic strategy in a press conference in June 
2013. They talked about the importance of defining clear restrictions on executions of 
Arctic natural resources. Environmental risk of the Artic economic activities must be 
assessed carefully before any decisions of natural resources can be made. (36) 
 
Niinistö commented on the new strategy in his blog after the strategy was published on 
the 23rd of August, 2013. Niinistö comments that the strategy agrees with the basic 
quidelines, that the Green Party values on the highest in Arctic politics; ”the most 
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important starting point for all activities in the Arctic are the boundaries set by the 
sensitive Arctic nature and environment, and identification of the risks caused by human 
activities.” He complimented the new strategy to be more thorough and more aware of 
the requirements of protecting vulnerable Arctic environment than the previous Finnish 
strategy. (37) 
 
Niinistö highlighted Finland’s important iniatitive to create a protected zone around 
particularly sensitive international maritime area surrounding the North Pole. These areas 
are located outside of the economic zones of the coastal, Arctic states.(37) 
 
According to the new strategy, Finland’s objective is to conduct Arctic activites by 
coherent, predictable and steady regulations. Sufficincy of the existing Arctic convention 
will be evaluated, and if necessesary, additions can be made. (37)  
 
Finland is  committed to promote binding minimum standards for oil drilling in the Arctic 
region, which supports the Arctic Council’s signed agreement on joint efforts on oil spill 
prevention in the region.  Overall, Niinistö addressed the so-called ”principle of caution” 
to be applied to all Arctic activities, which requires thorough evaluation of possible 
environmental risk before any decision are made. (37) 
 
Hannele Pokka, Permanent Secretary of The Ministry of the Environment, commented in 
her blog, that the new strategy is more focused on the economic opportunities and 
preconditions, whereas 2010 strategy emphasized foreign policy dimension in Finland’s 
Arctic policymaking. Pokka elaborated Finland’s objectives from the new strategy: to 
import Finland’s strong Arctic know-how, for instance ship building technology, to the 
Northern markets. In addition Finland has robust knowledge on risk management and 
precaution systems that has been tested in various oil spill response assignments in the 
Baltic Sea. (38) 
 
Pokka mentioned the preconditions to Artic activities to evoke from environmental 
questions and climate change. Also Pokka addressed Finland’s progressive initiative to 
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create a conservation area around the North Pole; The Arctic Council has prepared 
creation of the protected zone around the North Pole for eight years at this point. (38) 
 
Also, Finland’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, commented on the strategy 
in his blog in August 2013, by emphasizing the threats of climate change, which he sees 
as the most dominant attribute behind all the changes in the Arctic: “heating climate 
accelerates melting of the Arctic ice and permafrost, which in turn increases the release 
of methane into the atmosphere accelerating greenhouse effects.” At the same time, 
Tuomioja stated that emerging business opportunities in the Artic are important for the 
Finnish business community, who should be able to use these opportunities. However, 
Tuomioja wrote that uncompromising preconditions for all the Arctic activities are “the 
limits imposed by the sustainable development of the Arctic environment” Tuomioja 
finished with a note, that the vision introduced in the strategy will ensure Finland’s 
competitiveness in the Arctic affairs, because green know-how will be growing 
importance in the Arctic context. (39) 
 
Among others, Alexander Stubb, Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, 
summarized his views about the new Arctic strategy in his blog shortly after the strategy 
was publishes in August 2013. Stubb took part in the preparations process of the strategy 
and describes his contributions by following: “I wanted to get rid of the Arctic 
"challenges" and turn them into opportunities. I do not want to see the Arctic as a 
playground of various security efforts or as a laboratory of knocking over climate 
challenges. It (Arctic) is first and foremost a huge business opportunity for Finland.” He 
wrote to be very satisfied how Finland’s Arctic strategy was able to included previous 
principle to the strategy. (40) 
 
Stubb praised the strategy to provide excellent guidelines for business development in the 
region by describing various business opportunities at the region for instance in energy, 




Most of all, Stubb emphasized Arctic politics to be global, not local in all its aspects. The 
Arctic, including all of its “branches”, interests global actors. He highlighted long-term 
commitments to develop business in the Artic region as the only way to achieve long-
lasting result in regional development of the Arctic. (40) 
 
Stubb sees Arctic’s economic potential and challenging environmental conditions as  “an 
excellent “test-zone” for the Arctic countries' ability to produce wise action, in which 
different interests are taken into account, but at the same time, the offered opportunities 
will be effectively executed. (40) 
	  
6.4.5. The Arctic Railway: Finland’s Gateway to the Arctic Ocean? 
 
The new Arctic Strategy includes 
Finland’s plans to develop 
transportation infrastructure in the 
Northern Finland, especially a 
project to construct a ‘Arctic 
railway’48 from and to the Arctic 
Ocean. The Strategy states that 
infrastructural developments in the 
Barents region require consensus 
and understanding between 
neighboring states (Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Russia), as 
well as joint funding mechanism 
(Arctic Strategy 2013). However, 
Finland is the only Nordic country 
without concrete action point on the 
Arctic railway is to “adapt a long-term policy and investment plan for gradual improving 
                                                
48 In Finnish ‘Jäämeren rata’. 
Picture 1: Plans for Arctic Railway presented in 
Finnish Arctic strategy 2013 (Arctic Strategy 2013) 
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of connection to the Arctic Ocean in regards to the requirements of increasing traffic” 
(Arktinen neuvottelukunta 2013). The railway proposal caused a great amount of interest 
and public discussion in Finland, which was reported by several news outlets.  
 
YLE news reported in October on the Finnish Parliament’s discussion about the Artic 
railway by defining the Parliament to be very enthusiastic about the project. The 
Parliament evaluated all three possible Artic railway projects that were introduced in the 
new Arctic Strategy: connection between Norway’s Kirkenas and Sodankylä, or 
connection to Skibotnia, or as a third option connection between Finland’s Salla and 
Russian Kandalaksha. (41) 
 
The connection to the Arctic Ocean; Sweden has operated quicker in terms of developing 
Arctic transportation connections. It has started to expand its railway connection to the 
Norwegian coastal town of Narvik. YLE explained that the debate in the Parliament 
about the different railway options, heated up due to the party True Finns’49 eager support 
for connections to Kirkenes. Merja Kyllönen, Finnish Minister of Transport, said that the 
Government needs to define and examine very carefully transportation needs of Northern 
mining business before implementing expensive infrastructure project. (41) 
 
Railway projects require billions in investments which is why a thorough evaluation and 
monitoring of the demands is essential before going forward with the projects, 
commented Kyllönen to YLE news. A possible new railway connection will affect  
Finland’s Northern harbours, and those affects must be evaluated carefully. YLE news 
reported Kyllönen asking for patience in discussion about the Arctic railway projects. 
(41, 42)   
 
Prime Minister Katainen referred to the Arctic railway as ”a great possibility” to Finland. 
Nevertheless, Finland has to discuss thoroughly with the other Nordic countries which 
                                                
49 The Finns Party (Finnish: Perussuomalaiset) a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland, and currently the largest party in 
the opposition (Perussuomalaiset 2014). 
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Arctic harbour they are all supporting, and carefully estimate if a new railway connection 
is a profitable transportation solution to the region. Katainen was interview by YLE 
Lappi after an Arctic conference, which was held in Rovaniemi in December 3th, 2013. 
(43) 
 
Katainen gave an opening remark in the conference, where he elaborates Finland’s 
objectives for new Arctic strategy by highlighting the core vision of the strategy. 
Katainen affirms Finland’s plans “to promote growth and enhance competitiveness in the 
region, while paying due regard to the environment.” Also, Katainen addressed the 
importance of international cooperation in the region, and economic partnerships through 
which to expand Finnish export markets. Katainen mentiones Norway and Russia, as 
vibrant Arctic markets, where could be demand also for Finnish Arctic businesses. (43) 
6.4.6. Finnish Icebreakers: Doom of the Arctic Environment, Or the Savior 
of the Finnish Economy? 
Finnish ice management know-how was praised in the new Arctic strategy; Finland 
produces world leading off-shore ice breakers, as well as it masters highly skilled 
knowledge for oil spill prevention operations in Arctic conditions (Arktinen 
neuvottelukunta 2013, 6). Finnish ice-breaker industry, especially state-owned Arctia 
Shipping, broke their way to the Finnish mainstream media in October 2013, when 
Minister for State Ownership Steering was accused of double standards in a dispute case 
between Arctia Shipping and Greenpeace activists. As mentioned earlier, Hautala had 
blocked filing of complaints from Arctia Shipping towards Greenpeace activists in two 
incidents in 2012, when Greenpeace protesters climbed onboard state-owned icebreakers 
in Helsinki. YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, reported proceedings 
of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping –case. Hautala’s case caused lots of debate and 
controversy in Finnish media, over renting icebreakers for oil exploration projects such as 
the mission of Arctia Shipping and the Royl Shell at Beaufort Sea in Alaska in 2012. (44) 
 
As a result of the accusations, Minister Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on 
the October 11th 2013, which accelerated debate over the justification of state-owned 
icebreakers’ activities in the vulnerable Arctic region. Hautala commented at YLE that 
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environmental and economic interest clash in Finnish ice breaker business. Hautala 
reminds that Finland’s Arctic strategy obliges state to consider carefully use of Arctic 
natural resources, which can be interpreted to include icebreaker activities as well. In 
addition, she emphasized the need to formulate a state monitored, specific strategy for 
Arctia Shipping actions in the Arctic. (45) 
 
Helsingin Sanomat and YLE reported on the aftermaths in the Finnish Parliament after 
Hautala’s resignation. According to the Prime Minister Katainen, the Government does 
not see a serious conflict between sustainable Arctic politics and icebreaker business in 
the Arctic maritime areas. However, Katainen states that “the issues has to be now 
discussed thoroughly inside the Government, and broader. It is important to contemplate, 
what is Finland’s role in the Arctic”. (46, 47) 
 
YLE published that Minister of Transport, Merja Kyllönen, defended strongly the 
Government’s decision to order the so called “traditional” icebreakers, that will be owned 
by Ministry for Transportation, yet Arctia Shipping prefers to produce multi-purpose 
vessels, of which services can be sold also for external customers. (47) 
 
Despite the heated debate in the Finnish Parliament over the icebreaker business, and the 
use of emerging new commercial routes in the Arctic waters, there are no guarantees 
Arctic shipping routes will be utilizable in the near future. An Executive from Danish 
shipping giant Maersk Group, comments on Finnish Tekniikka&Talous-magazine, that 
global shipping business will benefit from Northern Sea Route at the earliest 15-20 years 
from now. Suez channel is still today the dominant transportation between Asia and 
Europe. (48) 
 
Besides the political debate around Finnish icebreaker industry, YLE news reported in 
October of that year, that the risks and opportunities that the Arctic oil exploration 
business creates for icebreaker companies. Interestingly, Finland is the only state in 
world, which at the moment is renting its icebreakers out to be used in Arctic oil 
exploration purposes. Russia is another global ice management super power, but its 
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icebreakers cooperate only with Russian energy giants such as Rosneft and Gazprom. 
(49) 
 
Icy Arctic conditions are still dangerous and unpredictable, and due to ice-covered sea 
areas, the season for oil exploration is short. Arctia Shipping’s offshore vessels, Nordica 
and Fennica, were rented to Royal Shell’s oil exploration in Alaska, but the operation was 
put on hold due to several problems during the mission. Greenpeace Finland’s General 
Director, Tapio Laakso, believes that Shell cannot re-start the operation in the upcoming 
years either, because the US officials are re-examining Shell’s permission to operate in 
the Arctic. (49) 
 
Kaleva summarized the arguments from both sides of the vigorous public discussion on 
Finnish icebreakers, environment vs. economic benefits –paradigm, and hidden Arctic 
energy “treasures” in their article “Cold Arctic Arouses Hot Emotions” (Finnish: Kylmä 
Arktis herättää kuumia tunteita). The article argued that Finland lacks consensus on how 
to approach the Arctic issues, when emerging energy sources attract new business to the 
Northern Finland, and at the same time environmental organization anticipate 
catastrophic consequences of a possible oil spill in vulnerable Arctic environment. If 
Arctic business scenarios succeed, Finnish economy, and especially Lapland region, can 
benefit from the Arctic future a great deal in terms of new jobs and investments landing 
to the region. (50) 
6.4.7. Finland’s Arctic Epiphany Badly Belated? 
The Arctic region was referred (in the media) as the northern “Eldorado”, whose potential 
Finland had not yet fully discovered.50 On YLE’s Morning Talkshow (Finnish Aamutv) 
in October 2013, Minister of Labour Lauri Ihanalainen described Finland’s Arctic 
activities sluggish comparing to our neighbors Sweden, Norway and Russia. Ihalainen 
emphasizes Finland’s strong Arctic know-how, which it should capitalize now rapidly, 
although acting in respect of environmental values in the region. (51) 
 
                                                
50 For instance Mirja Niemitalo, Kaleva 27.12.2013: “Eldorado, next door”; Verna Leinonen, YLE 5.10.2013: “ 
‘Eldorado of the oil world’ on the map: this is what Russia is going after in Arctic maritime region.” 
 101 
Chairman of the Parliament, Eero Heinäluoma, suggested in Helsingin Sanomat in 
November 2013, that Finland should appoint a new minister to manage and monitor 
Arctic affairs in order to stay up-to-date with emerging, Northern employment 
opportunities. Heinäluoma pointed out that especially the empoloyment potential in 
Northern-Norway’s energy project. Norway’s energy projects could be extremely 
beneficial for Finland’s businesses and workers. (52) 
 
Heinäluoma was not the only one encouraging Finland to explore arising employment 
and investment potential in Norway. In 2013, Norway came up several times in the 
Finnish media as “a perfect Arctic student”, whose example Finland should follow more 
carefully. MTV 3 news interviewed Terje Mayer, Managing Director of Kirkenes 
Naringshage (Business Garden ‘hub’), who encourages Finns to start engaging rapidly in 
accelerating Arctic business life before they would be left out. Especially the Chinese and 
Koreans are eager to participate in investment project in the Barents region. MTV 3 news 
published a commentary article after Terje Mayer’s interview, where journalist Keimo 
Lehtinen accused Finland of lacking political will to proceed with Arctic business and 
political prospects. Arctic affairs are still seen as “dabble of Laplanders”, which hinders 
political decision makers to see the exceptional growth potential on the coast of Arctic 
Ocean. Lahtinen argues, that in the worse case scenario, decision-making, and potential 
investment projects, will land to the hands of the Chinese and the Koreans, who have 
shown great interest towards the Barents region. (53, 54) 
 
After a visit to Hammerfest Norway, Minister Alexander Stubb wrote in this blog about 
the huge trade and partnership potential between Finland and Norway. Stubb argued that 
“there is lots of room for growth in economic relations between Norway and Finland”. 
He highlighted the Finnish know-how potential especially in construction, mining, 
engineering and metal industries. At the moment Finland’s export to Norway is only 3 % 
of its total foreign exports. Economic growth in the North is lead by the Norwegians still 
today, but it is high time for Finland to get involved in these emerging Arctic markets. 
(55) 
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6.4.8. The Other Side of the Golden Coin: Environmentalists Get Activated  
As summarized above, Finland’s economic initiatives in the Arctic were covered rather 
actively in Finnish media in the fall 2013, and consequently environmental endeavors 
remained in the background. Nevertheless, Finnish, as well as foreign, environmentalists 
praised Finland’s significant initiative to create a global sanctuary around the North Pole, 
which was introduced in the new Arctic Strategy. Greenpeace International was pleased 
on Finland’s initiative to support “one of the key demands of the growing Save the Arctic 
movement”, which is Greenpeace’s massive international, civil movement against Arctic 
energy exploitation. Greenpeace reminds in the same story on their website, that 
Finland’s previous Arctic strategy did not consist “a single concrete proposal about 
Arctic protection” (Greenpeace International 2013). 
 
Tapio Laakso from Greenpeace Finland expressed Greenpeace’s appreciation on 
Finland’s significant opening in the conservation of the Arctic nature. Laakso explained 
in YLE news’ interview that Greenpeace is very pleased about the call for global 
sanctuary around the North Pole, as well as for minimum standards for oil drilling in the 
Artic region. Greenpeace campaigns for a total ban for Arctic oil drilling but Finland’s 
initiative is the first state level demand around the oil drilling issue in the Arctic. (56)   
 
First and foremost, Arctic environmental questions appeared in Finnish mainstream 
media thanks to Greenpeace’s boarding of Gazprom’s oil exploration vessel in the 
Pechora Sea in October 2013. Finnish media was mostly interested in Finnish activist 
Sini Saarela’s participation in the mission, but in this study I have left out the media 
material around Saarela’s prison-time in Russia of the primary research data, because 
direct coverage of Saarela’s trial focused mainly on contradictions between international 
human rights and Russian juridical system. Through Saarela’s case, international Arctic 
politics gained great interests in media and public discussion. In that perspective 
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Greenpeace’s mission to raise awareness on the Arctic oil exploration issues in Russia 
was successful51. 
 
As reported above, the economic aspects, and Finland’s involvement to the Arctic 
business opportunities, did raise an intense debate in Finnish media; however 
environmental questions were not left out media’s limelight either. In October 2013, YLE 
interviewed Magnus Nyström, specialist to environmental safety and damages at the 
Ministry of the Environment, who argued that the Arctic stands a great symbolic value 
for environmental organizations. Arctic ecosystem is very different from the regions 
where oil exploration and drilling has been done before. Nyström argued that risks for 
environmental hazard rise essentially when commercial activities will be started at the 
Arctic region. (57) 
 
Again in YLE, Finnish MEP, Sirpa Pietikäinen, called for a robust ethical thinking over 
the questions on Arctic oil drilling, or Finland’s role in external partners’ Arctic resource 
explorations. Pietikäinen argued that Finland has to make a decision whether to be part of 
the Arctic resource exploitation or not, and consider what kind of message it will send 
from Finnish climate change policies. She also calls after proper evaluation on 
environmental risk analysis in EU’s Artic strategy. Pietikäinen compares environmental 
risk potential of an oil spill accident at the Arctic as ten times bigger than environmental 
hazards of the infamous Finnish Talvivaara mine disaster.52 (58) 
 
In September YLE summarized new results from IPCC’s fifth report on proceedings of 
climate change. The report described how global climate could warm up to 5 degrees 
over next decade. IPCC’s new report affirms that for 95 % guaranteed human activities 
are the main contributors for accelerating climate warming. The panel addressed the 
importance of cutting growing number of greenhouse gas emissions in order to slow 
                                                
51 In YLE radio’s magazine programme “World Politics Daily” (Finnish “Maailmanpolitiikan arkipäivää” ) Professor 
Lassi Heininen and Senior Research Fellow Harri Mikkola stated that the Arctic would not be in the public interest 
without Greenpeace’s “publicity” stunt in the Russian Arctic, that involved personal stories of the activist.   
 
52 Talvivaara http://londonminingnetwork.org/2012/11/finland-talvivaara-environmental-disaster-goes-on-an-on/ 
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climate warming to proceed. (59) The melting of the polar areas is believed to affect 
world’s climate globally. Finnish professor Timo Koivurova from University of Lapland 
commented IPCC’s report at YLE’s interview by stating that its results might be even too 
optimistic. He argued that living standards keep rising, especially in the Asian countries, 
which questions if there even is a global willingness to curb CO2-emission (60). 
 
YLE news reported about unpredictable weather conditions becoming a norm in the 
Arctic regions. Biodiversity of the polar areas alters due to changes in the areas usual 
weather conditions. International studies affirm climate change to be factual, which 
means melting of polar glacier as well as Arctic permafrost. Rising temperatures heat 
Arctic waters, air and land, which consequently has effects on for example Arctic fish 
stock. Drastic changes in the Artic biodiversity jeopardize indigenous lifestyles that are 
still in deep interdependency with the Arctic nature. (61) 
 
Aggressive fall storms raged in Finland in October and November 2013, which raised 
questions about origins of these exceptionally strong storms. Director of Finnish 
Meteorological Institute, Mikko Alestalo, discussed his concerns for the reasons behind 
the unusually strong storms in YLE news’ interview in December 2013. Alestalo posed a 
possible link between melting Arctic Ocean and exceptional weather conditions in 
Northern-Europe. (62) 
 
Arctic environmental cooperation suffered a political setback from a Finnish perspective 
in December 2013, when international Arctic ministerial meeting in Inari, Finland faced 
dramatically low attendance by its neighbors. The Minister of Environment Niinistö was 
the only ministerial representative in the meeting of Ministers of Environment of the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council in December 2013. Among others, Kaleva and Lapin Kansa 
newspapers noted Finland’s neighbors’ unfortunately low interest towards the Arctic 
environmental meeting. Kaleva quoted editor-in-chief from Barents Observer who 
interpreted lack of interest towards the meeting to reflect that “the states are interested in 
the Arctic region, mainly because of the economy, and the environmental issues are 
considered to be secondary” (63) 
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The only completely positive news piece on the Arctic environment registered on 
Arcticfinland-forum during the year 2013, was an article from MTV3 news station in 
December 2013. MTV3 reported on results of European Space Agency report on a 
bounce back in the extent of sea ice in the Arctic in the summer 2013.  Also, the volume 
of the sea ice increased. However, scientists warn to not get too consoled from the 
“recovery” news. Professor Andy Shepherd of University College London concluded:  
"Although the recovery of Arctic sea ice is certainly welcome news, it has to be 




By investigating the process constructed by the data presented in the previous chapter I 
have aimed to locate causal mechanisms behind the change in Arctic discourse in 
Finland, which I argue to reflect the current understanding of the Arctic in Finland.   
 
I acknowledge the researcher’s role in process tracing always to be active due to his/hers 
role as an interpreter of causal connections. Bennett (2002) describes researchers 
observations on causal mechanisms same as “(…) a detective looks for suspects and for 
clues linking them to a crime.” In process tracing dependent variables (the suspect) will 
be reflected through the eyes of a researcher (detective) and with the tools of independent 
variables, (the clues) in order to “solve” the selected research question (the crime) 
(Bennett 2002, 31). 
 
As the previous data review (the process) illustrates, the Artic was widely covered topic 
in the Finnish media, as well as in the speeches and opinion pieces of the Finnish 
policymakers. All the arguments, the framings and the emphasis presented in various 
platforms (in media outlets, in conferences or in debates), as well as all the things, that 
were not said, have shaped the Artic discourse as it appears in Finland today. In this 
master thesis project I presented only a limited selection of comments and arguments, 
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that were said about/or related to the Arctic affairs from 2011 to 2013, but already in an 
early stage of the research process I realize how vibrant the Arctic discussion in Finland 
and carefully limitations had to made to the data. I focus on the arguments on the 
environmental issues and economic prospects in the Arctic, which both proved to have 
vital part in the last years’ Arctic discussion.  
 
That being said, I had to restrict the data selection to December 2013, in order have 
control over this process, and actually have time to locate the causal mechanism behind 
the Arctic discourse in Finland. Though this thesis provides an analysis of the change that 
happened in the Arctic discourse during 2011-2013 in Finland, is there definitely demand 
on further studies and new hypotheses, when Arctic politics go forward. I would suggest 
a new study on the impacts that the change in the discourse have on the actual 
policymaking in Finland, e.g. how the new emphasis in the Arctic discourse will reflect 
in implementation of the Arctic strategy (2013)?  Arctic discourse will and should be 
under constant revaluation, because the actual changes in the Arctic region, and its 
politics happen rather rapidly. New actors, such as the Asian countries, will create new 
dynamics in the Arctic international relations, which can also effect to the Arctic 
discourse in Finland, as well as globally.  
 
Unexpected events in the Arctic, political or environmental, such as Greenpeace vs. 
Russia –dispute can have unforeseeable impacts on the current understanding of the 
Arctic, which is exactly what makes analysis of the change in the discourse meaningful. 
As I have showed in the data selection, the ‘Arctic media storm’ in the fall of 2013 had a 
significant impact on the Arctic discussion in Finland, and consequential shaped the 
current Arctic discourse; After the events around Sini Saarela’s case in Russia and Heidi 
Hautala’s resignation due to lack of confidence in Arctia Shipping vs. Greenpeace –case 
raised completely unforeseen attention in Arctic environment vs. economic prospects –
debate in Finland. ArcticFinland-portal collected only between October and February 
2013 over 80 articles, speeches etc. to its media monitoring web archives whereas in 
2011 and 2012, the total and combined number of same Arctic materials could not even 
together reach to numbers of the Arctic media boom in Finland fall of 2013 (Arctic 
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Finland 2014).   I argue this activated Arctic discussion will have long-reaching impacts 
on Finnish understanding of the Arctic, and consequential can affect the path chosen by 
the policy makers.   
 
In the next few pages I will analyze how the selected variables reflect the change in the 
discourse. I present the themes and framings used in the argumentations pro/con Arctic 
environment and economics (independent variables). I approach Finland’s international 
partners’, especially Norway’s, impacts to the change in the discourse as an intervening 
variable. Finally I will summarize, how causal connection between the variables envision 
the change that happened in the Arctic discourse in Finland from 2011 to 2013.  
 
As mentioned earlier all conclusions and connections presented in this analysi are drawn 
from this selection research data, and will not aim to present only possible interpretation 
of the current Arctic discourse. This study, as majority case studies in social sciences, 
aim to differentiate empirical generalizations from analytical replications; drawing 
generalizations from a highly selected and defined case study research should not be the 
goal of a single or comparative case study. I have focused on presenting the analytically 
replicable conclusions that can be tested in another context (Vaus 2001, 243) (Laine, 
Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 25), and further, an analysis that encourage scholars to create 
new hypotheses in order to capture future changing in Arctic discourse in Finland (or 
elsewhere).  
 
7.1. Year 2011 
 
Despite the newly published, Finland’s first Arctic strategy, Arctic issues were not as 
actively discussed in Finland in 2011 as they were in 2012 and 2013. Two thematic 
frames overarched discussion documented in my selected research data during the 2011: 
Objectives of Finnish first Arctic strategy and EU’s importance in Finnish Arctic politics, 
as well as Finland’s support to the EU in its Arctic affairs.  
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As in Pertti Torstila’s speech (1) from the January, 2011, Finland was described several 
times during 2011 as an economic-driven, environmentally conscious and cooperation-
favoring Arctic player, whose objectives for the Arctic politics were defined in its first 
Arctic strategy. In addition, international Arctic cooperation was mentioned as the 
cornerstone of Finland’s Arctic politics. Finland economic approach was described to 
respect the fragile Arctic nature, which was pointed as the basis of all the Arctic activities 
Finland supports or carries out. 
 
During the year 2011, government officials and civil servants repeated mainly that same 
arguments about Finland as a responsible, economic and environmental Arctic actor, and 
as a strong supporter of the EU’s bid for the permanent observer status in the Arctic 
Council. However, coherent actions, or initiatives to materialize the defined objective on 
the Arctic issues lacked from the speeches and commenters given by the Finnish 
governments representatives. I argue that media’s low interest, and consequential non-
existing public discussion, about the first Arctic strategy was a result of the vagueness in 
terms of concrete actions in the strategy. On the basis of the data, I could see that as 
critical geopolitics suggest, the practical dimension of geopolitical discourses (Ó Tuathail 
and Dalby 1998, 4-6), such as official speeches about the Arctic strategy, construct 
discourses. Finnish government official did not comment easily anything besides the 
points presented in the official documents, which shows their ways of framing the Arctic 
was defined by the Arctic strategy.  
 
In terms of following the intervening variable, international Arctic, Finland’s support 
EU’s bid to become observer in the Arctic Council was the most actively used argument 
in comments related to Arctic international affairs in 2011. I interpret Finland’s support 
to EU to reflect its attempt to strengthen its own role as an international Arctic actor (5), 
as well as to facilitate Finland’s own objective to get EU’s Arctic Information center to 
be placed in Rovaniemi (4). University of Lapland was also mentioned several times in 
documents from 2011 and 2012 as international, highly respected Arctic research 
institution (5, 23, 14), which, I argue, to reflect Finland’s role as neutral research partner 
in Arctic affairs. 
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In addition, references to EU as Finland’s important international Arctic partner, 
cooperation at the Barents Region was mentioned more than once as an important forum 
for international Arctic cooperation. Ministry of Employment and Economy emphasized 
Finland’s reluctance to materialize its geographical benefits in terms of business 
cooperation with Russia, which Norway is already doing successfully (2). Minister Erkki 
Tuomioja (8) highlighted the crucial role the Barents region has in infrastructural projects 
taking place in the Arctic, which obviously referred also to investment potential that the 
region has. The Barents link railway was discussed as a great opportunity for Finland to 
enhance its economic cooperation in the Arctic with Russia and Norway, and 
consequential the cooperation in the framework of the BEAC (and the Barents region in 
general) as Finland’s gateway to the Arctic.  However, comments related to the Barents 
region were strongly economic focused already during the year 2011, Tuomioja (8) and 
Niinistö (9) did mention the BEAC’s objective to support sustainable socio-economic 
growth in the region, and to act against climate change in terms of developing e.g. 
efficient use of renewable energy sources, in which the region states have remarkable 
knowledge and expertise. Niinistö encouraged BEAC to communicate importance of the 
environmental issues louder with and between the stakeholders at the region, especially 
when global interest toward the region is increasing.  
 
The Arctic Council did not come up in the documents from the 2011 at all, except in the 
note on US Secretary of State’s participation in the Nuuk Ministerial meeting, which was 
interpreted to envision growing importance of the Council. Also Asian countries’ bids for 
the observer status in the Council were noted as sign of the Arctic affairs becoming more 
and more globalized. (6) 
 
Changes in domestic politics also effected the Arctic discourse in Finland in 201. In the 
spring of 2011, Finland’s domestic politics underwent turbulent national elections, which 
resulted in a delay in the formulation of the new Government. The 2011 Elections were 
argued to have a hindering impact on the Arctic policymaking, because the new 
Government had new ministers with new politcal priorities (10). However, I argue that 
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change of the Government in the summer 2011, gave ‘a fresh start’ for Finland’s Arctic 
policy-lines and perceptions. As the data in this thesis show, Finland’s first Arctic 
strategy did not trigger any special interest towards the Arctic issues in Finland. In June 
2011 the new Government of Katainen’s announced their intent to increase focus on the 
Arctic issues (7) ‘kicked’ the Arctic affairs higher on the national policymaking agenda. 
 
7.2. Year 2012 
 
On the basis of my data I refer to year 2012 as Finland’s ‘real Arctic awakening’. The 
biggest single event, that had influence to the Arctic discussion in Finland in 2012, was 
the business partnership agreement between Shell and the Finnish company Arctia 
Shipping icebreakers, which was received as welcomed stimulation to Arctic business in 
Finland (14, 17). Although, some counterarguments against the Arctic resource 
exploration were presented (Tapio Laakso in 15, Niinistö in 16), the Arctic economic 
prospects mainly framed as underused economic potential, in where Finland should turn 
their gaze rapidly (e.g 14).  
 
Northern Finland was seen as a key region in the Arctic business partnerships.  Northern 
Finland as a region has great potential to attract investments and increase regional 
cooperation with Russia and Norway in the Arctic businesses. Barents region and BEAC 
was only one forum for cooperation but also bilateral relationship between the local 
partners in Norway and Russia was encouraged (12, 13). Kaleva newspaper was a strong 
‘voice’ to support regional business partnerships between the Northern regions of 
Finland, Norway and Russia (e.g.13). Finnish mining industry, among the others, was 
encouraged to learn about the efficient business models in the Arctic from the 
Norwegians. Shtokman’s energy projects were mentioned as an example of the efficient 
Norwegians-Russian cooperation in the Arctic (13).  Although Arctic partnership with 
Russia can be greatly beneficial to Finland (21), has it also its price. I found it very 
interesting to realize that the controversy, a sort of Arctic paradox (Palosaari 2011), with 
Russia as Arctic business partner did not arise to the headlines: Russia as a dirty Arctic 
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oil exploration, vs. important investment partner in the Barents Region did not come up 
in any documents in my data selection from the year 2012.  
 
President Niinistö’s state visit to Norway produced positive publicity about Finland and 
Norway’s good diplomatic relations, which mainly focused on their mutual interest 
towards the Arctic, and the political and economic cooperation in the region (26). 
Niinistö encouraged both countries to ‘open their eyes’ for their closeness and reinforce 
their cooperation in the Arctic. President Niinistö also admitted Finland to be behind 
Norway in terms of materializing the economic potential of the Arctic (27). In the 
arguments presented during the state visit in Norway, variable international Arctic, 
envisioned Finland’s dependency on its Arctic partners, such as Norway. Samio Moisio 
argued that Finland’s position in the Arctic geopolitics will be defined in future 
developments of the Arctic international relations, which are strongly influenced by the 
global energy and raw mineral prices (18). Through partner such as Norway, Finland can 
expand its Arctic leverage outside of its place as a non-littoral Arctic state.  
 
Economic potential in the Arctic was not seen to benefit only the Northern Finland. 
Among the others Prime Minister Katainen argued that business opportunities in the 
Arctic Finland would not only to benefit the regions in the northern Finland, but also the 
whole country; Arctic has shifted from far-away to center of the opportunities (19). 
Finnish expertise in ice management technology was embraced by various Finnish Arctic 
actors (19, 15), which I argue, reflects a common ‘need’ to create positive discussion 
about the economy in Finland. Europe’s economic stand-still has created a need for 
Finland to create national trust to the economy with new business opportunities such as 
the Arctic. 
 
However, focus on the business opportunities in the Arctic increased remarkably 
compared to previous years’ data. Prime Minister Katainen and Minister Tuomioja 
reminded Finland to coordinate its Arctic activities in environmental constrains of the 
fragile Arctic nature (19, 20). In addition, conflicting interests of the local indigenous 
people and the potential investors’ was seen as a challenge for materializing Arctic 
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business potential (13). Concerns over the fragile Arctic nature appeared the strongest in 
the arguments of Minister Niinistö, who was very vocal in his demands for more 
sustainable Arctic environmental politics. Niinistö was the only Finnish politician, who 
(based on my data) suggested a the Arctic moratorium, which would ban all oil and gas 
extraction in the Arctic region.  
 
Not surprisingly Greenpeace’s Tapio Laako also reminded weakening environmental 
agenda in Finnish Arctic politics: He accused Finland to “talk the talk” of environmental 
conservation in the Arctic, but not “walking the walk” to it (15). 
 
Also in 2012, EU was framed as one of Finland’s main Arctic partners, and EU’s High 
Representative, Catherine Aston’s visit was clearly received in Finland as a sign of 
respect for Finland being ’a real Arctic country’. The main, common theme in the media 
coverage from the visit was the Arctic research cooperation between Finland and the EU, 
in which the EU’s support to Finland’s bid to get the Arctic Information Center to 
Finland was frequently emphasized (e.g. 14, 20, 21, 22). I argue that the EU’s Arctic 
Information center represents an easy, low-tension area of cooperation in the times of 
conflicting environmental and economic interests in the Arctic.  
7.3. Year 2013 
 
The Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a 
combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected 
international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released 
its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September 30 international, Greenpeace 
activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to 
protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. This caused a media tornado, which 
invigorated Arctic interest also in the Finnish media. During the 2013, Arctic question 
were covered by wider range of Finnish media outlets than during any previous years 
since the turn of the millennium, but due to limits of a master thesis project I still focus 
only to the same selection of media outlets than in years 2011 and 2012 (Helsingin 
Sanomat, YLE and Kaleva). 
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Through Sini Saarela’s time in custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between 
environment and economic activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire 
Finland was following during the fall of 2013. 
 
All the 30 Greenpeace activists participating the operation, including s Finnish activist 
Sini Saarela, were detained by Russian Coast Guard and kept in prison for more than two 
months. Finnish as well as global media followed closely the events surrounding the 
imprisoned Greenpeace activist in Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of two activists who 
were able to board the Russian vessel before they got detained. Saarinen was held in 
custody for over two months while Russian authorities pursued investigation around 
piracy charges for the activist. However, charges changed from piracy to hooliganism 
during November 2013 (Greenpeace International). Through Sini Saarela’s time in 
custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between environment and economic 
activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire Finland was following during 
the fall of 2013.  
 
In addition to the incidents mentioned above, environment vs. economic benefits in the 
Arctic rose to the media headlines, when the Finnish Minister for State Ownership 
Steering Heidi Hautala resigned after a dispute between Arctia Shipping and Greenpeace 
in 2013. Hautala had blocked filing of complaints following two incidents in 2012, when 
Greenpeace protesters climbed aboard state-owned icebreakers in Helsinki. Hautala is a 
former chair of the Green League, Finnish environmental party, and media accused her 
supporting her own “green agenda” (i.e. Greenpeace) over economic benefits of the state 
of Finland (Arctia Shipping). YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, 
reported widely on the proceedings of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping–case. As a result 
of accusations, Minister Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on October 11th 
2013, which accelerated debate over the moral behind state-owned ice breakers’ activities 
in the vulnerable Arctic region. 
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Whether Greenpeace’s project was successful, or even legal, or whether Hautala’s 
reassignment was necessary, is not discussed in this paper. However both of these 
incidents’ influence to Finnish Arctic discussion is undisputable; in the fall of the 2013 
Arctic questions were discussed in Finnish media more frequently than any other year 
during the 2000s. Also, the release of Finland’s new Arctic strategy accelerated media to 
address Arctic question more often than usually (Arctic Finland 2014)53. 
 
Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a 
combination of developments in national Arctic policymaking and unexpected 
international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released 
its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September Greenpeace attempted to board 
a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling 
activities in the Arctic. This caused a media storm, which invigorated Arctic interest in 
the media. 
 
All 30 Greenpeace activists participating the operation, including the Finnish activist, 
Sini Saarela, were detained by Russian Coast Guard and kept in prison for more than two 
months. Finnish as well as global media followed closely the events surrounding the 
imprisoned Greenpeace activist in Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of  two activists who 
were able to board the Russian vessel before they got detained. Saarinen was held in 
custody for over two months while Russian authorities pursued investigation around 
piracy charges for the activist. However, charges changed from piracy to hooliganism 
during November 2013 (Greenpeace International). Through Sini Saarela’s time in 
custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between environment and economic 
activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire Finland was following during 
the fall of 2013.  
 
In addition to the incidents mentioned above, the discussion on environment vs. 
economic benefits in the Arctic rose to the media headlines, when the Finnish Minister 
                                                
53 Arctic Finland-forum gathered 85 articles, news etc. press releases on the Arctic topics only during the fall months of 
2013, from August to December. 
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for State Ownership Steering Heidi Hautala resigned after a dispute between Arctia 
Shipping and Greenpeace in 2013. Hautala had blocked filing of complaints following 
two incidents in 2012, when Greenpeace protesters climbed aboard state-owned 
icebreakers in Helsinki. Hautala is a former chair of the Green League, Finnish 
environmental party, and media accused her supporting her own “green agenda” (i.e. 
Greenpeace’s agenda) over economic benefits of the state of Finland (Arctia Shipping) 
(44). YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, reported widely on the 
proceedings of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping–case. As a result of accusations, Minister 
Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on October 11th 2013, which accelerated 
debate over the moral behind state-owned ice breakers’ activities in the vulnerable Arctic 
region (49, 50, 58). Finnish MEP Sirpa Pietikäinen made an important comment on now 
being crucial point in Finland’s Arctic policy making in order to decide whether it wants 
to support the Arctic resource exploration or not (58).  
 
During the 2013 arguments on the both sides of the debate over economic benefits vs. 
environmental conservation got stronger than any other year in the 2000 before, and I 
argue that publicity that Greenpeace got with their Arctic Sunrise-attact made ‘the 
business-side of the Arctic’ fight even harder to get their arguments out to the 
conversations as well. Norway’s example was used to back up different argumentations 
on execution of Arctic business potential, which reflects Norway’s increased influence as 
role model to Finland’s Arctic  politics(52, 53, 54, 55).  
 
I argue that events of 2013 triggered significant Arctic conversations in Finland, which 
created new geopolitical imagination in of the Arctic in the understanding of the Finnish 
public. Critical understanding of geopolitical produced definitions of power, in this case 
who has the power to define the Arctic, can be studied exactly in geopolitical structures 
between actors such as nations states and NGO’s (Harle 2003, 38-39). Obviously 
environmental organization Greenpeace and Russian energy company define the Arctic 
very differently, but what was even more interesting finding from my data was that even 
different ministers of the same (Finnish) Government defined the Arctic very differently. 
Reviews and comments about Finland’s new Arctic strategy envisioned variety of the 
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perspectives Finnish ministers represent about the Arctic. Minister Niinistö emphasized 
the boundaries of the Arctic nature as a starting point for all activities in the Arctic (37), 
whereas minister Stubb commented the Arctic to be “first and foremost a huge business 
opportunity for Finland”(40). In terms of the content of the strategy Niinistö’s higlighted 
the iniative, supported by Greenpeace (56) to create protected maritime zone around the 
North Pole as one of the most important action points of the strategy (37).  Stubb instead 
praised the concrete business initiatives the strategy suggests (40). Business and political 
Arctic partnerships were high on Stubb’s agenda in his visit to Hammerfest, Norway 
(55). I argue that these divergent perspectives to the future of the Arctic diluted the boost 
that the new Arctic strategy could have had for Finland’s Arctic actions. Prime Minister 
Katainen’s comments in media also reflected his concerns about Finland’s Arctic role 
(46, 47) 
 
Arctic business opportunities indeed penetrated into Finnish discussions in 2013 after the 
release of the new Arctic strategy, which introduced more detailed visions for execution 
of Finland’s economic actions at the Arctic region, as well as after media storm around 
Arctia Shipping ice breakers and minister Hautala. Most significant change in the 
discussion of the Arctic business opportunities in Finland  was the vider range of actors 
who participated the conversation, as well as increased number of arguments for the 
Arctic railway connection. Better connections e.g to the Arctic Norway were used to 
argument for the benefits of the project (41).  
 
I argue that the AC’s Kiruna meeting was the most influential event to the dimension of 
international Arctic in Finnish Arctic discourse in 2013. I argue that in Kiruna the global 
governence in the Arctic took a huge leap forward, and lifted the Arctic affairs higher on 
the global political agenda (29,30). For Finland the delay in the schedule to reaffirm the 
Arctic Information Center’s location (28), as well the AC’s decision to postpone the 
acceptance of the EU’s bid for the observation status in the Council, were both 
geopolitical setbacks.  
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Science of the climate change and changing weather conditions got bit more voice in the 
data in 2013 compared to previous years, but it was overshadowed by the ice breakers’ 
and Arctic railway news. However IPCC’s report results that the climate change is, with 
95 % guarantee, caused by human activities, was a strong scientific to support the 
environmental conversation agenda in the Arctic. I argue that sort of an ‘Arctic media 
hype’ made room also for more scientific debates to rise on the headlines, because in 
2013 people in general had rising interest towards the Arctic (62). Biggest 
(environmental) political set back in the Arctic front for Finland was its neighbors low 
interest towards the BEAC’s ministerial meeting in Inari. From geopolitical perspective 
the low attendance in international Arctic meeting hosted by Finland reflected Finland’s 
place in the lonely periphery of Finland (again). 
 
From the basis of the selected data and analysis above I conclude that three (four) strong 
factors, which created the change in the Arctic discourse from 2011 to 2013. In 2012 and 
2013 Norway was mentioned frequently as ‘a good role model’ in the Arctic business 
functions, and Finnish political decision makers were eager to find Arctic partners for 
Finland from Norway. In addition in international Arctic, Finland identified itself as a 
strong supporter of the EU in the Arctic matters throughout the 2011-2013, but active 
discussions about the EU’s Arctic endeavors faded in 2013, after the EU was left without 
the final confirmation to join the AC as a permanent observer.  
 
From the basis of my data I name the polarization between the environmental and 
economic arguments as the most significant change in the Arctic discourse during the 
years from 2011 to 2013, and it got stronger towards 2013. The polarization was clearly 
shown in the media aftermath of minister Hautala’s resignation and Sini Saarela’s 
imprisonment. The supporter of the Arctic business framed e.g. utilization of the Finnish 
ice breaker in the Arctic as an economic necessity in order to strengthen Finland’s 
economic competitiveness in the global, and domestic markets. In the contrary, the 
environmentalist demanded a total ban on the Arctic resource exploitation and called for 
Finland’s moral responsibility on the fragile Arctic nature. As a third significant finding I 
conclude the Finnish Government representatives’ fragmented positions in the Arctic 
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policymaking in terms of supporting or objecting commercial activities in the Arctic. 
Fragmentation of the arguments was cleared to observe in the comments given after new 
Finnish Arctic strategy was published in the fall 2013. Though the new Arctic strategy 
assured Finland to be aiming for environmental sustainability in its future Arctic actions, 
the economic initiatives, e.g. the plans of the Arctic railway, were more frequently 
highlighted m in the public discussion and in the media during the fall 2013.   
8. Conclusions  
 
Naturally, for every aspect of Arctic discourse analyzed in this thesis I have left a dozen 
out. It can rightfully be argued that I have neglected e.g. the importance of the aboriginal 
population, latent domestic and global economic issues or the security consequences of 
climate change. I have however allowed my analysis to be guided by the chosen 
methodology, which focus on first and foremost collecting a wide selection of data on the 
selected case, and to locate causal mechanisms (connections) between the selected 
variables, which I choose due their ‘current nature’. Based on the findings presented in 
the analysis I conclude that chosen independent variables (environmental changes and 
economic prospects) had an impact on the dependent variable (the change in the Arctic 
discourse in Finland), and the intervening variable (international Arctic) brought some 
unexpected results out of the process. 
 
Process tracing analysis requires a huge collection of data, which in this thesis was 
collected only from the Finnish media outlets and other sources representing public and 
official ‘voice’ in Finland, the same method can create interesting new understanding of 
the Arctic discourse, when applied to a differentcase, e.g the Arctic discourse, which 
European Union is representing could be another interesting research topic to scrutinize. 
Though process tracing provided this thesis with a fresh methodological approach, it was 
also a challenge to find any drastic changes in the discourse, when the timeframe of this 
study covered only the past three years of the Arctic discussion in Finland. However, the 
timeframe of years 2011-2013 was chosen due to significant events in the Arctic politics, 
that happened during those years, and which paradoxically enough, were triggered by the 
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accelerated environmental changes in the Arctic, but appeared to strengthen the 
arguments supporting the business plans for the future of the Arctic. 
 
The change reflected in the Finnish Arctic discourse can be also seen in the change of the 
Arctic academic paradigm. As the chapter three in this thesis indicated conflict vs. 
cooperation  -paradigm have has been the dominant thematic umbrella in the Arctic IR 
until the recent years. However, scientific data on accelerating global warming on the 
polar areas combined with the diplomatic resolutions to territorial disputes, such as the 
Barents Sea Treaty, have pushed academic Arctic discussions further from the 
deterministic preconceptions of only two possible outcomes of the Arctic relations, 
conflict or cooperation, and towards a more complex analysis of unknown implications 
triggered by the environmental changes in the region (Sørensen 2013, 5-6). On the basis 
of my data analysis, I conclude that the developments in the Finnish Arctic discourse 
reflect similar changes that the international Arctic affairs is undergoing, as well as a shift 
in the paradigm of the Arctic IR from conflict vs. cooperation to environment vs. 
economy –debate. 
 
In this thesis I have presented that complex, political ‘ping pong-battle’ between the 
conflicting arguments of the Arctic Paradox define contemporary Arctic discourse in 
Finland, and even further, the economic arguments in the debate are becoming more 
frequent and stronger. Theoretical reason behind this thesis backs up the question why 
this change in the discourse actually matters, and it is based on the critical understanding 
of geopolitics. Critical understanding of geopolitics suggest that acts of politics, e.g. 
foreign policy strategies such as the Artic strategy and discussion around it, produce 
geopolitical spaces, which are always produced, and reproduced by someone in 
discourses. Discourses create geopolitical imagination of e.g. the Arctic as a geopolitical 
region, and change in the discourse envision change in imagination, and consequential it 
reflects a change in the politics (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 194-195). 
 
On the basis of the events influenced the Arctic discourse in Finland in 2011-2013, is still 
too early to make far-reaching conclusions of the change in the actual Finnish Arctic 
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politics, but this thesis concludes that change have already happened at the discursive 
level. At the time of writing this, in the spring 2014, writing of John Vidal, the 
Guardian’s environmental editor, already support my conclusion, that frequency of the 
economic-driven arguments to back up actions in the Arctic will increase. He argued 
“confidence that the Arctic will become economically important is seen in the rush of 
countries and companies to claim a stake” (Vidal 2014). As an example he mentions 
Russia’s urge to cash in the thawing temperatures in its Siberian cities. Remote cities in 
the Russian Arctic locate in a halfway point on the sea route between Europe and Chine – 
if the polar shipping route opens up because of climate change. In the same article 
Finnish Hannu Hallinen defined Finland’s current vision on the Arctic economic 
prospects: “Finland needs a new Nokia. The Arctic could be it" (Vidal 2014). 
 
I argue that the change in the Arctic discourse in Finland envisioned in this thesis is just 
the beginning, and the discourse requires academic up-to-date analysis again when the 
politics and the Arctic international relations proceed. Investigation of causal mechanism, 
between different variables, behind the Arctic discourse in Finland after e.g. 10 years 
from now will reveal new, most likely, unexpected connections. Nevertheless I hope this 
thesis can still that time contribute a snap shot of analysis of the discourse of its own 
time, from 2011 to 2013, which can serve as a relevant academic comparison and 
evaluation, how the discourse have change in 10 years from now.  
 
In terms of creating new, geopolitical understanding of the Arctic, I found it interesting to 
evaluate how much influence the official briefing paper and strategies, such as the first 
and the second Finnish Arctic strategies, compared to the events such as ‘Sini Saarela –
case’, which received vast publicity in media, have on the Arctic discourse formulation. 
In the data selection of this thesis I aimed to include as thoroughly as possible sources 
from formal and practical ‘producers’ of geopolitical knowledge in order to create a 
comprehensive picture of the Arctic discourse in Finland. In terms of the ‘media buzz’, 
which represents the public ‘voice’ about the Arctic in this thesis, unexpected events 
initiated by e.g. environmental NGOs, can have a huge effect on the Arctic debates in 
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Finland, which also the official representative of the Finnish government have to 
participate and take a stand on those issues. 
 
Although process tracing analysis is time-consuming and ‘heavy’ method to be used in 
master thesis research , it enabled me to create academically reasoned, up-to-date analysis 
on how the economic argument in the Arctic discourse in Finland have actually 
increased, which leaves the window open for the further research to be conducted, and 
new hypotheses to be created on what does this change actual implicate for the future 
years of the Finnish Arctic. The heating up of rhetoric (environment vs. economy) makes 
me argue that such an analysis as you have in your hands serves to strengthen the 
argument found in my hypotheses, and inspire to further studies on Arctic discourse in 
Finland. As I see it today, discussions around environmental and economic perspectives 
of the Arctic will accelerate in Finland, and globally, in the upcoming years, and well-
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